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This book is a gift to Roel Nieuwenkamp to pay tribute to his work on the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. He has spent many years pro-
moting responsible business conduct with governments, companies, non-gov-
ernmental organisations and trade unions. Initially in his capacity as Director 
of Trade Policies at the Ministry of Economic Affairs in the Netherlands and, 
since 2013, as the Chair of the OECD Working Party on Responsible Business 
Conduct. Five years later, as he steps down from his role as Chair, this Liber 
Amicorum compiles testimonies from academics close to him engaged in 
efforts to promote responsible business conduct.
Submissions from contributing authors address a number of themes: progres-
sive expansion of the scope and increasing scale of norms and practices of 
responsible business conduct (John Ruggie), focus on stakeholder-based gov-
ernance (Mervyn King), strengthening NCP roles and functional equivalence 
(Christine Kaufmann, Michael Addo, Larry Catá Backer, Maartje van Putten, 
Martijn Scheltema/Constance Kwant, Sander van ‘t Foort/Tineke Lambooy), 
stakeholder involvement (Ola Mestad), strengthening Pillar 3: ‘Access to 
Remedy’ (Joseph Wilde-Ramsing). Further perspectives offered are country- 
specific views on the United States (Lance Compa), China (Liang Xiaohui), India 
(Bimal Arora), the desired linkage with the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals (Teresa Fogelberg/Tim Mohin, Karin Buhmann, 
Rob van Tulder) and the academic grounding through the OECD Academic 
Network on Responsible Business Conduct (Raymond Saner).
Herman Mulder and Martijn Scheltema wrote the Synthesis and further perspec-
tives. All contributions solely represent the views of the respective authors.
FOREWORD
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Today the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines) are the leading instrument on responsible business conduct worldwide. This is evidenced by the growing commitment by business, governments, and also investors, consumers and society at large to 
the values underpinning the OECD Guidelines— fundamentally, that business 
should do good while doing no harm. In addition to growing awareness and 
uptake of the recommendations of the OECD Guidelines, the functioning of the 
National Contact Points (NCPs), the implementation mechanism of the OECD 
Guidelines, has also been strengthened. NCPs are increasingly making headlines 
for helping address issues related to the observance of the OECD Guidelines. 
Roel has played a crucial role in these developments. His strategic and tireless 
leadership has raised the visibility and prominence of the OECD Guidelines, and 
responsible business conduct more generally and globally. 
Roel’s connection with the OECD started in 2006, first as a delegate and later as 
a Bureau member of the Investment Committee. In this capacity, he contributed 
to preparing the ground for the most recent review of the OECD Guidelines 
and subsequently chaired the working group responsible for the review process. 
This two-year effort resulted in the adoption of the 2011 version of the OECD 
Guidelines, currently in force today. The review was ground-breaking for many 
reasons, but three elements in particular stand out: the addition of a chapter on 
human rights, the enhanced expectation of due diligence across the value chain 
and reinforced procedures for NCPs.
To better respond to the heightened expectations resulting from the 2011 
update, the Investment Committee created a new subsidiary body, the Working 
Party on Responsible Business Conduct. Roel was designated as the first Chair 
of the Working Party at its inaugural meeting in March 2013. However, Roel’s 
involvement, dedication and engagement to the responsible business conduct 
agenda has extended far beyond the traditional role of a Chair for an OECD 
body. In this respect, he has travelled the world to reach out and participate in 
events and initiatives to promote the OECD Guidelines and the NCP mech-
anism as the best available means to advance responsible business conduct. 
He has chaired numerous multi-stakeholder groups and consultations on 
responsible business conduct to ensure alignment with the OECD Guidelines. 
PREFACE BY ANGEL GURRÍA
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Roel has embraced preaching the RBC gospel through social media channels 
like Twitter, YouTube and LinkedIn to reach a broader audience. As he leaves his 
role as Chair, he leaves behind a legacy of blogs, academic articles and opinion 
pieces, in which he boldly champions a new, more meaningful understanding 
of responsible business conduct. Examples include proclaiming that “CSR is 
dead”, cautioning against “SDG washing” and “addressing the imbalance 
between investment protection and people protection”.
As Chair, Roel has demonstrated strong political leadership, strategic thinking 
and negotiation skills. His energy for discovering new frontiers and achieving 
pragmatic solutions has helped drive the RBC agenda forward. The emphasis 
and the support he gave to inclusive approaches has also been central to 
the success of his role as Chair, and truly reflected the spirit of the OECD 
Guidelines. He also showed a remarkable ability to build trust and confidence 
with governments, international organisations, business, trade unions, civil 
society, academics and other stakeholders, which has enabled him to break silos 
and build lasting partnerships. 
This book demonstrates the extent of his achievements and the high regard in 
which he is held by all who have worked with him as Chair. I would like to add 
my voice to this chorus of appreciation and good wishes and express my grat-
itude for his dedication and commitment to the OECD standards. I wish him 
all the best in his future endeavours knowing that, wherever his professional 
career may lead him, he will always be an inspiring ambassador for responsible 
business conduct and for the OECD Guidelines.   
 Angel Gurría,  
 Secretary-General, OECD
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Roel Nieuwenkamp is a so called ‘founding father’ of the work on responsible business conduct. First in his capacity as director Trade Policies at the Ministry of Economic Affairs in the Netherlands. Later as the Chair of the Working Party on Responsible Business 
Conduct at the OECD. 
Roel Nieuwenkamp acknowledged very soon the importance of the new DNA 
of global trade and investment: the international fragmentation of production 
and services in global and regional value chains as an important driver of glo-
balization. This process of fragmentation was an important driver for global 
trade and investment. 
We all know how important global trade and investment are for growth and 
employment. But today, global trade and investment is not only about growth 
and employment. It is also about human rights, labour and environmental 
progress. Therefore it is important that an international economic system of 
trade and investment is delivering for everyone. Not only on growth, but also 
on the social and environmental aspects of growth. And to make the interna-
tional trade and investment system work better, responsible business conduct 
in global and regional value chains is crucial. 
The private sector plays a vital role in those value chains, therefore it can also 
play a vital role in human, labour and environmental progress. Especially 
because many parts of these value chains are located in complex and/or con-
flict areas. It is for the private sector a challenge to do business in those areas. 
By acting in a responsible way, the private sector will contribute substantially 
to human rights and will have a positive impact on labour and environmental 
conditions. 
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines), the National 
Contact Points, the continued efforts to reinforce the effectiveness of the 
Guidelines and the outreach to non-OECD countries are very important steps 
in further strengthening responsible business conduct and to bring responsible 
and sustainable business to the heart of every business model.  
PREFACE BY MARTEN VAN DEN BERG
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Roel Nieuwenkamp played a leading role in the development and the imple-
mentation of the Guidelines. This Liber Amicorum is a wonderful tribute to 
the work of Roel Nieuwenkamp, to his never ending enthusiasm to convince 
governments, companies, non-governmental organizations and trade unions 
to participate in the process of responsible business conduct. But I hope that 
this Liber Amicorum is also an inspiration for everybody who is involved in 
responsible business conduct. The different contributions from so many dif-
ferent countries illustrate how Roel Nieuwenkamp was able to connect so 
many people from the globe to the agenda of responsible business conduct. 
This Liber Amicorum is part of the legacy of Roel Nieuwenkamp on respon-
sible business conduct to make the world a better and more responsible and 
sustainable place. 
 Marten van den Berg 
 Director-General Foreign Economic Relations,  
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  
 The Netherlands
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A TRIBUTE TO ROEL NIEUWENKAMP
Roel Nieuwenkamp wrote recently: “corporate responsibility as described in the OECD 
Guidelines is not optional, as more and more consequences are attached to non-compliance”. 
And: “the NCP glass is now half full, but the aim should be fill it to the top”
 Indeed, the evolution since 2011 of the application of the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines), in tandem with the 2011 United Nations Guiding 
Principles for Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), has been remarkable, with more con-
ceptual clarity and improving practice on responsible business conduct, also in the context of 
John Ruggie’s 3 Pillars for human rights: “Government duty to Protect, Business responsibility 
to Respect, and Access to Remedy”. Despite these positive developments, the practice and 
learnings, as reflected by the various chapters in this Liber, show that more needs to be done 
for responsible and sustainable business conduct to be the “natural thing” to do by business: 
inclusive, integrated, focused and with ambition.
 We are proud to present this “Liber Amicorum”, especially to Roel Nieuwenkamp, 
but also to all diverse interest-holders in responsible (and sustainable) business conduct. The 
Liber is a tribute to the impressive work Roel has done as moderator of the 2011 Update of the 
Guidelines and, subsequently, till mid-2018, as the Chair of the Working Party for Responsible 
Business Conduct (WPRBC). But it is definitely also an encouragement to all interest-holders, 
the OECD, the business and further global communities to “fill the glass to the top”. 
THE 2011 UPDATE AS A KEY INFLECTION POINT
The 2011 Update of the Guidelines has proven to be an important inflection point for defining the 
role of business in the context of a broad set of important societal themes. It not only clearly sets 
the stage and baseline for responsible and sustainable business conduct in the interest of society 
and of business itself, but it also, uniquely, introduced a combination of a new scope for respon-
sible business conduct  (due diligence in business’ value chains), an integrated approach with new 
emphasis on important issues (human rights aligned with the UNGPs, enhanced disclosure as 
driver of change), an inclusive approach with new partners (next to BIAC for business, TUAC 
for trade unions, also OECD Watch for NGOs),  a strengthened implementation regime through 
the National Contact Points (NCPs) and the creation of the Working Party on Responsible 
Business Conduct. 
 Moreover, while putting the Guidelines into practice, it offered the opportunity to 
deepen and broaden the understanding of business responsibility, clarifying underlying prin-
ciples by guidance papers (notably on general and sector-specific due diligence), strengthening 
the NCPs by advice and peer-learning and by active outreach, and the promotion with the 
(34) OECD Member States and the (14) Guidelines’ Adhering Countries, business sectors and 
possible future partner-countries.
n HERMAN MULDER AND MARTIJN SCHELTEMA
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AUTHORITATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS
The appreciation for what has been achieved by the WPRBC and its Secretariat under the lead-
ership of Roel Nieuwenkamp is reflected by the immediate enthusiasm of a diverse group of 
(academic) “Amici” to contribute to this Liber Amicorum and providing rich contributions on 
the learnings and achievements since 2011 and the expectations and promises for the future.
 Some of the themes addressed are not necessarily new, but the authoritative nature of 
each of the “Amici” should provide food for thought and, hopefully, immediate action, or later 
in a possible Update (in 2021?). The themes include: progressive expansion of the scope and 
increasing scale of norms and practices of responsible business conduct (John Ruggie), focus on 
stakeholder-based governance (Mervyn King), strengthening NCP roles and functional equiv-
alence (Christine Kaufmann, Michael Addo, Larry Catá Backer, Maartje van Putten, Martijn 
Scheltema/Constance Kwant, Sander van ‘t Foort/Tineke Lambooy), stakeholder involvement 
(Ola Mestad), strengthening Pillar 3: ‘Access to Remedy’ (Joseph Wilde-Ramsing). Further 
perspectives offered are country-specific views on the United States (Lance Compa), China 
(Liang Xiaohui), India (Bimal Arora), the desired linkage with the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals  (SDGs) (Teresa Fogelberg/Tim Mohin, Karin Buhmann, Rob van Tulder) 
and the academic grounding through the OECD Academic Network on Responsible Business 
Conduct (Raymond Saner). 
IMPORTANT THEMES FOR ATTENTION
More specifically, certain important themes in the space of business and society are not at all 
explicitly addressed in the 2011 Guidelines (such as climate change, land governance (inter alia 
Free prior and informed consent) (FPIC), biodiversity, animal welfare, “externalities”, data-col-
lection, privacy and artificial intelligence, as well as the role of government in connection with 
public procurement, contracting, investing, or not sufficiently (such as corporate governance, 
taxation, competition law, consumer interests). Due diligence by multinational enterprises in 
their value chains should pay particular attention to sourcing from, or other association with 
conflict zones and on human rights (including gender, children, minorities). Moreover, the 
learnings since 2011 offer opportunities to reinforce the effectiveness of the Guidelines through 
the NCPs (such as their stature, independence, governance, resources, its low-threshold, low 
cost, remedy-effective processes and procedures, own investigatory initiatives).
 These are not recommendations for a distant future. Some NCPs already consider 
climate change to be part of the spirit of the Guidelines; for example, the Dutch NCP has 
accepted a specific instance against a Dutch financial institution related to climate change. 
The same may apply to topics like artificial intelligence, which have a considerable impact 
on labour and human rights, as some artificial intelligence applications are reported to make 
discriminatory assessments. 
HERMAN MULDER AND MARTIJN SCHELTEMA n
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 As (effective) legislation on some of these responsible business topics may be remote, 
an immediate need (and opportunity) emerges to consider these themes in connection with the 
Guidelines. Working Groups have been successfully established to provide multi-stakeholder 
(due diligence) guidance, including due public consultation processes, in specific sectors, 
further working groups may be established to develop guidance on these specific themes.   
 Other themes may be strengthened and improved, such as strengthening Pillar 3 
on Remedy (soft law with -hard- consequences), not only by strengthening the NCP func-
tion itself, but also by other aspects such as: (better) aligning it with other dispute resolution 
mechanisms, providing credible and effective escalation mechanisms which provide (binding) 
dispute resolution between companies and affected individuals or communities, guidance on 
effective leverage in the value chain, improved disclosure, further sharpening “for whom it 
may concern”: beyond large international enterprises (smaller companies with vulnerable 
value chains, aided by advanced certification schemes);  policy coherence within the OECD: 
Common Approaches, corporate governance.
 Lastly, new developments, some of which were catalyzed by the Guidelines need to be 
considered: legislative initiatives (on ”duty of care”, due diligence, key issues such as modern 
slavery, child labour, gender/diversity, corporate reporting/disclosure), National Action Plans 
(on human rights and beyond), structured multi-stakeholder governance of the NCPs, better 
resourced NCPs for more promotion and in some specific cases room for possible clarifying 
field visits, further sector- or theme-specific guidance papers.
 Important is also to evaluate national legislation as well as international treaties and 
standards which are in conflict with the objectives of the Guidelines. For example, competi-
tion law may hamper collaborative initiatives (including exercising leverage in the value chain) 
by business, either or not with non-governmental organizations or governments, to enhance 
responsible business conduct in line with the societal interests and priorities. To date, little 
progress has been made to adapt competition law in this respect. In connection with this, 
transparency issues arise. Some responsible business initiatives require public reporting on 
business policies and progress. Especially if this reporting includes third parties (“business 
relationships”). For example, if banks would have to report also on the progress of their clients, 
confidentiality and competition issues may arise. To date, this is partly addressed by legislative 
reporting requirements, but it may be advisable to more broadly discuss the role transparency 
should have regarding responsible business conduct. Whereas new technologies such as block-
chain provide new inroads to transparency, this topic becomes even more salient. 
n HERMAN MULDER AND MARTIJN SCHELTEMA
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FURTHER DEEPENING AND BROADENING
Beyond that, the OECD may play a role to align and reinforce legislative initiatives on respon-
sible business conduct as well as to propose and discuss other (concerted) steps governments 
may take to enhance responsible business conduct, not only by strengthening National Action 
Plans but also through other means such as public procurement, tax incentives, subsidies, 
export credit insurance and reaching out to governments in developing countries to discuss 
issues in connection with responsible business conduct. 
 In connection with the foregoing, the global effectiveness of the Guidelines as a 
“do no harm” framework itself, as the most comprehensive contributor to “an international 
business level playing field”, would be enhanced if at least all G20 countries would become 
“adhering”, or fully aligned and “at the table”, and supporting the underlying principles, the 
dynamic learnings, through cooperation and coordination on material issues.
THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
The 2015-2030 SDGs have added an important new dimension to responsible (and sustainable) 
business conduct, hence also the Guidelines. The Guidelines are focusing on preventing, mit-
igating, reducing adverse impacts (“do no harm”) in their own value chain, while the SDGs 
offer a comprehensive, universal agenda to create a just and equitable (“doing good”) environ-
ment  “from us all, by us, for us all”, including by and for business.  In the Preface of the 2011 
Guidelines, paragraph 1 states: “The Guidelines aim to ensure that the operations of these enter-
prises are in harmony with government policies, to strengthen the basis of mutual confidence 
between enterprises and the societies in which they operate, to help improve the foreign direct 
investment climate and to enhance the contribution to sustainable development made by multi-
national enterprises”. In other words, the basis for linkage with the SDGs, as 
the universal, comprehensive agenda for inclusive sustainable development 
worldwide, is already implicitly in the 2011 Guidelines.
The agendas of “do no harm” (in the business value chain, per the 
Guidelines) and “doing good” (in society-at-large, per the SDGs) should 
reinforce each other. Issues such as workers’ exploitation are connected to 
poverty issues as minimum wages are often below the level of a living wage. As long as this 
situation continues, workers remain vulnerable and prone to irresponsible business practices. 
If SDG #1 to eradicate poverty is implemented and for example supports the raise of minimum 
wages to the level of living wages, this will enhance responsible business conduct and counter 
workers’ exploitation. 
HERMAN MULDER AND MARTIJN SCHELTEMA n
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 Thus, it would make sense to include the SDGs framework in the discussion on 
responsible business conduct as adopted in the Guidelines. Moreover, it may be hard to erad-
icate irresponsible business conduct if the SDGs are also not (at least in part) been achieved. 
In connection with this, currently adhering, and also not-yet-adhering governments, should 
realize that they have an important, proactive role to play in the achievement of the SDGs in 
connection with the promotion of responsible and sustainable business conduct as the SDGs 
cannot be achieved without business. 
MOVING FORWARD WITH AMBITION
The Guidelines have proven to be a key driver in “making markets fit for sustainable and 
responsible purpose”; the role of the NCPs has always been and still is beyond resolving a par-
ticular case. It offers the opportunity to “address accidental pain in the value chain for systemic 
gain”, offering learnings and commitments for real improvement in behavior to prevent, miti-
gate or at least reduce adverse impacts in the entire value chain. We do hope the Guidelines will 
maintain this function in future. By addressing the abovementioned topics, the Guidelines 
will keep their dynamic relevance and bringing about future improvement of business conduct 
in these areas is well conceivable then.
 The 2011 Updated Guidelines, led by the WPRBC, has accomplished much of its 
mission by its collaborative approach, constructive challenge, building multi-stakeholder 
trust: “we may move fast alone, but much farther together”. This is the social capital which 
Roel Nieuwenkamp has created and must be built on for “continuously better” in the interest 
of the long-term value creation by business and a just society. We, as “Amici”, thank Roel for 
his great contribution!
n HERMAN MULDER AND MARTIJN SCHELTEMA
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As recently as the late 1990s, “there was no recognition that companies had human rights responsibilities,” according to the director of business and human rights at Human Rights Watch.1  Today, that recognition has become increasingly embedded in the social, policy, and legal regulatory ecosystem within which global 
business operates. Of course, it is far from being universally acted upon even in societies where 
the recognition itself is relatively robust. “We didn’t take a broad enough view of what our 
responsibility is, and that was a huge mistake,” Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg conceded in 
the wake of the Cambridge Analytica fiasco, in which possibly as many as 87 million American 
users’ profile data was compromised and then weaponized in the 2016 United States presiden-
tial election.2   
 The concept of responsible business conduct has become a trademark of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The OECD issued the 
first version of its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines) in 1976, largely in 
response to an ultimately unsuccessful initiative by the so-called “Group of 77” developing 
countries to negotiate what they hoped would become a legally binding treaty governing the 
conduct of multinationals. In gaining international recognition of the corporate responsibility 
to respect human rights, the “watershed event,” as the Economist Intelligence Unit put it, was 
the endorsement by the United Nations Human Rights Council of the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) in June 2011.3 Shortly before, due to different 
scheduling, the OECD Council had already added a human rights chapter to the Guidelines, 
which by agreement among its stakeholders was drawn virtually verbatim from the UNGPs. 
Roel Nieuwenkamp, who headed the OECD drafting group revising the Guidelines, played a 
central role in that process, and subsequently he successfully advanced the agenda as chair of 
the OECD Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct. 
 A core challenge in the business and human rights space is increasing its scope 
and reaching scale. So let me briefly differentiate among three approaches to addressing this 
challenge, hoping thereby to inform future steps in a journey that has only recently begun. 
 The traditional human rights approach has been to try and subject the entire busi-
ness and human rights space to a comprehensive international treaty. In the latest iteration, 
led by Ecuador and South Africa, the elements of a draft treaty released in September 2017 
would have international human rights law trump other areas of international law, particularly 
trade and investment law.4 Such efforts have always been problematic on conceptual, legal, and 
political grounds, and it seems even less likely to succeed in the present international context. 
 The Guidelines approach differs. It combines the legal obligations of adhering 
governments to promote the Guidelines, and to establish a national complaints mechanism 
(National Contact Points, or NCPs) with the authority to hear complaints about “their” mul-
tinationals wherever they may operate. That is coupled with voluntary recommendations 
by the governments to multinationals as to the terms of responsible business conduct in 
different operating contexts and industry sectors. The 2011 Guidelines and the subsequent 
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guidance documents expanded the Guidelines’ scope. Greater scale has been reached because 
the number of adhering countries now numbers 48, including such non-member states as 
Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Latvia, Lithuania, Morocco, Peru and Romania. One important 
development in the complaints system is that some NCPs have begun to recommend penalties 
on companies for non-compliance by withdrawing various forms of public support from them, 
such as export credits, investment guarantees, and trade missions.5  
 The UNGPs are complementary but were designed to reflect yet a third model. 
They seek to populate the business and human rights space with a mix of voluntary and man-
datory standards and procedures, national and international, as well as with a greater diversity 
of key social actors that have not been previously engaged. The theory is that this has the best 
chance to drive a cumulative process of embedding human rights-related business conduct in 
a transnational ecosystem of mutually reinforcing expectations and rules. Let me elaborate. 
 Governments endorsed the UNGPs. Some 40 have developed or are developing 
national action plans for their implementation. Companies draw on the UNGPs, particu-
larly the human rights due diligence process and grievance mechanisms they provide, and a 
growing number use the UNGPs’ reporting framework created by Shift, the non-profit center 
of excellence for the UNGPs established by members of my former UN team. Workers organi-
zations and NGOs use the UNGPs as an advocacy tool, affected individuals and communities 
as a basis on which to seek remedy. Other international standard setting bodies with a role in 
the business and human rights space have replicated or drawn upon the UNGPs within their 
own operations. We might refer to these developments as the first level of scope and scale 
expansion.
 The next level comprises new national and regional legal developments that refer-
ence the UNGPs, including legislation to combat modern day slavery, child labor protections, 
the French Due Vigilance law, expanding non-financial disclosure requirements, and in the 
case of Canada the terms of reference for the first national ombudsperson with the authority to 
compel documentation and testimony from Canadian companies alleged to have committed 
human rights violations in their overseas operations. 
 Moving away from the world of officialdom, the UNGPs have made some inroads in 
the world of corporate legal practice. Several national and sub-national bar associations have 
endorsed the UNGPs. The International Bar Association has issued guidance as to what the 
UNGPs mean and entail for the practice of corporate lawyers and law firms, as businesses in 
their own right.6 A survey of 275 senior-in-house counsel across an array of industries found 
that in nearly 60 percent of the responding firms responsibility for human rights issues now 
resides in legal and compliance departments, with just 19 percent in corporate social responsi-
bility departments.7  
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When it comes to global scale, there is nothing quite like football, the world’s most popular sport. FIFA, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association, is the sport’s global governing body. It has a presence in 209 countries and territories, and is the organizer of the world largest single sports tournament, 
the Men’s World Cup. The UNGPs have found their way into this sporting and cultural phe-
nomenon. In addition to bribery and corruption scandals, FIFA also faced enormous pressure 
from NGOs and sponsors due to serious human rights abuses in the preparations for the 2018 
World Cup in Russia and even more so the 2022 World Cup in Qatar. An international labor 
federation brought a complaint against FIFA to the Swiss NCP. FIFA asked me for assistance. 
Under the auspices of Harvard University, I worked with Shift to advise FIFA. We presented a 
public report and recommendations in April 2016.8 In rough order, the following changes have 
taken place since: FIFA amended its statutes to include an article committing it to respect all 
internationally recognized rights; it adopted a human rights policy in line with the UNGPs; 
it appointed a Human Rights Advisory Council, including representation from Shift, the 
International Labour Organization, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Human Rights Watch, the Players Association, and the International Federation of Building 
and Woodworkers, which had brought the complaint against FIFA. Human rights provisions 
were included in the bidding requirements for the Men’s World Cup, and the two bids for 
2026 (US-Canada-Mexico and Morocco) include an entire chapter on the subject. For its part, 
Qatar has pledged to dismantle the kafala system of labor control, which amounted to a form 
of bonded labor for foreign workers, beginning with the abolition of and back-payments for 
workers’ recruitment fees. Finally, the Players Union has adopted a Players’ Declaration of 
Human Rights, also referencing the UNGPs and our FIFA report.  These developments do not 
only FIFA, related businesses, players, and FIFA’s national associations and regional confed-
erations. They also loop back to host governments, which are now required to support FIFA’s 
human rights commitments for the purposes (and duration) of the Cup.  
 The theory of change reflected in the UNGPs is a dynamic process whereby 
movement by one part provides opportunities for (or the courage of) other parts to move, in 
a progressive expansion of scope and increasing scale of norms and practices of responsible 
business conduct in relation to human rights. The Guidelines are a complementary component 
of this dynamic. For international legal instruments to contribute to this evolution, they would 
have to be narrowly targeted on reinforcing specific elements or closing specific gaps, not aim 
to swallow up the entire space in one gulp. 
 There are always many impediments to achieving progress on business and 
human rights. But there are also opportunities. Opportunities reveal themselves more clearly - 
and may even be created - by looking at this space through appropriate lenses, which see the 
world as it is while enhancing our vision of what it can become. Roel Nieuwenkamp has the 
prescription for those lenses. 
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T he OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines) are recommenda-tions addressed by governments to multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in or from adhering countries. They are non-binding principles to hopefully create responsible business conduct which governments have committed to promoting. 
The Guidelines are implemented through the mechanism of National Contact Points (NCPs), 
which are agencies established by adhering governments to implement the Guidelines. The 
responsible business conduct referred to in the Guidelines includes adherence to human rights, 
responsible supply chain management, corruption, taxation policy and sustainable develop-
ment. It also embraces the practice and upholding of good corporate governance principles.
 MNEs are also asked to ensure that timely and accurate information is disclosed 
on all material matters regarding an organisation’s activities. In the Guidelines it is stated that 
disclosure by MNEs should result in stakeholders having an improved understanding of the 
operations of MNEs. The aim is to improve the public understanding of enterprises and their 
interaction with society and the environment. There is a special chapter heading on human 
rights acknowledging that while states have the duty to protect human rights, enterprises 
should respect human rights, which means that MNEs should address adverse human rights 
impacts arising from their business models.
 Similarly, there is a chapter on the environment and MNEs are called upon to estab-
lish and maintain a system of environmental management appropriate to their enterprise 
including the collection and evaluation of adequate and timely information regarding the 
environmental health and safety impacts of their activities.
 The question is posed as to whether the Guidelines have achieved their purpose. It 
is difficult to measure such achievement because of the different laws in different jurisdictions 
and the overall effect of other guidelines involving good governance, disclosure, strategy and 
reporting.
 The question can also be posed: has there been alignment with other relevant (inter)
national frameworks? In this regard the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) has 
recognised that there are competing guidelines and standard setters in the world, which have 
created an alphabet soup of acronyms and also clutter. The latter word is used because there is 
an overlap of standards and guidelines between these international bodies. For example, for 
years there has been an endeavour by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
and the Financial Accounting Standards Board of America (FASB) to converge the United 
States’ Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and the International Financial Reporting 
Standards created by the board of trustees under the auspices of the IASB. To this end the 
IIRC has created the Corporate Reporting Dialogue where the FASB and the IASB, the Global 
Reporting Initiative and the Sustainability Accountancy Standards Board of America meet 
and have drawn up a landscape map which indicates the overlapping. They are now in deep 
discussion on trying to formulate a common definition of materiality.
 What are the perspectives for a possible future review of the Guidelines to make 
them more effective for sustainable development and the protection of human rights? 
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 The concept of sustainable development is the opposite of unsustainable develop-
ment. From the middle of the 19th century when the concept of the limited liability company 
was established, the equity capital granted to companies was by wealthy families. Members of 
those wealthy families also became directors of the company. It was almost a natural conse-
quence that other stakeholders regarded them as the owners of the company.
 This primacy of the shareholder was underscored in the famous corporate case of the 
Ford Motor Company and the Dodge Brothers. The Ford Motor Company had made excessive 
profits and it decided to increase the wages of its employees to encourage them to work longer 
hours to meet the demand for the company’s product, the Model T Ford. The Dodge Brothers, 
a minority shareholder, contended that the shareholder is the primary stakeholder and with 
this primacy, the excess profit should be declared as a special dividend to shareholders before 
increasing the wages of the employees. A court granted a declarator in favour of the conten-
tions of the Dodge Brothers.
 This concept of the primacy of the shareholders and that directors should focus on 
the maximisation of shareholder wealth was underscored by the Nobel laureate economist, 
Milton Friedman, who said words to the effect that the sole purpose of the company is to make 
profit without deception. The question needs to be asked, at any cost? This shareholder centric 
governance model was at a cost to society and the environment right through the 20th century.
 The success of a company was determined by its increasing monetary bottom line, 
increasing share price and increasing payment of dividends. That company, however, may 
have had a business model which resulted in a breach of human rights and unsustainable 
development.
 For example, the dye house of a textile company uses toxic chemicals to dye fabrics 
and once it has been used together with water and steam the waste goes into a vat. The toxins 
should be treated by chemical processes and removed from the water before the valve to the vat 
is opened and the water runs down gulleys into rivers. By qualified chemists not treating this 
toxic waste, the expenditure of the dye house would diminish, the bottom line profit of the dye 
house would increase, but those toxins in the river would kill fish below the blue line and have 
an adverse impact on plant life along the river. Further, that toxified river water would be used 
by a local authority for use of residents in the local authority area. The local authority would 
have to spend more money to treat that water to remove the toxins before placing the water into 
the infrastructure of the town concerned.
 It will be seen from this example that the increased profit of the dye house would 
have been at a cost to society and the environment. This, in my judgment, was the “free” part 
of the free economy. 
In a future review of the Guidelines, it must be accepted that we cannot continue with the same 
corporate toolbox we used even as late as into the 21st century when many of these problems 
and challenges were created. Because of the shareholder centric governance model of acting 
in the best interests of the shareholders, lawful wrongs were committed. This oxymoron is 
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because directors were acting lawfully in making decisions in the best interests of the general 
body of shareholders, even if it resulted in the company having a negative impact on two of the 
three critical dimensions for sustainable development, namely adverse impacts on society and 
the environment. As stated in the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals of April 
2015, organisations in order to achieve sustainable development by 2030 must have a business 
model that results in positive impacts on the three critical dimensions for sustainable develop-
ment, which are integrated, namely the economy, society and the environment.
 There is a revolutionary immensity in the vision of integrated thinking resulting 
in a business model that embraces sustainability issues pertinent to the business of the MNE, 
with positive impacts on the three dimensions of sustainable development. It has the outcome 
of dealing with lawful wrongs at their source, in the boardroom, and meeting the outraged 
conscience of the world to corporate profit subsidized by society and the environment.
When Pacioli in the 15th century recorded the double entry bookkeeping system of the 
Merchants of Venice he created the foundation of accountancy as we know it today. But that 
was purely financial. What is needed is a multi-capital approach to reflect value creation in a 
knowledge-based naturally resource constrained world. Integrated thinking and drafting an 
integrated report matches double entry bookkeeping for its global applicability and its reso-
nance to the needs of today’s business and society.
The Guidelines have done an enormously good job in drawing the attention of the collective mind of a MNE’s board to the importance for responsible business, in other words, sustainable development, focusing on human rights, the environment, transparent disclosure, combating bribery, inequitable corporate tax policies and 
stakeholder relationships.
 The Guidelines, however, have not been structured to deal with the outcomes or impacts 
of an MNE’s business model. In a revision of the Guidelines, thought should be given to guide all 
MNEs to deal with any adverse outcomes or impacts on the issues raised in the Guidelines at their 
source. In other words, at the time of the board creating the MNE’s business model. 
 The error of regulators has been to deal with adverse impacts on the three critical 
dimensions of sustainable development rather than dealing with a shareholder centric gov-
ernance model. MNEs have complied, but it has increased the per unit cost of production. 
The regulators are the representatives of society, but society has carried the financial burden of 
paying more for the product.
 In any revision of the Guidelines, the OECD should focus on the governance models 
of MNEs. It should be a company centric model moving away from the shareholder centric 
model. MNEs should be guided to focus on the long term health of their enterprises rather 
than maximisation of shareholder wealth, which will be in the long term better interests of all 
their stakeholders including their shareholders. 
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BETTER POLICIES FOR BETTER LIVES –ARE WE THERE YET?
In 2011, the 50th anniversary of the OECD provided the opportunity to revive the organisa-
tion’s original mandate with the catchy slogan “Better Policies for Better Lives”.2 
 What did this mean for the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises? Roel 
Nieuwenkamp recently characterized its 2011 version as the Paris Agreement for Responsible 
Business Conduct. This contribution will, amongst others, focus on the newly designed 
concept of corporate due diligence as a key element of the 2011 revision and its consequences 
for the overall content of the Guidelines and the system of National Contact Points (NCPs). 
 With the creation of a new fully fledged Human Rights Chapter in 2011 to accom-
modate the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), the Guidelines 
induced a shift in paradigm by opening their focus from investors’ and economic perspectives 
to the people whose rights might be infringed. Accordingly, “risks” include not only investors’ 
and corporate risks but also the risks for rights-holders on the ground. The result is a sub-
stantial expansion of the Guidelines’ scope in two regards: First, they now cover all business 
activities regardless of an investment nexus. Second, as in the UNGPs, the new concept of 
risk-driven corporate due diligence applies to the whole supply chain because all suppliers’ 
actions may have adverse impacts. Importantly – and often overlooked – according to the 
Guidelines General Policies (para. A.10) this newly defined due diligence applies not only to 
the new human rights chapter but to all chapters of the Guidelines except for the ones on 
science and technology, on competition and on taxation3. 
 Finally, strengthening the NCP system as the Guidelines’ grievance mechanism is 
a prerequisite for these conceptual changes to become effective in the real world – a finding 
which was confirmed by the G7 leaders at their 2015 summit4.
 So, where are we now? The number of submitted specific instances since the 2011 
revision and the fact that more than 50% of them referred to the new human rights chapter 
shows that the revision has quickly gained momentum and the interest in the Guidelines as the 
only government-backed instrument for responsible business conduct with a built-in non-ju-
dicial grievance mechanism is as high as never before5. But, apart from numbers, does the 
revision live up to the substantial expectations it raised? Critics of the NCP system regularly 
address institutional and procedural issues. Institutionally, NCPs come in different shapes 
and sizes, some act as independent bodies (e.g. in Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway), 
others (the majority) are based in one or more departments of the government, sometimes 
following an interagency model (e.g. Canada, Germany, Switzerland, UK, US). Depending 
on the institutional set-up, stakeholders are included with different mandates as regular indi-
vidual members of the NCP (Netherlands, Denmark, Norway); in a tripartite model for a min-
istry-based NCP (France), or as members of an advisory or steering board (such as UK, US, 
Switzerland). The extent to which stakeholders are included in the NCPs’ decision making and 
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in specific instances procedures depends on the NCP. This institutional variety is reflected in 
equally diverse procedural guidelines, for instance regarding transparency, a potential adjudi-
catory role of the NCP or the possibility to appeal its findings. Some NCPs even have a mandate 
to become active themselves either by launching cases independently from a submitted com-
plaint (Denmark, Netherlands) or by initiating topical discussions (France). Operationally, the 
Guidelines do not provide a uniform monitoring or follow-up scheme to secure compliance 
with NCP proceedings. 
 As a result, the NCP landscape is highly fragmented which leads to particular chal-
lenges when a submission relates to different NCPs because companies from different adhering 
countries are involved. The Guidelines only call on the respective NCPs to coordinate among 
themselves but do not provide detailed criteria. 
 With the incorporation of the UNGPs, the question of remedy has become more 
pertinent. However, at this stage, the Guidelines do not foresee an obligation for financial 
compensation or assistance for submitting parties. Indeed, in terms of financial compensa-
tion, remedy is still rare. This leads to the monitoring and enforcement of NCP procedures. 
Most NCPs do currently not have the mandate to require corporate participation in specific 
instances procedures nor can they enforce their findings or sanction non-compliance. Some 
NCPs have however undertaken first steps in this direction: for instance in Canada, the 
non-compliance with or non-participation in NCP procedures can result in the withdrawal 
of government support for export activities. Similarly, several recent National Action Plans 
(NAPs) for the implementation of the UNGPs combine governments’ (soft) expectation of 
responsible business behaviour with tangible (hard) consequences. 
 In sum, despite substantial progress the intended change in paradigm to better 
include victims and provide them with remedy has not yet been fully implemented on the 
ground and coherence remains an issue. 
POLICY COHERENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS: ARE ALL ROADS LEADING TO ROME?
The myriad of standards on responsible business conduct share one common feature: criteria 
for corporate due diligence. Coherence among different standards as well as within the dif-
ferent chapters of the Guidelines is crucial for effectively implementing responsible business 
conduct on the ground. Within the OECD, two avenues have been pursued to further specify 
due diligence criteria and align existing standards: sector-specific due diligence guidance and 
good practices papers have been developed for the minerals, agriculture, garment and footwear 
supply chains, the extractive and the financial sector. In addition, a cross-cutting general due 
diligence guidance for responsible business conduct will be launched in June 2018. It applies 
to all chapters of the Guidelines except those on Science and Technology, Competition and 
Taxation6. The sector-specific and the general guidance were developed in a multistakeholder 
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process and contain general references to other international instruments. They aim at pro-
moting a common understanding amongst governments and stakeholders on due diligence for 
responsible business conduct and thereby at fostering coherence.   
 While the importance of coherent standards for businesses is widely acknowl-
edged there is less awareness for NCPs’ challenges in assessing whether a specific standard 
that a party refers to is in line with the OECD Guidelines. A current example is a specific 
instance submitted by an Indonesian NGO to the Swiss NCP arguing that the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) violates the Guidelines. Should the Swiss NCP accept the case, 
the question of the compatibility of the RSPO rules with the Guidelines may arise. 
 At the national level, NAPs play a particularly important role in aligning existing 
standards for responsible business conduct. So far, all 19 countries that have published a NAP 
are either OECD members7 or adhere to the Guidelines8 and with the exception of Lithuania, 
they all mention the Guidelines and the NCP system9. 
 Despite different conceptual approaches10, due diligence is the main anchor point for 
fostering coherence in NAPs. Several such as the German NAP11contain a review process to 
monitor business compliance with due diligence requirements. Others have already introduced 
(France12 and UK13) or are discussing (Australia, Canada, Netherlands14, and Switzerland15) 
binding provisions on due diligence. All these initiatives for hardening soft law are driven by 
states’ and stakeholders’ common interests to specify coherent rules of the game which can 
be operationalised by business and trigger clearly defined consequences. Conceptually, they 
are in line with the Guidelines because they translate the existing binding state obligation in 
the Decision of the OECD Council on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises into 
specific, now legally binding requirements for business. \
PERSPECTIVES FOR THE FUTURE: IS BETTER GOOD ENOUGH? 
Although substantial progress in fostering responsible business conduct was achieved over the 
last seven years further work is needed to implement two elements of the 2011 Revision which 
are key for the long term credibility of the Guidelines. 
 First, the application of supply chain-wide corporate due diligence beyond the 
human rights chapter is still in its infancy. In this context, the Dutch NCP is currently consid-
ering a submission by a group of NGOs asking for a review of ING Bank’s disclosure policy 
on its and its clients’ carbon emissions and the publication of a target limit for such emissions 
in accordance with the Paris Climate Agreement. Hence, the Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change (PACC) is not reflected in the Guidelines and there is currently no internationally 
agreed guidance or standard on what is expected from a financial institution with regard to 
climate-change specific due diligence and the related disclosure. As a result, the Guidelines 
hardly answer some of the pertinent questions that an NCP may be faced in such a context. 
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 While the Guidelines are a living instrument, which leaves NCPs and eventually 
the Investment Committee16 with some leeway for their interpretation, milestones such as the 
PACC will need to be adequately incorporated with the next revision. In addition, substantive 
efforts are necessary to operationalise risk-based due diligence in all matters covered by the 
Guidelines that are related to adverse impacts. So far, these due diligence requirements did not 
apply to the Chapters on Science and Technology, Competition and Taxation17. This finding 
will however have to be revisited given recent international developments. For the Science 
and Technology Chapter new regulatory developments, for example on intellectual property 
and access to medicine, will be relevant. For the Chapter on Taxation it needs to be assessed 
whether a consensus has emerged from recent discussions on tax avoidance and illicit flows. 
Potentially relevant work to be evaluated for consideration has been done for instance by the 
OECD/G2018, the Financial Actions Task Force , by several UN bodies19, and in the context of 
Target 16.4 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
 Ideally, such an update of substantial criteria for due diligence would go hand in 
hand with the discussion of tools for states on how to monitor compliance with due diligence. 
What could be relevant indicators? Are there examples from member and adhering countries 
that could serve as a first step to define best practices? 
 A second focus for the future will be the NCP system. It raised high expectations and 
one can discuss at length whether the glass is half full or half empty. As a matter of fact the 
expectations have so far only partially been fulfilled. The NCP system as it currently stands 
can – by design – not fulfil all the requirements for effective, state-based non-judicial remedies 
according to the UNGPs. 
 Institutionally, coordination in cases where several NCPs are involved could be 
improved by defining clearer procedures for coordination. This will trigger the related ques-
tion to what extent NCP procedures may be further aligned with a view to levelling the playing 
field. Elements to be considered include the transparency of proceedings and the publication 
of initial assessments and final statements. An exchange among member states and adhering 
countries on the consequences of non-participation and/or non-compliance with NCPs’ pro-
cedures could assist in identifying best practices for fostering the Guidelines’ effectiveness.  
 Last but not least, as already George Marshall noted in his seminal speech in 1947, we 
need to know what the reactions of the people are. Do businesses know about the Guidelines? 
The Dutch20, Danish, Norwegian21 and most recently the Swiss NCP as well as BIAC22 con-
ducted surveys to obtain a clearer picture. Despite their different methodologies, all these 
studies conclude that the Guidelines are not that well known, particularly among small and 
medium sized enterprises. The Swiss survey showed that the topics covered by the Guidelines 
are recognised by the majority of business but rather addressed under the umbrella of the much 
better known SDGs. One of the explanations offered is that the SDGs would pursue a more 
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positive, future and outcome-oriented approach than the Guidelines which were perceived 
as an instrument for sanctioning past behaviour. Obviously, such a conclusion overlooks the 
fundamentally different nature of the Guidelines as a business-oriented set of rules with a 
fully-fledged non-judicial grievance mechanism and the SDGs as a more programmatic policy 
instrument. It seems therefore clear from all the surveys that the promotion of the Guidelines 
needs to be intensified. Since almost all NAPs mention the Guidelines their implementation 
offers a window of opportunity for promoting the Guidelines. 
In conclusion, policies for responsible business conduct have substantially improved with the 
2011 revision of the Guidelines. Thus, it seems safe to say that most of the equation’s policy 
part has reached its objective; we do have better policies in place. However, these policies have 
not yet completely reached the rights-holders on the ground. This is where we should focus on 
now: Bringing better policies to life. 
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INTRODUCTION
The OECD is today acknowledged to be one of the leading institutions, alongside the United 
Nations (UN), the European Union and the Council of Europe with a clear commitment for 
responsible business conduct (RBC).  As this has not always been the case, it is useful to explore 
some of the key turning points and actors without whom this transformation would not have 
been possible.  The essay will focus on the significance of the elaboration and provision of mate-
rial content for RBC concepts and principles – the so-called unpacking of ideas and principles 
– under the guidance of the Working Party on RBC and its iconic Chair, Roel Nieuwenkamp.
 Up until 2011, the approach of the OECD to RBC was a defensive and rhetorical one 
as reflected in the earlier iterations of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(Guidelines) alongside the failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment.  This character and 
reputation of the OECD is similarly confirmed by its members’ reaction to the proposal in the 
1980s for the UN for a Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, which reaction, some 
scholars have suggested, provided the initial motivation for the original Guidelines in 1976. 
With the benefit of time, knowledge and good leadership, this rather unfortunate reputation 
has been transformed to the attractive and, one may argue sustainable role carved for the 
OECD today.  
 The difference since 2011 came with the adjustment of value emphasis from free 
market economic vision to one based on the humanization of the global economy.  The change 
was motivated by a variety of factors including the lessons from the increasing integration 
of world economies and the policy consensus hatched by the UN under the Global Compact 
and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).  Indeed, the major 
milestone in this respect is marked by the adoption of the fifth iteration of the Guidelines in 
2011 in which corporate respect for human rights became a primary policy objective.
MAKING RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT OECD-RELEVANT
As with many policy instruments, the Guidelines, including the 2011 revisions, set out broad 
concepts and general ambitions and expectations that require practical operationalisation. 
These broad ambitions and concepts need to be operationalised into practice and this is the 
point at which the contribution of the Working Party on RBC represents an important turning 
point in the role of the OECD.  This is especially true because the RBC platform for the oper-
ationalization of the Guidelines represented an entirely nouvelle approach to the conduct of 
business for which internal policy coherence was critical.  Communicating the value and sig-
nificance of RBC within an organisation with a track record of representing and engaging with 
business in an entirely different way is a challenge in itself. Under the stewardship of its Chair, 
the Working Party transformed the profile and place of RBC from a peripheral matter into a 
central theme in the work of the OECD. 
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 The credibility of the RBC strategy at the OECD rested on its alignment with other 
international initiatives such as the Global Compact and the UNGPs.  In this respect, the struc-
tural and practical robustness of the OECD approach to the subject which the Working Party 
had crafted has been useful but it is the outreach to partners such as the UN Working Group 
on Business and Human Rights, the European Union institutions, the Council of Europe, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Organisation of American States that helped 
to embed the OECD’s RBC message in the activities of partner institutions.  The effort and 
the success to establish such important partnerships has been the responsibility of the Chair 
of the Working Party who has travelled far and wide and participated in numerous meetings, 
workshops, conferences and forums to share the new OECD vision on RBC.
UNPACKING 
Whilst working to ensure policy coherence within the OECD as well as normative alignment 
with external partners, the Working Party has remained committed to its core mandate to 
operationalise its vision and strategy for RBC and for this it has kept a tight focus on the 
needs and expectations of its primary constituency, the member states.  This is especially 
important because the member states in turn have responsibilities to local constituencies, in 
particular, multinational enterprises (MNEs).  Keeping faith with its core mandate helped to 
define another important milestone in its effort to operationalize the general RBC standards 
by elaborating guidance of necessary actions for MNEs that seek to operate responsibly.  
 The Working Party made a firm determination that due diligence is a key concept in 
the effective operationalization of the RBC standards flowing from the Guidelines and so it set 
about to unpack this concept.  This is particularly useful also because the decision responds 
to a clamour from stakeholders for guidance on the expanded meanings of these terms as set 
out within the RBC framework.  The concept of due diligence as part of RBC faced a difficult 
challenge of looking beyond the traditional understanding of risks to business enterprise and 
also taking account of risks, dangers and challenges to other stakeholders including vulnerable 
groups.  Due diligence in this context was therefore as much a benefit as it is a challenge to 
the enterprise itself.  It acknowledges the underlying ides for RBC discourse that the business 
enterprise itself can be a source of adverse impacts that need to be taken into account in the due 
diligence assessment.  This entirely new representation of due diligence needed to be commu-
nicated effectively and convincingly if it was to be accepted by the constituents of the OECD.  
 In addition, there is further value in pressing for this wider understanding of due 
diligence because it is the only way to align the policies and strategies of the OECD with the 
emerging common understanding of the concept as it also appears in other international 
standards such as the UNGPs. This way, the business enterprises called upon to implement 
RBC standards in different contexts will have a consistent and unified task.  Furthermore, the 
unpacking of the due diligence standard will contribute to levelling the business playing field.
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 The question arising from this decision to focus on due diligence as a starting point 
for the operationalization of the RBC standards by the Working Party took a nuanced and 
pragmatic understanding of the reality of modern business as delivered through supply chains. 
The Working Party further reflected on the importance of appreciating the differences in the 
expectations among different sectors and so proceeded with sector-specific supply chain due 
diligence guidance.  The choice of emphasis was, no doubt, influenced by events in the global 
business environments such as Rana Plaza and the trading in conflict minerals.  The Due 
Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains in the Garment and Footwear sector, the 
Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected 
and High-Risk Areas emerged from this process of unpacking the concept.  Other Guidance 
such as the Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains, developed in partnership 
with the Food and Agricultural Organization follow the same rationale.
 The value of these due diligence guidances lies beyond the unpacking of their 
meaning and practical implications for business enterprises alone because they contribute to 
their legal and social significance as well.  Three dimensions of tangible value come to mind 
in this respect.  Firstly, the National Contact Points (NCPs) established to oversee the imple-
mentation of the Guidelines benefit from the interpretation reference point by which to assess 
the compliance of enterprises with their responsibilities.  The interpretative guide that the 
elaboration of standards provides will help to ground the reasoning of the NCPs’ decisions in 
clear and predictable arguments.  This should in turn uplift the credibility and respect for the 
NCP system.  As a source of remedy as envisaged in the UNGPs and similar instruments, the 
profile of the NCPs has been enhanced considerably on account of the vision and activities of 
the Working Party, especially with the introduction of the peer review system introduced at 
the behest of its Chair and on the recommendation of the Working Party.
 Secondly, it is arguable that the core business enterprise constituency of the OECD 
makes the emphasis on due diligence predictable but there is more to RBC than due diligence 
and the Working Party has been acutely aware of this.  In response, its Chair has guided the 
attention of interrelated significance of other aspects of RBC including access to remedy and 
National Action Plans (NAPs) with due diligence.  Concerning NAPs, the Chair of the Working 
Party personally (but on behalf of the Working Party) initiated regular review workshops in 
collaboration with the UN Working Group, on the margins of the RBC Annual Conference to 
bring together government representatives, including the drafters and implementers of NAPs 
in the OECD member countries to share their experiences and lessons on the subject.  Beyond 
the support and assurances that this provided the participants, the regular meetings enabled 
participants to join in the wider RBC conversation of the Annual Conference and so help 
mould and communicate the vision of the Working Party of the contribution of the OECD 
to the field.  In this sense to emphasise the relationship between the OECD flagship of due 
diligence and the states’ NAPs.  From the perspective of the UN Working Group on Business 
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and Human Rights, the opportunity to co-convene and co-chair the annual NAPs meetings 
was especially valuable because of the evidence of progress it helped to gather and also to get 
a realistic understanding of what it takes, in practice, to develop and implement a NAP.  More 
recently, the door to these OECD NAPs review meetings has been opened for non-OECD gov-
ernment representatives.
 Finally, the project to unpack the concepts in the Guidelines has been a source of 
inspiration to international actors to complement or follow the work of the OECD towards a 
level playing field for all stakeholders.
INSPIRATION
In the spirit of institutional alignment with the objective of achieving a level playing field, 
the OECD strategy of unpacking the RBC concepts has inspired other international mech-
anisms to follow the practice of the OECD.  The UN Working Group on Human Rights has 
embarked on the unpacking of the UNGPs using its thematic reports and the development 
of Guidance for States and other stakeholders.  In this respect, the UN Working Group has 
developed Guidance for NAPs and prepared thematic reports seeking to unpack UNGP 4 con-
cerning the State-Business nexus and on UNGP 14 on the challenges facing small and medi-
um-sized enterprises’ implementation of the UNGPs.  Similarly, a recent report prepared for 
the UN General Assembly has sought to unpack the concept of remedy in the UNGPs.  The 
thematic reports currently under consideration by the UN Working Group on the subjects of 
due diligence, public procurement and the gender lens have all been inspired by the value of 
unpacking concepts. 
CONCLUSION
The world of business and human rights has a lot to be grateful to the Working Party on RBC 
and especially to its Chair, for the passion, commitment and the transformation of the field 
within the OECD and beyond.  Under the visionary superintendence of its Chair, the Working 
Party has afforded the OECD more than a credible role in this field.  Indeed, the OECD now has 
a leadership position in the field from where it commands the attention of other international 
institutions and all stakeholders.  In addition, the vision and strategy has brought the OECD 
out of its previously parochial, defensive and rhetorical (and dare one say, unproductive) posi-
tion to the more constructive and sustainable one that it has adopted today.  Furthermore, with 
the support of the Working Party, the OECD is now a fully recognised and appreciated partner 
in the search for a sustainable approach to the conduct of business in the modern society.  This 
represents an immense success in rather difficult and complex circumstances.
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 With the departure of Roel Nieuwenkamp as Chair, one may be permitted to ask 
the unavoidable question of what will become of the OECD’s approach to RBC in the future. 
Fortunately, the success that has been achieved and the depth of foundations that have been 
laid for this subject, one may happily conclude that RBC now forms part of the core fabric of 
the identity and work of the OECD and so not so easily reversed.  It is true that the loss of Roel 
Nieuwenkamp is a big one but the future of RBC at the OECD can today be said to lie beyond 
the actions of one individual.  The hope is that the Working Party will continue to evolve in its 
ambition to contribute to balanced and sustainable RBC policies and guidance at the OECD 
that the rest of the world may emulate.  This expectation is not an exaggeration because, whilst 
the next Chair of the Working Party has big boots to fill, they can be assured of the goodwill 
and support of other actors such as the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights 
on account of the gains made over the last few years through Roel.
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The year 2011 was indeed an auspicious year.  It was marked by what would come to be understood as two germinal events.  The first was the endorsement of the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (UNGP); the second was the revision of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(OECD Guidelines). These, together, marked the most visible effects of the “Revolution of 
2011.” Both had their genesis in recognition of the substantial transformations of international 
business as the structures of globalization became clear after 2000. Both represented mul-
ti-year efforts and symbolized the transformation of the language and outlook of economic 
activity, of the enterprises that engaged in them, and of the states that to some extent regu-
lated their conduct within (and to some extent beyond) their territories.  Both also represented 
efforts to respond to criticisms by all stakeholders seeking some sort of regulatory coherence 
in an area that was both new and increasingly central to the legitimate operation of global 
trading and investment orders.  The UNGP project was overseen by John Ruggie as UN Special 
Representative and Roel Nieuwenkamp, then Director of Trade Policy & Globalization for the 
Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, chaired the equally important effort of the 2011 update 
of the OECD Guidelines. It is now impossible to consider one without the other.  While many 
thought at the time, despite substantial naysaying that these events signalled a fundamental 
shift in the approach to law, regulation, and the construction of supra national rules based 
economic orders, I do not think any of us understood the extent of the importance of these 
efforts, the influence of which is only now being understood. 
 The UNGPs have become the baseline standard around which the human rights obli-
gations of states and enterprises are framed and through which business and human rights 
advances are measured. The OECD Guidelines provide the most comprehensive structures 
for responsible business conduct — the crown jewel of a complex baseline set of governance 
principles that includes the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2015) and the 
OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2015). The UNGPs 
catalyzed the 2011 revisions and the OECD Guidelines served an important guiding role for 
the development of the UNGPs. Both were meant to be situated within what was then (and is 
still now somewhat more contentiously) labelled the corporate social responsibility field (with 
its three areas of focus: philanthropy, sustainability and human rights). Both were meant to 
frame but not displace private platforms for action (for example, the UN Global Compact ini-
tiative), or private tools for implementing the development of tools for implementing corporate 
social responsibility related activity (for example, ISO 26000), or private initiatives (such as 
enterprise codes of conduct and due diligence systems). 
 Each has served as a catalyst to substantial transformations in ways states, enterprises 
and civil society approach issues of the duties of states, the responsibilities of enterprises and 
the obligations of individuals and civil society both within states and in the transnational 
space within which global economic orders are emerging. From each, states, enterprises and 
civil society organs have sought to adapt their own governance and to develop credible and 
effective systems of managing economic activity around human rights, sustainability and 
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ethical principles that weave together traditional national and public international law, with 
new and emerging systems of transnational governance, regulatory governance, and the 
self-regulatory systems of non-state organs.  Roel played an instrumental role in this develop-
ment during its critical formative stages and his handiwork will be felt for a long time to come. 
This is especially the case with respect to the most challenging aspect of the OECD Guidelines 
— the determined and clear-headed efforts to develop and offer a means of finding, if not 
remedy, then at least guidance, through the National Contact Point (NCP) Specific Instance 
process. If the OECD Guidelines are substantive principles in search of a jurisprudence, then 
the NCP mechanism ties to a substantive framework and the Specific Instance process prom-
ises a means of providing an engaged and legitimating environment in which shared principles 
can move from abstraction to application.  That advance, the reconstitution of the NCP and its 
Specific Instance process, marks the greatest triumph, its greatest point of transformation, and 
the most significant unfinished business of the “Revolution of 2011.”   
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED?  
At the time of its adoption, Hillary Clinton, then US Secretary of State, noted: “If you look 
at these guidelines, they will be helping us determine how supply chains can be changed so 
that it can begin to prevent and eliminate abuses and violence.  We’re going to look at new 
strategies that will seek to make our case to companies that due diligence, while not always 
easy, is absolutely essential”).1 She was right in several key respects.  The first was the leader-
ship role of the OECD Guidelines, especially after 2011.  The second was the focus on supply 
chains rather than on enterprises, an extraordinary transformation of focus. The third was 
the limited role of states in the process of providing a regulatory base for operationalizing the 
OECD Guidelines.  And the fourth was the central importance of using enterprises (not the 
state) as the organizational apparatus of the supply chain. 
The OECD Guidelines are voluntary standards that are consistent with laws and international 
instruments to encourage responsible business practices. Though not legally binding on enter-
prises, many aspects of the OECD Guidelines can be regulated by governments. Though the 
OECD Guidelines should not act as a substitute for domestic regulation, they can serve as 
a basis for internationalised readings of state obligations, especially in those territories suf-
fering conflict or weak governance.  And that guidance is directed to the enterprises oper-
ating in those areas rather than necessarily or solely to those states (or others) (Concepts and 
Principles para 2). The ultimate objective is to provide a basis, necessarily grounded in interna-
tional legal-governance frameworks, within which transnational enterprises may, like states, 
contribute to economic, social and environmental progress.  This requires the establishment 
of partnerships between enterprises and states - and that, in turn, requires management at 
the supra national level.  But that management cannot be understood so much as law but as 
governance, an international relation without law.  It is in the framing of these relationships 
between dissimilar enterprises - states and businesses - that the OECD Guidelines are most 
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useful. "Governments can help by providing effective domestic policy frameworks that include 
stable macroeconomic policy, non-discriminatory treatment of enterprises, appropriate reg-
ulation and prudential supervision, an impartial system of courts and law enforcement and 
efficient and honest public administration" (OECD Guidelines Preface).  But that help cannot 
substitute for the OECD Guidelines themselves, and the construction and management of a 
governance space beyond the state.   
 The definition of multinational enterprises is not of concern for the OECD Guidelines. 
Multinational actors could represent public, private, or hybrid institutions. The distinction 
lies however in that the OECD Guidelines do apply to all organizational structures within a 
multinational enterprise. And though smaller and medium sized enterprises do not have the 
same economic advantages and resources as conglomerates, they also have the responsibility 
to adhere to the OECD Guidelines to the extent possible. And yet this blurred focus on the 
institution of the multinational enterprise makes it possible to shift focus from the institution, 
as the apparatus through which governance is organized, to the supply chain, which is the 
place where the objects of regulatory concern tend to occur. And indeed, from the kernel of 
conceptual transformation from enterprise to supply chain has come some of the most inter-
esting new work of the OECD — its Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains 
of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas; its Responsible Supply Chains in the 
Garment and Footwear Sector; its  OECD-FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply 
Chains; its guidance on Responsible business conduct in the financial sector; and more to 
come (see https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/duediligence/). 
 All of this suggests a complex hybridity that itself aligns closely with the complexities 
of polycentric public-private governance that in the aggregate begins to outline the structures 
of global regulatory systems. The curious hybridity exemplifies how the OECD Guidelines 
operate. They are not law in the conventional sense, but represent a consensus of appropriate 
behavior norms for profit making enterprises.  Like the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml), the OECD Guidelines have 
become the kernel around which consensus about international behavior standards for cor-
porations have developed. They are overseen by the OECD member states through an agency 
designated for the purpose.  But that agency applies the consensus norms represented by the 
OECD Guidelines, even where these may not be accepted within the domestic legal order 
of that state. The application facilitates private efforts by stakeholders who are free to bring 
complaints against companies that are mediated, using OECD Guidelines standards, for that 
purpose. States oversee programs designed to make it easier for private parties to determine 
violations of rules, which have no legal effect within the states whose governments now provide 
the remedial mechanisms for the determination of violations in accordance to standards and 
rules that are international and public in character. The result is a hybrid arrangement between 
domestic, international and private actors. "The Guidelines are the only multilaterally agreed 
and comprehensive code of responsible business conduct that governments have committed to 
promoting" (MNE Guidelines 2011, Foreword, https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/).   
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COHERENCE AND INTERMESHING WITH OTHER SUBSTANTIVE   
GOVERNANCE NORMS 
This mission requires a framework for facilitation, but also one that is consonant with the 
philosophy and approach of the substantive elements of the OECD Guidelines themselves.  To 
that end the NCP mechanism, in general, and the Specific Instance tool, specifically, provides 
an effective means. The NCP system working through layers of Specific Instance actions pro-
vided the necessary jurisprudence for a system of behavior conduct without a center. That this 
was commonly understood was evident by the strong focus on the NCP in the consultations 
leading to the 2011 revisions and thereafter to the assessments of those changes in the years 
following. But the form of the NCP mechanism itself required a delicate balancing.  On the one 
hand, it could most usefully serve as a crucial element in fleshing out the normative standards 
that constituted the build of the OECD Guidelines themselves. By 2011, the NCP mechanism 
appeared to exhibit some of the characteristics of a jurisprudence in search of coherence. 
It had developed basic principles for application of its procedural rules, including rules of 
standing; some of its reports were published and widely circulated, and some of its reasoning 
was persuasive. The “output of quasi-judicial and interpretive statements ... will continue to 
contribute, incrementally, to the institutionalization of transnational systems of multinational 
regulation; systems that will have legal effect whether or not this is law as classically under-
stood. These cases continue an effective process of operationalizing soft law to produce the 
effects of hard law beyond the state, without directly challenging state authority. The OECD 
system is progressing through this form of institutionalizing quasi-judicial organs in parallel 
with other soft law operationalizing endeavors”.2 On the other hand, the OECD Guidelines are 
not binding. They remain voluntary principles, “recommendations addressed by governments 
to multinational enterprises” (OECD Guidelines Preface). Key states would be likely to object 
to the juridification of the OECD Guidelines or to the establishment of global courts detached 
from the judicial branches of their domestic governmental apparatus. 
 By the middle of 2017, Roel Nieuwenkamp himself was able to state: “The successful 
outcomes of the Heineken, Kinross and Statkraft cases3 have recently demonstrated that the 
National Contact Point system4 for the OECD Guidelines on Responsible Business Conduct 
can be effective for providing access to remedy in the business and human rights domain”.5 
And on that basis he could conclude looking both back to the NCPs’ accomplishments and 
forward to the challenges that remained: “My conclusion on the effectiveness of NCPs as a 
non-judicial grievance mechanism on business & human rights is that the glass is half full, but 
we must take active steps to fill it to the brim. Functioning NCPs which currently have strong 
track records with respect to outcomes in cases can serve as mentors to those lagging behind. 
Furthermore, all NCPs can look to recent successes for lessons learned to ensure that remedy 
in the context of cases handled by NCPs is routine, rather than rare” (Ibid.). 
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 And, indeed, it is as a remedy embedded within webs of national remedies, that 
the NCP Specific Instance procedures appear to have their greatest potential. The recent use 
of the NCPs as a means of effecting significant public-private partnerships and agreement, 
for example with the Dutch Banking Sector Agreement6 suggests the future use of the NCP 
Specific Instance tool beyond the crafting of yet another quasi-judicial mechanism. But more 
interesting has been the use of the NCP mechanism as an aid to national litigation — the 
availability of higher profile NCP proceedings in OECD states is especially useful where the 
breaches of the OECD Guidelines (and local litigation) occurs out of sight of developing states 
and their media (for example Vedanta7). 
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE  
The prospects for the future build on the challenges of the present. And these, in turn, return 
us to the insights of then Secretary Clinton at the 50th Anniversary Commemoration of 2011. 
The leadership role of the OECD Guidelines, the focus on production chains rather than on the 
enterprises that oversee these chains, the limited though critical role of states, and the central 
role of the enterprise at the center of the nexus of transnational economic activity and the insti-
tutional apparatus through which the “soft” power of the OECD Guidelines can be hardened 
and globalized should serve as the framework for future revisions. These four foundational 
insights about the character and role of the OECD Guidelines, ushered in with the changes 
of the 2011 Revisions, can realize their transformative potential in any future revisions — can 
carry forward the vision of the “Revolution of 2011.”  
 The leadership role of the OECD Guidelines can be furthered in a number of ways. 
The first is through the ongoing project of keeping its provisions current.  The current mul-
ti-stakeholder consultations on the future revision of Chapter IV, “Administrative Approaches 
to Avoiding and Resolving Transfer Pricing Disputes”8 of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, and 
the future revision of Chapter VII, “Special Considerations for Intra-Group Services”,9  of the 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines serve as a useful template. But leadership also requires a greater 
ability to move NCPs toward common consensus on their role in general and on the use of 
Specific Instance proceedings in particular.  That has been a key challenge with substantial 
potential adverse consequences — from the development of NCP “power centers” in states 
with strong and active NCPs, to the effective closing off of NCPs, which develop barriers to 
accessibility either formally or through their habits of practice.  National variation around a 
core is the essence of leadership, but the absence of or a weak core undoes much good work 
since 2011. Lastly, greater leadership will be required to embed sustainability goals into the 
OECD Guidelines — and more importantly to enmesh sustainability into the core current 
substantive areas of OECD concern. 
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 The focus on production chains has already begun to bear fruit. In a sense, the 
OECD Guidelines have always been about the coherent management of supply chains across 
borders.  A future challenge will center on the need to move beyond the traditional relation-
ships between law and a natural or juridical person on which it is applied, in this case the 
multinational enterprise, to a recognition of the importance of drawing a direct regulatory 
connection between law (broadly conceived) and crafting one between regulatory structures 
and production chains. The supply chain guidance is a strong step in the right direction.  But 
the OECD may need to tackle the complex transformations of states (which now regulate 
and operate commercial enterprises), enterprises (that operate commercial enterprises and to 
which governmental responsibilities are being devolved) to civil society (which begins to serve 
as substitute representative bodies of key stakeholders in economic relations). 
 The OECD Guidelines will likely have to deal with the state.  The state, of course, is 
the foundation of the OECD (itself a multilateral international organization).  But the state, 
and the state system itself is changing.  At some point, it will be necessary to consider the way 
that China’s One Belt One Road Initiative and the US America First Project will substantially 
reshape the nature of global trade and trade regimes.  Those changes will necessarily create 
opportunities for OECD Guidelines to fill gaps and serve to provide a framework for transla-
tion and coherence.  And, of course, a number of important states require outreach. 
 Lastly, the focus on the enterprise (within production chains) remains a central 
element of the OECD Guidelines. The trend toward governmentalization of multinational 
enterprises continues.  Enterprises will continue to grow as centers for governance within their 
production chains.  To some extent they will serve as important a role as states within the 
sphere of their control.  For that reason, the rule of law principles at the center of state-based 
law legitimacy will likely have to find expression in enterprise governance regimes as well, 
including those of the OECD Guidelines themselves. 
 The governmentalized enterprise will also require heightened attention to account-
ability measures, foremost among them due diligence.  And it is here that the essay comes 
full circle.  One of the great sources of innovation for accountability and due diligence is the 
UNGPs, now written into that framework as human rights due diligence.  And so one sees the 
seeds of the “Revolution of 2011” bearing fruit and the work for which Roel Nieuwenkamp 
laid the foundation now serving its instruments well to guide the project that is the OECD 
Guidelines into the next stage of its development.  
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Chair National Contact Point, The Netherlands
The NCP work:  
Dancing on a cord
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Portraits of the Royal couple of the Kingdom of the Netherlands prominent on the wall. The location is the central meeting room of the Dutch Embassy in Kampala Uganda. A delegation of the Dutch beer company Heineken from Amsterdam, a delegation of former workers of a Heineken subsidiary Bralima based in Bukavu in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and a team of the Dutch National Contact Point (Dutch NCP), are 
seated around the table and discuss a road map that finally should result in a solution for griev-
ances expressed by the former workers. The atmosphere is good.  Everybody agrees it has taken 
too long and they all want to settle and close an old and sensitive case, in OECD terminology 
a ‘Specific Instance’. I definitely recall a moment we were stuck with a very specific question 
concerning the interpretation of OECD procedures and how easy and convenient it was to pick 
up the phone and call Roel Nieuwenkamp in Paris. 
 These are the moments one realizes how important it is to have a strong ‘backyard’ or 
central secretariat for the National Contact Points (NCPs, or NCP), delivering substantial and 
coherent support to all the NCPs. The final result in this case was remarkable; an agreement 
between 150 former Bralima workers, dismissed during the genocide around 1992-1993 in 
Ruanda and the DRC, whose rights as former workers were allegedly ignored at the time.  With 
a young generation of Heineken, and the desire of the workers to close the case, the Dutch NCP 
was able to assist the parties in such a way that an agreement was reached in 2017. The Dutch 
government provided a budget making it possible for the workers delegation and the NCP to 
travel to Kampala and do preliminary field research in Bukavu, the location of the factory.  It is 
of crucial importance for NCPs to be able to physically go where the adverse impact occurred 
(locus delicti). 
 It is an achievement and even amazing that all OECD member governments as 
well as eight non-OECD adhering governments decided to further strengthen the function 
of the NCPs while adopting the 2011 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (the 
Guidelines). It was agreed that the adhering countries ‘shall set up National Contact Points to 
further the effectiveness of the Guidelines by undertaking promotional activities, handling 
enquiries and contributing to the issues that arise’. The NCPs are available for  ‘the Business 
community, worker organizations, other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other 
interested parties’.  The countries also agreed to ‘make available human and financial resources’ 
to the NCPs.  However there is still a long way to go for most NCPs. 
 There are significant differences between the NCPs. In the Procedural Guidance of 
the Guidelines it is noted that countries have ‘flexibility in organizing their NCPs’. At one hand 
they have to be composed such that they can deal ‘with a broad range of issues covered by the 
Guidelines and enable the NCP to operate in an impartial manner’. Thereafter the suggestion 
is given that ‘an NCP can have different forms of organization’ and some forms are spelt out 
such as: it can be a senior government official or a government office, an interagency group, a 
group of independent experts and representatives of the Business community, worker organi-
zations and NGOs may also be included.  
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From then on many countries created their own NCP model and the outcome is rather divers. 
Most governments have a firm say in the functioning of the NCPs, not giving much room for 
independent outside stakeholders. Some countries probably do not have the ‘right culture’ or 
attitude to deliver the financial means for a well-equipped NCP that can do its work proper 
and impartial. The middle-income countries often have little financial resources available for 
the NCPs. It is questionable if similar cases always will be declared admissible by any NCP? 
In order to follow the OECD guidelines some governments appointed just one official (such as 
Sweden, Hungary and Colombia); an almost impossible position.  
 Other governments created a standalone probably more independent NCP while staff 
members and NCP management are government officials (such as the United States NCP). 
Somewhat similar is the NCP of the United Kingdom (UK). Government officials handle 
the cases, however there is an independent oversight Board, monitoring the work of officials. 
For the French NCP it is about the same.  In some Northern European countries the NCPs 
core is a Panel of outside independent experts with different backgrounds (unions, employ-
er’s organizations, universities, et cetera). Staff members supporting the work of the Panel are 
government officials and their office is hosted by one of the Ministries (Dutch and Norwegian 
NCPs). The Dutch NCP has besides the four independent members advising members from 
four Ministries. The principal is to work in consensus however it is the independent Panel that 
takes the final decisions. 
In December 2016, following the 2015 G7 Leaders’ Declaration, the German National Action Plan for Business and Human Rights adopted in that year and the feedback from stakeholders all together were the reason to restructure the German NCP. Today the German NCP has a staff of five officials based in a separate unit in the Federal Ministry 
for Economic Affairs and Energy.  The separate unit provides a greater element of autonomy 
and more visibility. The NCP closely coordinates with an Inter-Ministerial Steering Group on 
all issues, including decisions on specific instances. The group is comprised of officials from 
seven Ministries. The German structure is somewhat similar to the Dutch structure with 
the difference there is not a core group of independent NCP members not being officials of 
government.
 The substantial differences in the organizational structure, independence, final results 
of NCPs’ efforts and financial resources ultimately is a risk of weakness for all. Multinational 
enterprises  after all operate in a globalized world; an arena where the Guidelines, United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and other international standards 
should be standard. The Guidelines state that “NCPs will operate in accordance with core 
criteria of visibility, accessibility, transparency and accountability to further the objective of 
functional equivalence”. The absence of an equal international level playing field in what one 
NCPs might declare a specific instance not admissible while another one does take up the 
case, is detrimental.  The end results still differ a lot. To reach a standardized structure for 
all NCPs might take years if not decades. And it is crucial to have a strong OECD secretariat 
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in Paris to guide and support the NCPs globally. No doubt, this situation has triggered Roel 
Nieuwenkamp and members of the OECD Secretariat to work towards harmonization of the 
NCPs structure and work. 
 NCPs have become one of the most prominent non-judicial grievance mechanisms 
with the mandate to address notifications of ‘specific instances’ about the conduct of multina-
tional enterprises.  It was during the 2011 update of the Guidelines that the NCPs agreed to 
reinforce their joint peer learning activities including also voluntary peer reviews. The Dutch 
NCP was one of the first in 2011 followed by the Japanese NCP in 2012 and the Norwegian 
NCP in 2013. The objectives of the Peer reviews are two-fold. The first aim is to strengthen 
the performance and functioning of the NCP under Review by engaging with domestic stake-
holders and peer NCPs, and secondly by contributing to the strengthening of the NCP system 
as a whole, by sharing lessons learned and good practices with the broader NCP community 
and in particular the NCPs contributing to the review process by sharing their comparative 
experiences during the Peer review week.
 From its inception in 2001, the initial Norwegian NCP had a tripartite structure and 
consisted of members from Government (Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Industry), 
Industry (Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise) and other stakeholders (Confederation of 
Unions), located in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ‘Storting’ (Norwegian parliament) 
changed the composition, administration and budget of the initial NCP.  Since March 2011,  a 
four-person expert panel operates independently from Government. 
 I have been involved in three reviews, Norway, Belgium and Germany and the 
review of Norway was the first. The Canadian NCP chaired the Peer review team with the 
Netherlands and Colombia as co-chairs and Belgium and the UK as additional members. As is 
today common in the peer review process, the team consulted relevant domestic stakeholders: 
government officials, union leaders, representatives of non-governmental organizations and 
last but not least large, middle and small businesses. These were well-organized closed sessions 
in the center of Oslo in what pretty frank and free discussions took place.    
 As mentioned above, it was a remarkable accomplishment that so many OECD coun-
tries agreed to establish an NCP. Fortunately the more independent NCPs remain independent 
in such cases. The impacts of international operating enterprises could be severe: in the field 
of human rights, the environment or for workers. The importance of such enterprises for their 
home countries (tax revenues, employment, prestige) makes it difficult for many governments 
to deal with it. And that is exactly the reason why the NCPs exist and should be supported by 
the OECD countries. The NCPs are the messengers and therefore need full support and the 
means from the OECD countries to do their work independently. 
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INTRODUCTION
The OECD evaluation of the National Contact Point (NCP) function has identified interesting 
advantages. For example, NCP intervention has brought about many positive impacts such as 
agreements between parties (in one specific instance including payment of compensation and 
in other specific instances other forms of direct remedy), changes in management practices, 
clarification of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines) and a cata-
lyst for the use of leverage by the company involved.1 That said, the NCP function also faces 
some challenges.2 These are, amongst others, significant variations in the practice of NCPs in 
applying the guidance for specific instances, accessibility and overly stringent interpretation 
of criteria “material and substantiated” resulting in a high rate of non-acceptance of specific 
instances for further examination, overly restrictive definitions (such as  the term “multina-
tional enterprises”, “adverse impact”, “business relationship”), costs for parties to participate 
in mediation, good faith behaviour of the parties to the specific instance, parallel proceedings, 
delays, insufficient use of recommendations or determinations in final statements, and lack of 
clear or equitable procedures (OECD NCP Report, p.30 and pp46-56). Furthermore balancing 
confidentiality and transparency, cooperation between NCPs, and resource constraints are 
identified (OECD NCP Report, p.30). Most of these challenges are connected to the NCP pro-
cedure as such, except from cooperation between NCPs, parallel proceedings and resources 
issues.
 This contribution will analyse alternative approaches, which means not regarding the 
NCP procedure as such, to enhance the NCP function. The NCP procedure as such has been 
analysed by many, including the OECD itself (OECD NCP Report). Thus, we will consider 
other avenues which may be connected to but do not regard the NCP procedure as such. One 
may consider these avenues as alternatives to the ones related to the NCP procedure as such. 
These alternatives approaches will be elaborated hereinafter. However, we will not discuss the 
resource challenges.
TYPES OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
Referral to external dispute resolution options
The first avenue to strengthen the NCP function is the referral (with consent of the parties) 
to an external dispute resolution mechanism. This has been done by the Dutch NCP and the 
NCP of the United Kingdom (UK NCP). In the Privacy International v. Gamma International 
case, Gamma and Trovicor allegedly were selling –‘intrusive’- surveillance technology and 
training to the government of Bahrain, used against targeted named individuals to monitor 
their contacts through remote monitoring of their devices (human rights violations). The 
UK NCP was unable to assess whether the spyware products were sent to the named indi-
viduals and/or supplied by Gamma to the Bahraini authorities.3 External mediation failed 
and no agreement was reached. Referred back to the NCP, it held that Gamma had not acted 
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consistently with provisions of the Guidelines and issued recommendations applying broadly 
to the enterprise’s future trading, although Gamma had already stopped trading even though 
still formally incorporated in the UK. The NCP considered Gamma’s overall engagement with 
the process unsatisfactory and in bad faith by providing no information. In the Heineken-case 
the Dutch NCP, after consultation with the parties, engaged an external mediator who has 
indeed reached agreement between parties.4 The Dutch NCP found the complainants were 
seeking financial compensation. It made clear to the parties the NCP procedure is not a judi-
cial procedure but a procedure aimed at reaching an agreement on the issues at stake and that 
the NCP did not have the power to decide on financial compensation. However, in its opinion 
facilitating a dialogue between the parties might assist in clarifying Bralima’s responsibility 
towards its employees under the Guidelines. The same was true in connection with clarifying 
Heineken’s independent responsibility under the Guidelines towards its subsidiary Bralima, 
in relation to the latter’s operations in the DRC in the period 1999-2003.5 The parties agreed 
to not disclose the content of the agreement. It has however been reported that the complain-
ants received a total amount of USD 1.3 million from Heineken.6 The case is internationally 
hailed as ‘historical precedent’. This solution to externally mediate cases addresses the issue of 
the hybrid function of the NCPs on the one hand trying to find a solution between the com-
plainant and the multinational enterprise involved and on the other issuing a final statement 
(which may include an analysis whether or not the multinational enterprise has complied with 
the Guidelines). 
 However, to date NCPs have only referred (with consent of the parties) to dialogue 
based mechanisms such as mediation. One may wonder whether referral to binding mecha-
nisms may be an alternative too. Obviously, this would require consent of the complainant and 
the multinational enterprise involved. Such consent may be conceivable. For example, many 
large Dutch retailers are signatory to the Dutch International Responsible Business Conduct 
Agreement in the Textile Sector (Textile Agreement, or Agreement).7 The signatories to this 
Agreement have accepted jurisdiction of the dispute resolution committee of the agreement.8 It 
is well conceivable the complainant would also agree to engage in this mechanism. The dispute 
resolution committee issues a binding decision on the complaint.9 The complaints committee 
will decide, having heard the parties, whether an adhering enterprise is acting in accordance 
with the agreement. Article 1.1 of the Textile Agreement refers to human rights due diligence 
as adopted in section IV.5 of the Guidelines and the OECD Guidance in the garment and foot-
wear sector.10 Thus, this mechanism assesses compliance with the Guidelines and supporting 
guidance and my even provide remedy through compensation for victims.11 The Secretariat 
of the Agreement will monitor compliance with the decision as part of the assessment of the 
annual action plan of the enterprise involved.12 Referral to other binding mechanisms may be 
conceivable as well. For example, the use of arbitration to solve human rights issues has been 
suggested.13 Referral to arbitration may be an option too, if parties would agree to this (and the 
NCP may use its leverage to incentivize such agreement). It may be feasible agreement could 
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be reached in specific sectors on (contractual clauses for) a binding escalation mechanism, as 
happened in connection with the Dutch Responsible Business Agreements. Engagement in a 
binding mechanism may also be agreed upon by the parties to the dispute in connection with 
consent to engage in a non-judicial mechanism (such as the NCP) if this would prove to be 
unsuccessful.  
Discovery, (external) fact-finding and the use of independent local facilitators
Furthermore, an issue may be the assessment of facts in a specific instance. It is often hard 
for an NCP to assess facts in a foreign country where the alleged violation has occurred. The 
complainant and the multinational enterprise involved may have quite different views on 
these facts. For example, the Dutch NCP sometimes commits fact-finding missions to experts 
as it has done with environmental experts in the Shell-Philippines case. An interesting pro-
posal has also been launched in connection with the Canadian Ombudsperson in the mining 
industry.14 Fact finding by this ombudsperson  may be facilitated through Canadian courts, as 
a complainant may file a request for discovery in order to substantiate its case with the ombud-
sperson. If this request is granted the court will supervise this discovery and the results thereof 
may be used in the procedure with the ombudsperson.15 This type of approach may also be 
implemented in connection with NCPs.16 However, this approach may be feasible if documents 
in the domain of the multinational enterprise are needed to substantiate a complaint. Factual 
evidence regarding the situation on the ground and eyewitness statements may not be acquired 
in this way. A need may exist to acquire this type of information too.17 Thus, the NCPs (or the 
procedural) rules may facilitate such an independent fact finding endeavour.18 In connection 
with this one may consider a solution as is implemented in the Textile Agreement which entails 
provisions to hear witnesses in such a way they are protected from retaliation. This provision 
includes the use of an independent facilitator in exceptional cases.19The advantage of such a 
solution is that a local independent facilitator/investigator may be in a better position to gen-
erate trust with local inhabitants/victims and reach out to them in a manner consistent and 
appropriate with their local habits. This is pivotal to acquire meaningful input from these local 
inhabitants/victims. Thus, an opportunity for external fact finding or consultation by local 
facilitators may be an interesting alternative. Obviously this raises questions about resources 
for this type of approach, but we feel it may be worthwhile to consider. In connection with this 
information gathered through operational or local grievance mechanisms may also be used by 
NCPs if parties would consent to this. 
The role of governments     
Governments of OECD member states may play an important role in strengthening the position 
of NCPs too. This is especially valid in connection with the participation of business in specific 
instances and the implementation of outcomes agreed upon. For example, governments may 
adopt policies which attach consequences to refusal of a multinational enterprise to engage 
with an NCP when a complaint is filed or to implement solutions that have be agreed upon. 
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This type of consequences may even be attached to the refusal to implement recommendations 
included in the final statement of the NCP if no agreement is reached. Consequences may 
comprise the non-eligibility for government subsidies or export credit insurance, exclusion 
of public procurement or trade missions. The Canadian government has indeed adopted this 
approach and excludes multinational enterprises for subsidies, export credit or public pro-
curement if they refuse to engage in specific instances or to implement recommendations 
included in the final statement of the NCP. It may be an example for other governments to 
follow. Furthermore, governments may play a role in funding (part of) the costs of external 
mediation, collaborative fact finding endeavours or the use of local facilitators. For example, 
travel costs were covered by the Dutch government in the Heineken case. Meetings within the 
NCP process were held at the Dutch embassies in respectively Kampala and Paris and were 
monitored by the Dutch NCP (to the satisfaction of the parties). In Kampala, the meeting 
between parties took place with the expert mediator who was appointed by the Dutch NCP at 
the request of the parties. In Paris, the meeting between parties took place with an externally 
appointed expert in Congolese labour law. 
Monitoring
A further means to enhance the NCP function may be the monitoring of the implementation 
of the NCP recommendations put forward in the final statement. Although the commentary 
to the conclusion of procedure (of the NCP procedure) adopts the possibility, it has only been 
mentioned in seven specific instances since 2011.20 However, some NCPs make it regular prac-
tice to follow up on recommendations they provide during specific instances. For example, 
follow-up is part of the UK NCP’s rules of procedure for specific instances.21 The Swiss NCP 
asks parties to report to the NCP on the progress of the implementation of the agreed outcome 
after a certain period (for example 6 months) after the closure of the specific instance. If the 
NCP does not see enough progress, the NCP can make recommendations and request further 
reporting.22 The French NCP follows up with parties where appropriate and maintains contact 
for several years. This policy has resulted in successful outcomes of certain cases even if agree-
ments were not originally reached through the specific instance process. For example while 
an agreement was not initially reached under the specific instance involving Michelin Group’s 
operations in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, the French NCP continued to follow up and 
in response Michelin Group reported regularly to the NCP on a series of measures taken to 
implement recommendations of the NCP.23 The Norwegian NCP includes a clause regarding 
follow-up within a set time limit, often a year following a mediated outcome. The NCP notes 
that parties have expressed a wish for greater NCP involvement in follow-up, for instance to 
monitor whether the Guidelines are more effectively implemented by a company after the 
specific instance. However, the NCP is cautious about the potential resource implications of 
maintaining an on-going involvement with every specific instance. In addition, there is a risk 
of reopening specific instances that have been closed, or becoming involved in a follow-up 
role that had not been agreed to from the outset. The Norwegian NCP now advises parties to 
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include more detailed provisions about the implementation of the parties’ agreement as part of 
the follow-up in any mediated statement, including the role of the NCP.24 That said, it may be 
questionable, also in connection with available resources, whether NCPs are best equipped to 
perform this function in case parties do not ask for this. After all, for example courts or arbitral 
tribunals do not monitor the implementation of their decisions either, unless a new suit or 
claim is submitted on the implementation of an award. Furthermore, the question is which 
consequence an NCP may attach to the outcomes of monitoring. For example, if a company 
does not implement NCP recommendations the NCP may conclude so in a consecutive final 
statement, but apparently the previous one has not convinced this company to act. It may be 
questionable whether a next final statement will perform better in this regard. Thus, and also 
in connection with the role of governments mentioned previously the home government of the 
multinational enterprise may be better equipped to perform this function, for example by a 
supervisory body. This also enhances implementation as the government may avail over more 
compelling means to incentivize implementation, as has been elaborated previously.
Cases of contribution or linkage  
A further suggestion is connected to specific instances related to supply chains or other 
cases in which the multinational enterprise contributes or is linked to alleged violations of 
the Guidelines by other entities. For example, it may be conceivable a bank is involved in a 
specific instance in which its lender is accused of land grabbing.25 In such cases the NCP rec-
ommendations to the bank which may also affect the borrower will only impact the situation 
on the ground through the contractual relationship with the lender. Thus, it may be difficult 
for the bank to implement specific NCP recommendations especially regarding the lender if 
the contractual arrangement does not allow this or discussion may arise whether the lender 
is obliged to implement relevant recommendations of the NCP. This issue could be solved by 
strictly confining recommendations to measures the bank is able to implement itself. However, 
this may not have sufficient impact on the alleged violation (which the complaint also and 
maybe even predominantly addresses) by the lender. In such instances the NCP recommen-
dations may be considered to be weak in terms of impact. Moreover, the principal issue may 
not be addressed by these recommendations. A solution may be to incentivize buyers or banks 
to implement clauses in their contract obliging their suppliers or lenders to implement NCP 
recommendations which are of relevance for their conduct and which are included in the final 
statement rendered in a specific instance in which this borrower or bank is a party. One may 
wonder why a borrower or bank would be inclined to implement such a provision. This may 
be an issue, but as elaborated before, governments may incentivize this by requiring it in their 
public procurement, in subsidy requirements or through other means.
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International investment agreements
Finally NCP decisions and recommendations may play a role in investment disputes. 
International Investment agreements are primarily designed to protect investors’ interests 
against (illegal)26 seizure of their investments or measures comparable with it by host states.27 
Most investment agreements offer a dispute resolution option against host states which enables 
investors to instigate litigation against a host state, often by means of arbitration for example 
through the mechanism of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID).28 However, international investment agreements have been subject to criticism 
amongst others because they allegedly favour investor’s interests over human rights or envi-
ronmental protection.29 Thus, if an investor has instigated a claim in an investment arbitration, 
this begs the question whether it is eligible for protection if it has violated the Guidelines. 
This question raises multiple issues. First of all, the host state should primarily point at such 
violations in these disputes. However, it might be difficult for especially developing host states 
to properly defend themselves (in ICSID arbitrations), for example by pointing at violations 
of the OECD Guidelines by investors, because of the number of cases, the cost connected to 
investment arbitrations in order to engage skilled counsel to represent them and the cost to 
avail over the expertise required.30 In practice arbitral tribunals have chosen a jurisdictional 
and substantive approach to address these issues. The jurisdictional approach relates to the 
requirement in many investment agreements the investment has to be made in compliance 
with national laws or in good faith and this may include compliance with the Guidelines.31 
The substantive approach is connected to investors’ obligations in order to be eligible for pro-
tection. The Guidelines may be considered to be international obligations an investor is bound 
by in order to be eligible for protection under an investment agreement.32 However, it is quite 
unclear in practice whether these obligations exist and whether or not the investor has violated 
the Guidelines. Therefore, one might think of implementing the Guidelines for multinational 
enterprises as a requirement for protection in international investment agreements.33 The 
advantage of this (including supporting guidance in specific sectors) is that these guidelines 
are well known to governments and avail over a complaint mechanism in the form of national 
contact points (NCPs). The acceptance of dispute resolution by a NCP and implementing the 
result thereof or its recommendations if no agreement is reached may be made a requirement 
for protection if complaints are filed in connection with the project the investor searches pro-
tection for. The advantage of this may be legitimacy in the eyes of the states as it is an OECD 
instrument established by states, embedded in state structures and often run by independent 
officials.34 The requirement for protection under an investment agreement should than be that 
the investor implements the Guidelines in its operations and is prepared to implement either 
solutions agreed upon in the NCP process or recommendations made by the NCP if no agree-
ment is reached. Thus, international investment agreements may also be used to strengthen 
the NCP function.
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EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
We have discussed alternative approaches to strengthen the NCP function beyond the NCP 
procedure as such. The approaches are (i) referral to external dispute resolution options, (ii) 
external avenues to assess facts or the use of external independent local facilitators, (iii) an 
enhanced role of governments, (iv) improving contractual mechanisms to enhance the imple-
mentation of NCP recommendations in cases in which a multinational enterprise contributes 
or is directly linked to an alleged violation of the Guidelines and finally (v) implementing an 
obligation in international investment agreements (as a requirement for investor protection) to 
comply with the Guidelines and engage with the NCP procedure if complaints are raised and 
to implement NCP recommendations either agreed upon or included in the final statement if 
no agreement is reached.
 Some of these approaches are already used, such as the referral to mediation or other 
external dialogue based processes. However, this is not yet done in connection with binding 
dispute resolution mechanisms (parties may agree upon). This may be worth consideration too. 
Some NCPs have used independent consultants in fact finding missions. However, amongst 
others because of resource constraints this is not often done. It may be worthwhile to use this 
option more often including the use of independent local facilitators to relate to local commu-
nities/workers in order to acquire meaningful input from those witnesses/victims. Another 
interesting option has been adopted in Canada (however, not in connection with the NCP 
procedure) which allows a local court to grant discovery in order to substantiate a complaint 
with the national ombudsman. This may also be worth consideration for NCP complaints, but 
this will be more distant future for many other OECD members.
 OECD member states may strengthen the NCP function quite easily by implementing 
a requirement to engage with an NCP in case of complaints or to implement the NCP’s rec-
ommendations in for example subsidy, export credit and public procurement requirements. 
Some OECD members have already done so. However, to date most of them have not used the 
relatively easy way to strengthen the NCP function.
 The two alternatives discussed last are more challenging to implement and will need 
further elaboration. However, this does not mean they are not worthwhile to consider because 
their potential impact may be quite large.   
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NOTES
1. OECD NCP Report, p. 43-45.
2.  Implementing the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: The National 
Contact Points from 2005-2015, p. 30 (hereinafter: OECD NCP Report), https://
mneguidelines.oecd.org/oecd-report-15-years-national-contact-points.pdf. 
3.  See Privacy International v Gamma International UK Ltd, Final Statement after 
examination of complaint, UK NCP, December 2014 and its Follow up Statement 
February 2016 which can be accessed at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/gov-
ernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/502420/bis-16-127-uk-ncp-fol-
low-up-statement-privacy-international-gamma-international.pdf and https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/402462/BIS-15-93-Final_statement_after_examination_of_complaint_Privacy_
International_and_Gamma_International_UK_Ltd.pdf 
4.  See the Final Statement of August 18, 2017, which can be accessed through 
https://www.oecdguidelines.nl/documents/publication/2017/08/18/
final-statement-notification-bralima-vs-heineken. 
5.  Ibid., paragraph 5, Scope of the assessment.
6.  https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2017/08/18/heineken-betaalt-congolezen-na-klacht-
12563201-a1570284, and http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/08/18/en-rdc-une-
poignee-d-ouvriers-fait-plier-le-geant-heineken_5173706_3212.html
7.  This agreement can be accessed through https://www.internationalrbc.org/
agreements?sc_lang=en.
8.  See section 1.3 of the Textile agreement and for the procedural rules https://www.
internationalrbc.org/garments-textile/agreement/method/complaints?sc_lang=en. 
9.  See section 1.3 of the Textile Agreement. However, before this complaint may be lodged, 
the complainant (or its representative) first have to try to solve the case amicably. See 
section 1.3 of the Textile Agreement.
10.  See for the latter OECD Due Diligence Guidance on responsible supply chains in the 
garment and footwear sector, which can be accessed through http://mneguidelines.oecd.
org/oecd-due-diligence-guidance-garment-footwear.pdf.  
11.  The decision and its reasoning will be published, observing confidentiality where 
required for reasons of competition sensitivity and/or the protection of business confi-
dentiality. Section 1.3 of the Textile Agreement.
12.  Section 1.3 of the Textile Agreement.
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13.  This builds on commercial arbitration rather than investment arbitration. See for 
this proposal and a questions and answers document, which can be accessed through 
https://business-humanrights.org/en/pdf-an-international-arbitration-tribunal-on-busi-
ness-human-rights-version-five, and https://business-humanrights.org/en/qas-on-pro-
posed-intl-arbitration-tribunal-to-resolve-business-human-rights-abuse-disputes. 
14.  Who should be discerned from the Canadian NCP. Obviously, this raises the question 
whether the Canadian NCP should not avail over comparable instruments.
15.  See on this http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/top-
ics-domaines/other-autre/faq.aspx?lang=eng&_ga=2.3601200.1892813925.1523092391-
860716557.1521809049, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/01/
the_government_ofcanadabringsleadershiptoresponsiblebusinesscond.html, https://
www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/01/the_government_ofcanadabringslead-
ershiptoresponsiblebusinesscond.html and http://www.miningweekly.com/article/
canadian-miners-welcome-new-federal-business-ethics-ombudsman-2018-01-18. 
16.  This may also be true in connection with other ombudsperson functions such as  
collaborative fact finding.
17.  Cf. also in connection with other mechanisms such as the RSPO complaint mechanism. 
A review of the Complaints System of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 2014, 
p. 31 and 43 which can be accessed through https://www.rspo.org/news-and-events/
announcements/a-review-of-complaints-system-of-the-rspo-final-report.    
18.  As is adopted for the Dutch NCP. See the Dutch National Action Plan, p. 35, which can 
be accessed through https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/
netherlands-national-action-plan.pdf. That said, it is not quite clear under which condi-
tions such investigations will be conducted and whether independent investigators/facil-
itators will be engaged. It may even be conceivable a NCP in another country conducts 
this research or these NCPs that may even investigate on their own volition. 
19. Articles 23 and 24 of the procedural rules.
20. OECD NCP Report, p. 58.
21. OECD NCP Report, Ibid.
22. OECD NCP Report, Ibid.
23. OECD NCP Report, Ibid.
24. OECD NCP Report, Ibid.
25.  See for example the Final Statement of the Dutch NCP in the Rabobank Specific 
Instance, which can be accessed through https://business-humanrights.org/en/nether-
lands-oecd-natl-contact-point-final-statement-on-complaint-against-rabobank-over-
palm-oil-supply-chain-policy-0.  
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International Economic Law 13(4) 2010, p. 1049.  
27.  Cf. Eric De Brabandere, Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law, 
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Escobar, International Corporate Standards, Human Rights, and the Urbaser Standard, 
Transnationalen Wirtschaftrecht, heft 144, p. 6, which may be accessed through http://
telc.jura.uni-halle.de/sites/default/files/BeitraegeTWR/Heft%20144.pdf.
28.  The ISDS mechanism is the prevailing mechanism. See e.g. Joachim Pohl, Societal 
benefits and costs of International Investment Agreements, OECD 2018, p. 7, which can 
be accessed through http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/e5f85c3d-en.
pdf?expires=1518001777&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=F8E897DDF68E218926B2
D2209BA49908.
29.  Cf. Katharina Hausler, Karin Lukas and Julia Planitzer, Non-Judicial 
Remedies, In: Human Rights in Business (Juan Jose Alvarez Rubio et al. (eds.)), 
Routledge:London 2017, p. 108; Joachim Pohl, Societal benefits and costs of 
International Investment Agreements, OECD 2018, p. 42, which can be accessed 
through http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/e5f85c3d-en.pdf?ex-
pires=1518001777&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=F8E897DDF68E218926B2D22
09BA49908.
30.  Zeng Huaqun, Balance, Sustainable Development, and Integration: Innovative Path for 
BIT Practice, Journal of International Economic Law, 2014, p. 317, 321 and 322. Cf. Pohl 
2018, p. 45.
31.  See for this approach e.g. the Metal-Tech v. Oezbekistan case which is accessible through 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3012.pdf.
32.  See for this approach e.g. Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao 
Bizkaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/07/26, Final 
Award, 8 December 2016, available at https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/italaw8136_1.pdf.
33.  Cf. Crow and Escobar 2017, p. 26. 
34.  Cf. Axel Marx, Franz Ebert, Nicolas Hachez and Jan Wouters, Dispute Settlement  
in the Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters of EU Trade Agreements, Leuven 
2017, p. 87. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Almost four decades ago, in 1979, ‘Contact Points’ first emerged on the international plane 
as the precursors of what are now better known as National Contact Points (NCPs). Bereft of 
any formal powers, NCPs were initially expected to, amongst others, ‘usefully contribute to 
the solution of problems relating to the [OECD] Guidelines [for Multinational Enterprises]’ 
(Guidelines).1 Thenceforth, NCPs have evolved considerably. NCPs are assigned with a broad 
range of themes to deal with and received legal recognition in the OECD Council’s decisions, 
obliging adhering states to set up an NCP.2 
 Despite progress made, the NCPs’ effectiveness is being questioned by scholars and 
advisory bodies to the OECD. Arguably, not all NCPs have been a ‘picture of success’,3 their 
performance is rated as ‘uneven and in all too many cases poor’4 and claims have been made 
that – in general – NCPs are ‘not achieving their central objective, which is to further the 
effectiveness of the Guidelines’.5 Renowned international bodies, such as the Council of the 
European Union, UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights and G7, have empha-
sised this pressing need for effective NCPs, a ‘comprehensive improvement’ of their effective-
ness, and have shown commitment to enhance their effectiveness.6 
 In response to the general outcry for more effective NCPs, we venture to find an 
answer to what we exactly mean when we speak of ‘effective NCPs’. Diverging views on what 
effectiveness entails adds to the confusion on this theme. In this contribution, we first try to 
reconcile these diverging views and set out to define effectiveness (Section 2). We particularly 
focus on the grievance mechanism put in place by NCPs, namely the specific instance proce-
dure. Subsequently, we investigate how effectiveness has been measured in practice in order to 
get an idea of its application (Section 3). We conclude with a set of recommendations that may 
aid future revisions of the Guidelines (Section 4). 
DEFINING EFFECTIVENESS
Effectiveness in ADR literature
 When looking into alternative dispute resolution (ADR) literature, a multitude of 
definitions are used to define effectiveness. Effectiveness is defined as resolving disputes,7 ending 
contention over the issue(s) in question, reaching an agreement between conflicting parties, 
and as ending future conflicts between the parties in conflict.8 Although these definitions may 
resemble each other, the nuances may lead to very different conclusions when assessing the effec-
tiveness of dispute resolution. If an NCP’s effectiveness is for instance assessed by the numbers of 
agreements reached, it may come as no surprise that the outcome may be very different to when 
the touchstone of an NCP’s effectiveness is ending future conflicts between parties. 
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Effectiveness according to the OECD Council
 Effectiveness forms the bedrock of NCPs. The OECD Council’s decision, not the 
Guidelines, highlights the paramount importance of effectiveness for NCPs, and turns it into 
a legal obligation for adhering states. Interestingly, the focus is not on NCPs or its specific 
instance procedure, but on the Guidelines. In other words, NCPs are primarily tasked to 
further the effectiveness of the Guidelines. Achievement of this aim can be stimulated through 
‘undertaking promotional activities, handling enquiries and contributing to the resolution of 
issues that arise relating to the implementation of the Guidelines in specific instances [emphasis 
added]’.9 Following from their primary task, one can infer that NCPs, via their specific instance 
procedure, must help resolve issues within the purview of the Guidelines, with the ultimate 
aim to further the effectiveness of the Guidelines. We are left in the dark as to what ‘the effec-
tiveness of the Guidelines’ exactly means, but the procedural guidance to the OECD Council’s 
decision does stipulate that for specific instances NCPs should act in a manner that is impar-
tial, predictable, equitable and compatible with the principles and standards of the Guidelines 
as well as to take into account that they act consistent with the core criteria of visibility, acces-
sibility, transparency, and accountability (to ensure functional equivalence between NCPs). 
Effectiveness criteria of UNGP 31
 Following his extended mandate,10 former Special Representative for Business and 
Human Rights to the UN Secretary-General, John Ruggie, operationalised and implemented 
the three pillars of the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework by drafting 31 Guiding 
Principles (GPs), which were unanimously endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council.11 GP 
31 defines a number of effectiveness criteria for non-judicial grievance mechanisms (NJGMs) 
and specifically address NCPs. NCPs act effectively if they meet the following criteria: legit-
imacy, accessibility, predictability, equitability, transparency, rights-compatibility, a source 
of continuous learning.12 Note the resemblances and dissimilarities with the core criteria for 
NCPs and specific instances. A certain amount of coherence is reached between GP 31 and the 
criteria laid down in the OECD Council’s decision, but some criteria, for example legitimacy, 
can only be found in one of the two frameworks.
Effectiveness according to OECD Watch
 OECD Watch has acted at the forefront of the movement for more effective NCPs. 
Within the context of its campaign ‘Effective NCPs now! Remedy is the reason’, OECD Watch 
has published a number of critical effectiveness factors. To stimulate parties to engage in a 
mediation, OECD Watch proposes two ‘sticks’: (i) through governments by attaching con-
sequences to decisions of NCPs; and (ii) through NCPs by enabling/forcing them to make 
determinations. OECD Watch reiterates that NCPs are also bound by the procedural guidance 
of the Council’s decision that stipulates the effectiveness criteria discussed earlier: visibility, 
accessibility, transparency, accountability, impartiality, predictability, equitability, and com-
patibility with the Guidelines.13  
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A synthesised definition
 Taking into account the aforementioned definitions, effectiveness purportedly con-
sists of various elements. In line with the Guidelines, the primary task of an NCP during spe-
cific instances is to resolve issues with the aim to further the effectiveness of the Guidelines. 
Reaching agreement between parties should therefore be the primary focus. Important mech-
anisms to ensure that agreements are reached are making determinations whenever parties 
fail to reach an agreement and policy coherence to make sure that certain consequences may 
be attached to unwanted behaviour. During specific instances, NCPs must meet the criteria 
laid down in GP 31 as well as the Council’s decision to strengthen its effectiveness, i.e. NCPs 
must meet the criteria of visibility, accessibility, transparency, accountability, impartiality, 
predictability, equitability, compatibility with the Guidelines, legitimacy and a source of con-
tinuous learning. Put together, we define effectiveness of a specific instance as ‘reaching agree-
ments between parties within the framework of the Guidelines with respect of the core criteria 
stipulated by the OECD Council’s decision and GP 31’.
MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS
Van Eyk’s effectiveness questions
 Literature on effectiveness criteria for NCPs is hard to find.14 A notable exception is 
the dissertation of Van Eyk. Van Eyk assessed the effectiveness of NCPs form a legal perspec-
tive during the 1990s. In order to assess the effectiveness of NCPs, she developed a set of effec-
tiveness criteria in the form of questions to be answered. All seven questions are enumerated 
in Table 1. The questions follow a hierarchical order. When assessing the effectiveness of NCPs, 
one must therefore start with the first question, then answer the second, and so on.15 
Effectiveness by providing remedy
 OECD Watch asserts that effectiveness is measured by the provision of remedy. Its 
report ‘Remedy remains rare’ largely hinges on the idea that remedy should be the central 
output of an NCP. Based on an analysis of 250 cases, OECD Watch found that in merely 35 
cases some sort of remedy was obtained, which is commensurate with NCPs failing to meet 
their primary obligation, i.e. ‘to further the effectiveness of the Guidelines’.16 Thus, effective 
specific instance procedures are equated with the effectuation of remedy. Its legal grounding 
is found in the OECD Council’s decision stipulating that NCPs are primary tasked to further 
the effectiveness of the Guidelines. To a certain extent, OECD Watch’s view resonates well with 
Ruggie’s perspective that NCPs ‘have the potential to provide effective remedy’.17
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Table 1.  Questions to assess the effectiveness of NCPs
EFFECTIVENESS QUESTION DESCRIPTION
Which entity is the supervision  
aimed at?
Supervision may be aimed at states or multinational 
enterprises, but also at instruments such as codes of 
conduct.
What is the legal character  
of the instrument of supervision?
The legal character of the supervisory instrument can 
be either legally binding or not legally binding.
What is the composition of the  
organ involved in supervision?
The supervisory organ may for example be composed 
of judges, arbitrators, (in)dependent experts or 
government officials.
On which level does the supervision 
take place?
Supervision can take place on the national, 
intergovernmental and international level.
What is the function of  
the supervision?
Three functions are possible. First, whether behaviour 
is in conformity with a system of norms (review 
function). Second, if behaviour is not in conformity 
with a system of norms, the supervisory mechanism 
must be able to impose sanctions (corrective function). 
Third, supervisory mechanisms must be able to clarify 
existing rules or to create new rules if necessary 
(creative function). A combination of functions may 
also exist.
Which instrument of supervision  
is used?
An instrument of supervision can relate to all three 
functions (review, correction or creative).
What is the level of effectiveness  
of the particular form of supervision?
Effectiveness is assessed by examining the results 
of the supervision. All previous questions must be 
answered first. Then it must be assessed whether:  
(i) the norms which have to be supervised are 
adequate; (ii) the supervisory procedure is adequate 
to meet the objectives of supervision; and (iii) the 
supervisory organ can function adequately.
Source: Eyk, S.C. van (1995), The OECD declaration and decisions concerning multinational enterprises.  
An attempt to tame the shrew, Ars Aequi Libri: Nijmegen, pp.77-78 and 84-86.
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Effectiveness by concluding agreements
 Sometimes, effectiveness of specific instances is defined as the number of times that 
agreements are concluded.18 This definition seems to be consonant with the Guidelines insofar 
as the Guidelines stipulate that NCPs need to contribute ‘to the resolution of issues that arise 
relating to the implementation of the Guidelines in specific instances’.19 Resolving issues in a 
non-adversarial manner during specific instances is a key task assigned to NCPs.
 Khoury and Whyte20 analysed the outcomes of 403 notifications submitted by NGOs 
and trade unions between 2002 and 2016. They found that in more than half of all instances, 
the notifications were either rejected, blocked, suspended or were awaiting a decision or did not 
receive any decision at all (see Figure 1). In the remaining 191 instances, parties did manage to 
conclude the procedure. Of these 191 instances, 102 brought about unfavourable results for one 
or more parties leaving them unsatisfied. In 49 of the 403 instances, parties managed to broker 
a mutually agreed deal. On an annual basis, this accounts for three to four cases whereby both 
the corporation as the complainant were satisfied with the outcome. These findings lead to 
Khoury and Whyte’s conclusion that the specific instance procedure is ‘largely ineffective’.
Figure 1. Outcomes of 403 notifications by NGOs and trade unions between 2002 and 2016
Source: Khoury, S. and D. Whyte (2017), A Cautionary Tale of Regulating Corporate Human Rights Abuses, 
University of Liverpool; Khoury, S. and D. Whyte (2017), A manufactured consensus, in: Corporate Human 
Rights Violations, Routledge: Oxon. 
 In a similar vein, the OECD assessed the effectiveness of specific instances between 
2011 and 2015. It concluded that in approximately 50% of all the instances, i.e. 26 specific 
instances, an agreement was reached between parties. This finding should be caveated, 
because the OECD only included notifications that were accepted for further examination and 
instances that were concluded, excluding all notifications that were rejected.21 By including 
the latter group of rejected notifications, the percentage of agreements reached would be most 
likely substantially lower. Hence, the discrepancy with the findings of Khoury and Whyte.
 In its annual reports, the OECD also gauges effectiveness through the number of 
agreements reached. In its 2016 annual report, the OECD reported that of the 38 specific 
instances, 14 were not accepted. Of the accepted cases, eight resulted in an agreement via the 
Concluded/withdrawn  191
139  Closed/rejected
15  Blocked
58  Suspended, led,
       pending or no decision
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specific instance procedure accounting for 34 per cent of all instances.22 Compared with a year 
earlier, whereby parties reached an agreement in 44 per cent of all accepted instances,23 the 
effectiveness rate of NCPs went down with 10 per cent.
CONCLUSION
In the advent of a possible revision of the Guidelines in 2021, it would be wise to include a clear 
definition of effectiveness of specific instances in the Guidelines or in the Council’s decision 
(preferably the latter). We conclude that the present situation does not offer sufficient clarity: 
effectiveness is measured in different ways and a mismatch exists between the effectiveness cri-
teria of the OECD and GP 31. We defined effectiveness of specific instances as ‘reaching agree-
ments between parties within the framework of the Guidelines with respect of the core criteria 
stipulated by the OECD Council’s decision and GP 31’, but it will be best if the core criteria of 
the OECD Council’s decision and GP 31 are unified. Attention needs to be paid to the role of 
determinations and remedy within specific instances as well as the need for policy coherence. 
 Even though procedural guidance is given, no guidance is given on remedy, keeping 
NCPs in limbo whether remedy is a necessary precondition for effective specific instances. 
Including provisions about remedy in the procedural guidance would be welcomed and may 
stipulate in which cases remedy is warranted (for example financial compensations cases 
versus policy changes). Procedural guidance is also needed on determinations. Currently, 
determinations are prescribed when deemed ‘appropriate’,24 leaving it to an NCP’s discretion 
whether or not to include a determination in its final statement. Guidance can be given in 
which instances determinations are mandatory for NCPs.
 A possible revision of the Guidelines and the related Council decision, sets us at a 
critical juncture offering the opportunity to fundamentally revise the concept of effectiveness 
enshrined within the Council’s decision. Literature provides ample direction as to how to rein-
force this concept of effectiveness. Promulgating recommendations, making available human 
and financial resources,25 stimulating the political will of NCPs to start procedures, more 
coercive powers for NCPs,26 independent NCP structures, consistency in decision-making, 
reducing physical barriers for parties involved, peer reviews between NCPs,27 transparency of 
procedures and concomitant media attention,28 creating oversight bodies, lowering thresholds 
to access the specific instance procedure29 – all are just a few recommendations given in litera-
ture to increase effectiveness.
 The time has come for the new Chair of the OECD Working Party on Responsible 
Business Conduct to step up the plate by seizing a unique opportunity to enhance the 
Guidelines and its related decision. The new Chair may draw on formidable work done by 
its predecessor Roel Nieuwenkamp and can work towards even stronger and more effective 
Guidelines. It is our hope that more attention will be paid to the concept of effectiveness and 
that it will form the cornerstone of the specific instance procedure. If we have a clearly delin-
eated definition and a comprehensive set of criteria, we are convinced that specific instances 
may become more effective in the long run. 
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In his impressive work with the 2011 revision of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines) and the follow up, Roel Nieuwenkamp has always been a person who has listened to the voices of stakeholders – the persons who should be involved in a process. What better topic, then, as a tribute to Roel, than discussing how the voices of 
affected persons should be identified and brought forward under the Guidelines, and, espe-
cially, under the new OECD Due Diligence Guidance Documents that have been shaped and 
adopted under Roel’s leadership.
 Why is it important to include the voices of those affected? As is well known, the 
activities of multinational enterprises can affect many people worldwide positively or nega-
tively. How this happens is often difficult to predict. People should be heard because their input 
could get the facts straight, could raise the values that should be considered and, most of all, 
would clarify and present the interests and rights of local communities and individuals that 
need to be taken into account.
 Among the most important new features of the 2011 revision of the Guidelines, 
chaired by Roel, was the introduction of a human rights chapter, the general due diligence 
requirements and company responsibility for supply chains. The combination of a general due 
diligence requirement and the new chapter on human rights as well as supply chain respon-
sibility introduced a new method for companies’ management of their activities.1 After 2011, 
the work of the Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct in the OECD has focused 
much of its effort on implementing this through the development of specific guidance doc-
uments. The most recent is the Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct 
to be launched in June 2018. This is a general guidance document on the use of due diligence 
processes while all the previous guidance documents have been sector specific. 
 The starting point is the provision of the Guidelines on due diligence which states that 
enterprises should “Carry out risk-based due diligence, […], to identify, prevent and mitigate 
actual and potential adverse impacts […], and account for how these impacts are addressed.”2 
Alongside this, a separate provision was introduced with respect to stakeholder engagement. 
Enterprises should engage “with relevant stakeholders in order to provide meaningful oppor-
tunities for their views to be taken into account in relation to planning and decision making 
for projects or other activities that may significantly impact local communities.”3  
 With respect to due diligence, the official commentary to the Guidelines provides 
that the “nature and extent of due diligence, such as the specific steps to be taken, appropriate 
to a particular situation will be affected by factors such as the size of the enterprise, context of 
its operations, the specific recommendations in the Guidelines, and the severity of its adverse 
impacts.”4 The context of the operations is key to what sort of stakeholder engagement that is 
necessary. On stakeholder engagement, the Commentary explains that it “involves interactive 
processes of engagement with relevant stakeholders, through, for example, meetings, hear-
ings or consultation proceedings”. It is further said that “[e]ffective stakeholder engagement is 
characterized by two-way communication and depends on the good faith of the participants 
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on both sides”. It is said to be “particularly helpful in the planning and decision-making con-
cerning projects or other activities involving, for example, the intensive use of land or water, 
which could significantly affect local communities”.5
 In the Guidelines themselves, nothing more is said about stakeholder engagement. 
The intended relationship between stakeholder engagement and the due diligence process 
is not made clear.6  Should stakeholder engagement be part of or supporting the due dil-
igence process? In the subsequent diligence guidance documents, however, the stakeholder 
engagement activities have been included as important parts of the due diligence process. 
This has happened in an interchange with the due diligence thinking related to the United 
Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights.7 The document which is devoted 
exclusively to stakeholder engagement, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Meaningful 
Stakeholder Engagement in the Extractive Sector (Extractive Sector Guidance, or Guidance), 
refers explicitly to the two provisions of the Guidelines on stakeholder engagement and on due 
diligence quoted above when explaining the background of the document.8 In the other due 
diligence guidance documents, stakeholder engagement is also included as part of the process, 
albeit a little differently in the individual documents, at least partly because of the different 
contexts in which the sector activities will take place.
 Including stakeholder engagement in the due diligence process raises questions about 
who the stakeholders are and how they should be involved. Answers to these questions are 
most extensively provided in the Extractive Sector Guidance just mentioned. The document 
is comprehensive with its 118 pages. Before looking into that, however, it is important to say 
something about the drafting process of the guidance. It was drafted by the OECD secretariat 
of the Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct, supported by an important Advisory 
Group. This group consisted of representatives of some OECD member state governments, 
industry representatives from relevant business organizations, as well as representatives from 
some important companies in the sector like AngloAmerican and Shell, some civil society 
representatives, some representatives from international organizations like the International 
Labour Organization  and the International Finance Corporation, and finally representatives 
from the Sami, Ogoni and Kamchatka communities.9 Such a manner of working is normally 
called a multi-stakeholder process. That name demonstrates also the vagueness of the stake-
holder concept. Most of the interests represented were not people who would be affected by 
extractive sector activities. It is important to note however that representatives of three indig-
enous peoples were included. The idea of working in this manner is that different perspectives 
will be included and improve the document while at the same time establishing a buy-in into 
the outcome by several interested parties, thereby also furthering the distribution of the docu-
ment when finalized. The wide participation by important actors demonstrates the convening 
power of the OECD.
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 Who are the stakeholders? That is explained in the Extractive Sector Guidance as 
“persons or groups who are or could be directly or indirectly affected by a project or activity”.10 
A non-exhaustive list is provided that covers potentially impacted local communities 
(including nomadic communities, communities living near an extractive concession, down-
stream from a river near the site, or along a transport route or near associated infrastructure 
such as energy grids or processing plants), indigenous peoples, farmers, workers (including 
local and migrant workers), artisanal miners, host governments (local, regional and national), 
and, local civil society organizations, community-based organizations and local human rights 
defenders. All of these are potentially directly affected by an extractive industry project in the 
mining or oil and gas sectors.
 On the same page, there is also another list of so-called “Additionally interested stake-
holders”. That group may include non-governmental organizationss, industry peers, investors/ 
shareholders, business partners and the media. That these parties are included within the 
stakeholder concept, demonstrates the difficulties with that as a concept. There is a funda-
mental difference between these two groups since the first group covers those persons or 
organizations that are directly vulnerable, the potential victims and their own representatives, 
while the other group covers what we could call other interested parties. It is the voices of the 
first group that should be important in the due diligence process. Some of the stakeholders are 
also identified as rights-holders. The Guidance uses the term “rights-holders in the context of 
stakeholders subject to real or potential human rights impacts” because that is the language 
of the Guidelines themselves.11 Depending on how broadly one interprets some human rights, 
also environmental impacts may be human rights violations.
How should stakeholders be involved? That is the most important part of the Extractive Sector Guidance. Here, there is only room for looking into a few aspects. The Guidance is organized with tables assisting the enterprise in the dif-ferent steps of the stakeholder engagement. Step 2 is about identifying priority 
stakeholders and interlocutors. As an example, Table 4. Identifying potential human rights 
impacts of extractive activities, lists 10 issues, from resettlement via security and cultural her-
itage to environmental degradation and gives examples of potential human rights impacts as 
well as factors increasing the likelihood of impacts and the relevant types of stakeholders.
 At the core of the Guidance, covering 18 pages, is step 4 titled Designing appropriate 
and effective stakeholder engagement activities and processes with its Table 6. Identifying 
and applying best practices to engagement activities. Here different stages of the engagement 
are analyzed and issues to consider as well as best practices identified. The different stages 
are Information Sharing, Consultation/Learning, Negotiation, Consent, Implementing 
Commitments, Adressing Adverse Impacts and Benefit Sharing. Here it is for example explic-
itly stated with respect to information sharing that the target audience should be able to access 
the information and be able to understand it, that use of collected information should be 
accessible by those that provide it, that negotiations should take place under equitable terms, 
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that conditions of consent and for withdrawing consent should be clearly defined, that mis-
alignment in expectations should be addressed as soon as possible et cetera. In another table, 
at page 72 of the Guidance, capacity constraints are addressed and it is suggested to provide 
direct support to a local community to make the group able to participate in consulting and 
negotiations.
 A special important feature of the Extractive Sector Guidance is the annexes that 
address specific topics when engaging with indigenous peoples, with women and with workers 
and trade unions. All of the annexes emphasize how to understand the respective context. 
With respect to indigenous peoples, customary land rights are mentioned. In the annex on 
engaging with women, it is pointed out that some impacts may affect men and women dif-
ferently and examples are given. When engaging with workers where trade unions are not 
established, special advice is given.
 Also in the other sector guidance documents on conflict minerals, agriculture, 
garment and footwear and to some extent, the guidance on Responsible Business Conduct for 
Institutional Investors and the new general Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business 
include stakeholder engagement in the due diligence processes. In some cases, they also refer 
to the more developed coverage of the Extractive Sector Guidance.
 How can we characterize the story outlined above? The development of the stake-
holder engagement thinking from the few lines of the 2011 Guidelines to the integrated role 
and the extensive practical advice that we find in the hundreds of pages of guidance docu-
ments is astonishing. When the Guidelines were adopted in 1976 it was as a quid pro quo for 
increased investment liberalization. If a country opened up for more foreign direct investment, 
the multinational enterprises should behave themselves.12 The change of perspective in the 
Guidelines and the guidance documents from the enterprise and host country dualism to the 
inclusion of the affected persons with their own interests and rights is striking and demon-
strates a changed way of thinking about companies and their roles. Through striving to give 
voice to, among others, the most vulnerable people, the OECD has made an important effort 
to smoothen some of the negative consequences of globalization. Now, the job is to make these 
guidance documents work on the ground.
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The third pillar of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(UNGPs) recognizes the critical need for appropriate and effective remedy when human 
rights are breached through a failure of state duty or business responsibility.1 Among the 
avenues to remedy outlined in the UNGPs, Principle 27 calls on states to provide access to 
state-based non-judicial grievance mechanisms (NJGMs) for the remedy of corporate-related 
human rights abuses. The National Contact Point (NCP) system of the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines) has the potential to be that state-based mechanism. 
From 2011 to 2018, with Dr. Roel Nieuwenkamp as Chair of the OECD Working Party on 
Responsible Business Conduct (WPRBC), the NCP system made important improvements to 
its handling of cases. While Roel has got NCPs started in the right direction, there is still a long 
way to travel on the road to remedy. In order for the NCPs to truly be considered a provider of 
effective access to meaningful remedy, critical reforms are needed.
NCPS WITHIN THE “BOUQUET OF REMEDIES”
In 2017, the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights proposed that rights holders 
should be able to access a “bouquet of remedies,” both judicial and non-judicial, to meet their 
particular circumstances, needs, and desires.2 We have previously used the metaphor of the 
human anatomy to describe the remedy system. Judicial mechanisms function as the back-
bone: rule-based, they uphold the core standards of the system, handling the most serious 
cases and ensuring a backstop for the essential requirements of accountability. Simultaneously, 
NJGMs function as the fingertips. They are sensitive, able to reach challenges inaccessible to the 
spine and respond flexibly and creatively to evolving problems. Without the spine, the system 
cannot survive – but the fingertips are also essential, ensuring responses to harms that would 
otherwise go unanswered, and often preventing small problems from becoming disasters.
 Among NJGMs, the NCPs hold a unique place with clear potential to provide access 
to remedy for victims of corporate abuse. First, the NCPs are state-run: governments adhering 
to the OECD are bound under international law to establish an effective NCP and provide 
them sufficient funding and resources to meet the responsibilities set out for them. The man-
datory engagement of states in the complaints procedure offers potential for stronger account-
ability for wrongdoing, and paves the way for wider normative and legal shift in cognizance 
of corporate human rights harms. Second, the NCPs have broad scope: they must be open to 
complaints pertaining to a wide array of corporate misconduct, concern businesses across the 
gamut of sectors and value chains, and identify harms to people beyond the national or juris-
dictional borders of the NCP host country. 
n JOSEPH M. WILDE-RAMSING
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: A GLASS HALF FULL 85 n
CURRENT STATE OF REMEDY THROUGH THE NCPS
Especially in recent years, governments around the globe have increasingly recognized the 
NCPs as a critical tool for ensuring access to remedy.In 2014, Roel Nieuwenkamp led the way 
by observing that the NCP mechanism’s specific added value in the international corporate 
accountability arena is “through providing access to remedy.”3 In 2015, G7 leaders com-
mitted themselves to “strengthening mechanisms for providing access to remedy, including 
the NCPs.”4  In 2016, the Council of Europe linked the Guidelines to remedy and urged EU 
members to further enhance their NCPs for this purpose.5 And in 2017, the G20 leaders cited 
the NCPs in relation to remedy,6 while the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
issued an opinion that NCPs “[have] the power to offer remedy.”7 
 The Commentary to UNGP Principle 25 clearly defines “remedy” to include “apologies, 
restitution, rehabilitation, financial or non-financial compensation and punitive sanctions,” as 
well as “the prevention of harm through, for example, injunctions or guarantees of non-repetition.”8 
 During Roel’s tenure as Chair of the WPRBC, a handful of cases have achieved outcomes 
meeting that definition. For example, in 2017, a complaint filed with the Dutch NCP resulted 
in Congolese beer factory workers receiving an apology as well as compensatory damages 
in excess of US$ 1.3 million from Heineken.9 Another recent NCP complaint prevented a 
destructive oil drilling project from going forward in a World Heritage Site in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.10  
 Despite these few bright spots in the NCP remedy landscape, the fact remains that 
most NCPs have not come close to affording complainants access to the array of remedies out-
lined in the UNGPs. In fact, many NCPs have interpreted their specific instance mandate so 
narrowly as to exclude real remedy altogether, encompassing mere facilitation of discussion on 
alleged breaches of the Guidelines.11 This is a serious problem, for to be “rights-compatible” a 
grievance mechanism must provide remedies that are “appropriate to the severity of the harm 
suffered.”12
REFORMS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE REMEDY
What reforms are needed, then, to help NCPs accomplish their mission to provide effective 
access to remedy for victims of corporate abuse? 
 For one, NCPs must be organized in such a way as to encourage impartial deci-
sion-making. Evidence has shown that NCPs consisting either of a panel of independent 
experts, a multipartite organization with participants from several stakeholder groups, or an 
entity overseen by a steering board, are more likely to achieve positive outcomes. Such was the 
case in both of the two bright-star cases cited above.13  
 In addition to appropriate structure, NCPs need sufficient resources. This includes 
funding for basic office operations, including full-time staff, external trained mediators, 
and fact-finding field visits. It also means resources to help indigent complainants use the 
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mechanism, such as assistance with language translation or travel to mediation.14 A little flex-
ibility can go far, such as through holding mediations in embassies, or providing web-based 
meetings. 
 Resourcing seriously impacts NCPs’ accessibility to complainants – and indeed access 
is a third area of reforms critically needed at NCPs. To start, NCPs must increase the visi-
bility of their services through better websites and outreach to the civil society groups that 
support claims.15 NCPs must also eliminate undue barriers to eligibility – such as a material 
and “proven” standard of harm, bars on cases concerning future harms, or unfair statutes of 
limitations.16  
 Another challenge impacting access is complainants’ fear of reprisals. Community 
members and human rights defenders have experienced threats and harassment for filing NCP 
complaints.17 This is a growing problem worldwide, and NCPs must do their own part to protect 
users of the mechanism by adopting safety protocols and emergency response procedures.
To afford real remedy, NCPs must also be transparent and predictable. NCPs must set and 
follow reasonable timelines for processing complaints, and communicate regularly with both 
parties on complaint status. They must base their final statements only on material available to 
both parties. And they must seek a meaningful balance between protecting trade secrets and 
respecting the impact civil society campaigning has in righting the power imbalance between 
parties and bringing corporations to the mediating table.18
 Sixth, governments must require NCPs to follow-up on case outcomes. Few NCPs 
monitor whether parties actually implement the recommendations given them.19  
 But perhaps the most critical areas of reform are in the mind-sets and approaches that 
governments take to interpreting and implementing their NCP mandate. If NCPs are serious 
about providing victims good offices to resolve allegations of corporate-related human rights 
harms, then NCPs must be willing to assign consequences to businesses that refuse to mediate. 
Consequences can include exclusion from trade promotion privileges, public procurement 
contracts, export credit guarantees, and investment missions. 
 Similarly, if NCPs are serious about meeting their legal responsibility to promote 
adoption of the Guidelines, then they should make clear determinations of non-compliance 
with the OECD Guidelines when mediation does not result in an agreement. Evidence shows 
that an NCP’s willingness to make determinations of non-compliance increases the chances of 
successful dispute resolution, encouraging parties to meaningfully engage in mediation.20  
THE ROAD TO REMEDY
The NCP grievance system has significant potential to respond to and reverse harms caused 
to individuals by business activity. To get there, governments must explicitly recognize that 
remedy is the reason for the NCP mechanism. With that understanding as a firm foundation to 
the pursuit for functional equivalence at NCPs and to the upcoming revision of the Guidelines, 
NCPs will progress on the path to remedy.
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American labour law and labour relations culture pose special challenges to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines, or Guidelines). They also test the United States’ National Contact Point (US NCP, or NCP) when it considers cases of global firms’ labour violations in the United States. 
Understanding and addressing this challenge is important, since a large majority of cases in 
the United States arise under the Guidelines chapter on employment and industrial relations. 
This essay discusses policy coherence and effectiveness in light of the U.S. national labour law 
and labour relations framework, and offers a perspective for advancing the Guidelines’ goals 
via-à-vis the United States in a possible future review.
POLICY COHERENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS
The 2011 Review increased the Guidelines’ scope, rigor, and effectiveness. It pushed the United 
States and its NCP to improve performance compared with earlier years. The NCP adopted more 
forthright approaches on parallel proceedings and supply-chain relationships, with positive 
effects in specific instances taken up in recent years. The NCP also greatly enhanced its website 
and launched new “proactive” outreach and education efforts on the Guidelines. To this extent, 
mission accomplished. However, in key respects – especially in the labour rights arena – the 
United States is still falling short of a fully functioning and effective role in the system.
 The US NCP has brought its policy and practice more in line with the purposes 
of the 2011 review and approaches of peer NCPs. Nonetheless, persistent shortfalls in the US 
NCP’s application of the Guidelines have allowed companies to continue evading accounta-
bility in the employment and industrial relations area. 
The biggest challenge is the universal refusal by companies violating workers’ rights in the 
United States to accept the NCP’s offers of mediation, with no consequences attaching. Foreign 
firms’ American management “stonewall” the NCP with impunity while the parent companies 
wash their hands of the matter. 
 The central challenge to coherence and effectiveness in the Guidelines’ application 
to labour-related matters in the United States is the disconnect between US labour practices 
and the Guidelines’ incorporation of the International Labour Organization’s core stand-
ards on freedom of association. American labour law and policy allow employers openly and 
aggressively to interfere with workers’ organizing and collective bargaining rights. But such 
interference is contrary to the Guidelines and to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (UNGPs), which the Guidelines incorporated in the 2011 review.
 Employers’ interference permitted by US labour law include requiring employees 
to attend forced-listening “captive-audience meetings” filled with vitriolic denunciations of 
trade unions, scorn for collective bargaining, and suggestions of dire consequences – espe-
cially workplace closure – if workers choose union representation. Management sends the 
same message in letters and CDs to workers’ homes, aimed equally at employees’ spouses and 
family members.
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 In captive meetings, managers convey these warnings through scripted speeches, 
power point presentations, films, and even by live actors portraying management and union 
representatives. The actors make unionists appear to be ignorant thugs only interested in 
getting dues money from workers, and managers to be enlightened leaders with workers’ best 
interests at heart. Interference also takes the form of required one-on-one meetings between 
workers and their immediate supervisor, with supervisors trained and scripted in advance by 
anti-union consultants who specialize in derailing union organizing efforts. 
 In both settings – captive-audience sessions and one-on-one meetings – man-
agement also declares that they can and will permanently replace workers who exercise the 
right to strike. Permanent replacement of workers who strike is allowed by a Supreme Court 
decision in 1938.1 The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association has ruled that the striker 
replacement doctrine violates Convention No. 87, one of the core ILO conventions.2 
 The US NCP has been powerless against the use of such tactics by foreign-based 
companies in their American workplaces. Local managers say they are simply availing them-
selves of practices permitted under US labour law. Meanwhile, parent-company management 
say that US labour law is too complicated for them, so they leave it to their American managers 
and lawyers. For its part, the NCP does not insist that parent company management answer for 
the actions of their subordinates.
 Reliance on national law and practice is not a defence to a violation of the OECD 
Guidelines. Where national law fails to comply with international standards, multinational 
enterprises should conform to international standards as long as such conformance does not 
put them in outright conflict with national law. 
 The OECD Guidelines make this point at the outset, in Chapter I on Concepts and 
Principles: [S]ome matters covered by the Guidelines may also be regulated by national law...[I]
n countries where domestic laws and regulations conflict with the principles and standards of the 
Guidelines, enterprises should seek ways to honour such principles and standards to the fullest 
extent which does not place them in violation of domestic law.3
 Foreign firms in no way would violate domestic US labour law by halting cap-
tive-audience meetings and anti-union propaganda campaigns, no longer threatening to 
permanently replace workers who exercise the right to strike, and no longer perpetrating 
other forms of interference with workers’ organizing rights. American employers themselves 
concede that US labour law and practice contravene ILO standards. The very organization 
which represents US employers at the ILO, the U.S. Council for International Businesses, states: 
U.S. law and practice conflict with many of the requirements of the ILO standards, preventing 
U.S. ratification of some of the core labour standards....U.S. ratification of Conventions 87 and 
98 would require particularly extensive revisions of longstanding principles of U.S. labour law to 
conform to their standards....U.S. ratification of the convention would prohibit all acts of employer 
and union interference in organizing, which would eliminate employers’ rights under the NLRA 
to oppose unions.4 
LANCE COMPA n
n 92 OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: A GLASS HALF FULL
THE NISSAN CASE
An important case exemplifies this problem. In April 2014, the United Auto Workers union 
(UAW) and the global union IndustriALL submitted a complaint to the US NCP on Nissan 
Motors’ interference with employees’ trade union rights at its Canton, Mississippi factory. 
Since opening the plant in the early 2000s, Nissan managers kept up an aggressive anti-union 
campaign driving home a central message that workers’ jobs would be in jeopardy if they 
formed a trade union. 
Contrary to ILO core labour standards and core conventions incorporated into the 
Guidelines, Nissan undertook a systematic campaign of interference with employees’ organ-
izing efforts. Management tactics included:
Telling employees when they are hired that “Nissan is totally non-union and 
“Nissan has never had a union,” despite the fact that Nissan recognizes and bargains with 
unions at facilities all around the world, and telling employees that “unions make plants close”; 
n  Holding mandatory captive audience meetings with videos, films, 
PowerPoint presentations and speeches vilifying trade unions in 
general, and the UAW in particular, and implying that Nissan will close 
the Canton plant or not bring new product lines into the plant  
if workers choose union representation;
n  Training and instructing supervisors on how to convey implicit 
threats to workers in one-on-one meetings between a supervisor and 
an individual employee, with no one else present to witness what the 
supervisor tells the employee;
n  Denying employees the right to hear from UAW representatives inside 
the workplace (in a time and manner that does not interfere with 
production), as called for under international standards on freedom of 
association.
Management’s anti-union campaign also contravened the long-standing posi-
tion of the OECD reflected in the following decision by the Committee on Investment: [I]n 
specific instances, active efforts may have been undertaken to discourage organising activities 
of employees. The Committee regrets that such situations continue to exist or arise and takes 
the present opportunity to stress again the provisions of the Guidelines as these apply to the 
question of employee representation. The Committee has therefore reaffirmed the view already 
expressed in both the 1979 and 1984 Review Reports that the thrust of the Guidelines in this area 
is towards management adopting a positive approach towards the activities of trade unions and 
an open attitude towards organisational activities of workers in the framework of national rules 
and practices.5 
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 The “framework of national rules and practices” in no way exculpates manage-
ment’s actions. Nothing in US labour law and practice encourages poisonous anti-union cam-
paigns like the one that Nissan managers launched against workers’ organizing efforts. Indeed, 
a “positive approach” and “open attitude” are entirely lawful, and indeed widely practiced by 
many employers in the United States when workers engage in trade union formation.6 
 Notified of the unions’ submission and asked to respond, Nissan’s American 
lawyers first told the national contact point that engaging in mediation would put Nissan in 
violation of American labour law. 
 The NCP rightly rejected this argument, saying, “the US NCP strongly disagrees 
and is not aware of any applicable law or procedures that would weigh against offering its good 
offices in this case.”7
 Nissan’s attorneys also argued that unions’ merely notifying their members about 
the filing of the specific instance violated confidentiality requirements. The unions did not 
disclose the text of their complaint, nor any of the further exchanges in the specific instance 
process.  
 The US NCP correctly denied this claim: With respect to the parties’ differing posi-
tions regarding whether the unions’ acted consistently with the confidentiality provisions of the U.S. 
NCP procedures by publicizing the submission of the Specific Instance, it is the position of the U.S. 
NCP that public reference to the filing of the Specific Instance is not inconsistent with those provi-
sions such that it would warrant further NCP action or breach of confidentiality by the parties.8 
 The NCP found that the matters raised were bona fide and merited further exam-
ination. After more exchanges with the unions and the company, the NCP offered its good 
offices to encourage a mediation process for a mutually agreeable resolution of the dispute. It 
proposed that the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) conduct the mediation, 
and asked the parties to meet with FMCS officials about procedures. The unions accepted the 
NCP’s offer and met with FMCS representatives. Nissan rejected the NCP’s offer and refused 
to meet the mediators, bringing the case to a close.9 
THE FINAL STATEMENT
The US NCP issued a Final Statement describing the course of events and expressing regret 
at Nissan’s unwillingness to participate in the process. The NCP also made two recommen-
dations: (i) that Nissan conduct a corporate-wide labour rights review, and (ii) that Nissan 
consider alternative methods of mediation or otherwise engaging with the unions to seek a res-
olution to the issues raised in the OECD complaint. Nissan has not reacted to or implemented 
these recommendations. 
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The NCP’s expression of regret and recommendations were as much as it could 
muster in the fact of Nissan’s recalcitrance. The unions could point to these elements of the 
NCP’s final statement to inform other labour groups, NGOs, socially responsible investors, 
journalists, government officials and other potential allies in the court of public opinion about 
what they see as Nissan’s failure to comply with the Guidelines. But they could not point to a 
determination that Nissan violated the Guidelines.
The National Contact Points of the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Norway and 
others make findings about companies’ compliance with the Guidelines. That is, while they 
cannot compel firms to accept their offers of mediation, these NCPs will determine whether 
companies have or have not violated the Guidelines, based on all the information gathered 
in the specific instance process. These are not judicial findings exposing companies to legal 
liability, since the Guidelines reflect a “soft law” system without hard-law enforcement. But 
they make a powerful statement about the Guidelines and expectations of firms’ compliance.
In contrast, the US NCP limits itself to deciding whether issues raised in a com-
plaint merit further attention, without determining whether companies complied with or vio-
lated the Guidelines. As the NCP stated in the Nissan decision: The U.S. NCP does not make 
a determination whether the party is acting consistently with the Guidelines, and the U.S. NCP 
does not have legal authority to adjudicate disputes submitted under this process. Acceptance of 
the Specific Instance is in no way an acknowledgement of or determination on the merits of the 
claims presented, but merely an offer to facilitate neutral, third-party mediation or conciliation 
to assist the parties in voluntarily, confidentially, and in good faith, reaching a cooperative reso-
lution of their concerns.
The US NCP’s failure to determine whether Nissan was acting consistently with 
the Guidelines neutered their coherence and effectiveness in this case. Other cases involving 
labour rights violations in the United States by foreign multinational companies came to the 
same dead end.10 
ADVANCING THE GUIDELINES’ GOALS IN A POSSIBLE FUTURE REVIEW
A future review of the Guidelines can clarify that all National Contact Points should make 
findings about companies’ compliance with or violations of the Guidelines when they refuse 
to accept a National Contact Point’s offer of mediation. Making this an available tool can help 
persuade firms to accept mediation or, if they refuse, serve as a justified rebuke within the 
Guidelines’ soft-law system. 
A future review should also allow submitting parties alleging violations of the 
Guidelines by subsidiaries in a host country of parent companies in a home country to have 
their case handled by the National Contact Point of either country or both. The National 
Contact Points should jointly and co-equally administer the case. If they believe that an offer 
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of mediation is appropriate, each should make the offer to the corporate office in its jurisdic-
tion: one to the firm’s management in the host country, one to the parent company manage-
ment in the home country. In the United States, at least, this will address the problem of the 
headquarters office “washing its hands” regarding labour violations by U. management. 
 The 2011 review’s attention to “due diligence” creates an opening for such a move. 
Nissan is a Japan-based multinational company, but France-based Renault owns a controlling 
interest in Nissan. Renault and Nissan formed a strategic alliance in 1999 which is incorpo-
rated in the Netherlands.
 A key issue in the Nissan case was the failure of due diligence by Nissan manage-
ment in Japan, Renault management in France (the controlling interest in Nissan), and man-
agement of the Renault-Nissan Alliance in the Netherlands. Parent company executives knew 
of their American management’s actions and failed to act to stop it. In a framework articulated 
in the UNGPs, they:
 n  Failed to assess actual and potential impacts on workers’ freedom  
of association;
 n  Failed to avoid causing or contributing to adverse impacts on workers’ 
freedom of association;
 n  Failed to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts on workers’ freedom  
of association that are directly linked to their operations.11 
 Local management’s conduct in the United States is the backdrop to these cases, 
but the real issue is failure of due diligence by controlling parent-company management. The 
place where top management makes the decision to allow American managers and lawyers to 
stonewall the NCP is the locus of the violation of the Guidelines. The US NCP should insist 
that counterpart National Contact Points work jointly to bring parent company management 
into the mediation process, not allowing them to say “we’re leaving this to our American man-
agers.” A future review should make such joint-case handling imperative.
LANCE COMPA n
n 96 OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: A GLASS HALF FULL
CONCLUSION
The OECD Guidelines and the NCP mechanism provide a viable, accessible international 
forum in which civil society actors can make rights-based claims beyond a national legal 
framework. To its credit, the US NCP does as much as it can, within the constraints of the 
non-determination policy, to find complaints to be bona fide and worthy of further treatment, 
to offer mediation, to make substantive recommendations, to refute specious employer argu-
ments about confidentiality, and so on. This at least allows advocates to refer to these steps 
when they seek to hold companies accountable for violations.
However, the soft-law nature of the Guidelines and the NCP mechanism allow no 
further recourse when a global firm refuses to engage in the process. In labour cases espe-
cially, the US NCP’s handling of specific instances contains dissonant results. While it finds 
that issues are bona fide and merit an offer of arbitration, its refusal to comment on a firms’ 
compliance or non-compliance with the Guidelines vitiates the force of its decision and leaves 
companies “off the hook” for their actions, even when evidence of violations is ample and 
compelling.
Nothing in this comment intends to criticize individual US government officials 
carrying out the functions of the national contact point. The US NCP post has always been 
held by civil servants whose job is not to make policy but to implement it. Primary responsi-
bility for the US NCP rests with senior political appointees who have failed to give it stronger 
tools to hold multinational companies accountable for violations of the Guidelines. A future 
review of the Guidelines can go far to strengthen the Guidelines’ impact in the United States 
and the role of the US NCP.
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China National Textile and Apparel Council
China, the OECD and 
responsible business conduct: 
10 years on
A piece dedicated to Roel Nieuwenkamp, 
One of the “RBC brothers”
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THE FIRST CONTACT
In November 2007, Mr. Ken Davies, the OECD’s China investment expert, conducted a 
research mission to China with the support of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. Included 
in his destinations in China, were four textile and garment factories in Guangdong province. 
According to Mr. Davies, the visits “were organised by the China National Textile and Apparel 
Council (CNTAC). The OECD team was accompanied by a lawyer from CNTAC…”
Yes, I was the “lawyer” from CNTAC, but I was not acting as a lawyer per se during 
that visit. Before Mr. Davies’s visit, I had been working at the Office for Social Responsibility 
of CNTAC - first of its kind in China - for two years. It was the time when “corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) in China” was being translated into “CSR of China”, and one of the mile-
stones of such transition was the release by CNTAC in 2005, the CSC9000T, China’s first 
standardised social responsibility management system and code of conduct. By the time Mr. 
Davies paid his visit to China, various local CSR initiatives were being fermented, stirring 
up excitement and uncertainty. And actually, two months after Mr. Davies’s visit to China, 
the Chinese State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council (SASAC) issued its groundbreaking Guidelines for State-owned Enterprises Directly 
under the Central Government on Fulfilling Corporate Social Responsibilities.
It is not surprising, however, that the OECD had left no footprint in this transition. 
For one thing, the conservative or resistant perception on CSR still remained at a certain 
level of resonance within the Chinese political circle. As late as in 2005, CSR was still labelled 
as a means of western protectionism by some Chinese officials and media. For another, the 
OECD, its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines), along with the concept of 
responsible business conduct (RBC) that it was upheld as a synonym of CSR, were practically 
strangers to the Chinese business society. As a result, the OECD had literally no impact on the 
first generation of Chinese CSR initiatives. Mr. Davies reported later in 2008 that the OECD 
Guidelines were “reportedly used as references in the development of” the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange’s Social Responsibility Instructions to Listed Companies, but no report or document 
or interviews from that time could support his claim. Despite frequent meetings, talks and 
visits by the OECD on the topic of RBC in China in 2005-2007, the OECD was away from the 
actual practice of RBC/CSR of the Chinese business. 
This is why the 2007 OECD trip to the textile and garment factories in Guangdong 
facilitated by CNTAC was extraordinary: the four factories were pilots of a major CSC9000T 
implementing program, and hence the visit was the first close look of the OECD at an operating 
Chinese CSR/RBC initiative on the ground. As rightly put by Mr. Davies himself, “the intention 
of visiting them was to see what is possible in existing Chinese conditions”. Although, after the 
visit, Mr. Davies believed these factories “should not be seen as typical Chinese factories” as they 
“were selected for observation”, which we did not do, his general conclusion was rather encour-
aging. Mr. Davies concluded that “to the extent that high standards of RBC are exhibited in these 
workplaces, they may serve as models for other Chinese enterprises to follow”.
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THE SECOND BOTTLE OF CHAMPAGNE
Seven long years had passed before the OECD would touch base again with the Chinese 
business CSR/RBC practitioners in 2014. In these years, social responsibility, or sometimes 
responsible business, was frequently referred to by the Chinese state leaders, and more Chinese 
business associations had developed their own CSR or sustainability guidance or standards, 
including those of international contractors, electronics, banking, and mining sectors et 
cetera. I was one of the key drafters of most of these guidance or standards. I know that many 
different international documents or standards were referenced by these Chinese sectorial ini-
tiatives, but not the Guidelines, although in most cases, I shared the Guidelines among the 
drafting teams. The reason for this exclusion remained a political one: China is not part of the 
OECD, which is a club for western and developed countries. 
 Meanwhile, the inception of the RBC Unit of the OECD - the team of Mr. Roel 
Nieuwenkamp - would change this predicament by making RBC a topic of common interest 
between the Chinese government and the OECD. In late 2014, the RBC Unit visited China at the 
invitation of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, and had talks with CNTAC and the Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and Chemicals Importers & Exporters (CCCMC), 
which was just about to finalise its Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Investment. 
Two rather diplomatic moves were made during this visit: the OECD invited CNTAC to join 
its advisory group of the Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains in the Garment 
and Footwear Sector, and a Memorandum Of Understanding between CCCMC and the OECD 
to promote RBC and due diligence was signed. The CCCMC also invited the RBC Unit to 
provide comments on its Guidelines being finalised. 
 Premier Li Keqiang’s historic visit to the OECD in July 2015 set a milestone for the 
cooperation between China and the OECD. Included in the Joint Programme of Work for 
2015-16 signed between the Chinese government and the OECD during this visit were two 
important action items: the OECD was to support CCCMC in developing the Chinese Due 
Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains, and Chinese business associa-
tions, such as CNTAC and CCCMC, were to establish a cross-sectorial platform for promoting 
RBC. This should be seen as the beginning of a new era for the collaboration between China 
and the OECD on RBC. 
 As the lead Chinese expert in the development of the Chinese Due Diligence Guidelines 
for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains, I had the opportunity to work with the OECD RBC 
team, led by Mr. Roel Nieuwenkamp, for a whole year. Their knowledge, professionalism as well 
as devotion have made it possible for the Guidelines to be completed by the end of 2015. It was 
the ever-first Chinese CSR initiative that has publicly made reference to its OECD counterpart, 
and was actually, a joint effort between the OECD RBC Unit and Chinese business and their 
stakeholders. At a reception celebrating the launch of the Guidelines, Mr. Roel Nieuwenkamp 
presented to Mr. Sun Lihui, the brain and arms of CCCMC’s RBC team, a bottle of French 
champagne, and he told us that when such guidelines for the Chinese textile and garment 
industry were produced, “let’s celebrate it with a second bottle!”
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THE THIRD PILLAR
The collaboration between the OECD and Chinese businesses in the past three years has gone 
much further than developing guidance or standards. The most important development from 
codification has been how to operationalize and implement international RBC norms as well 
as the Chinese standards, with a focus on establishing remediation mechanisms - the third 
pillar of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 
The establishment of a RBC platform in China - something similar to the National 
Contact Points in the OECD countries - has been the centrepiece of the China-OECD collabo-
ration in the RBC area. Such a platform can serve as a knowledge and exchange hub, capacity 
building centre, initiative incubator and an alternative resolution mechanism for RBC dis-
putes, which is missing in China. The OECD RBC team first presented the idea to the leader-
ship of both CNTAC and CCCMC in 2015, which was well received, and was later included in 
the Joint Programme of Work for 2015-16 between the Chinese government and the OECD. 
In the following two years, CNTAC and CCCMC have explored ways to set the foun-
dation for the platform, including securing an independent and competent institution that 
can host the platform, while the OECD RBC team has voiced their support for the platform on 
various occasions. For some time, the concretion of the platform idea has encountered difficul-
ties and delays due to reasons at different levels, but both the OECD and the Chinese initiating 
organizations believe such a platform is crucial for the popularisation and implementation of 
RBC in China, especially for Chinese businesses investing around the globe. Currently, the 
OECD RBC team is working closely with CNTAC and CCCMC to solve legal and resource 
barriers for the initiation of the platform. 
Another significant action of the third pillar jointly taken by the OECD and Chinese 
businesses as well as international companies concerns the adverse impacts including child 
labour along global cobalt supply chains. As the first step to handle this huge challenge, 
CCCMC joined hands with the OECD and held a discussion meeting with companies of 
different sectors along the supply chain, which resulted in a set of principles guiding collec-
tive actions of the companies, including systemic remedial interventions in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. Being the chief advisor of CCCMC on this matter, I have witnessed how 
the remarkable network, expertise as well as diplomacy of the OECD RBC Unit have moved 
companies from different countries and sectors, big and small, to commit in joint actions for 
the same responsible end, and how such joint actions have finally evolved into an industrial 
RBC initiative, the Responsible Cobalt Initiative, first of its kind in the industry, as well as the 
first international responsible business organization originated from China with a legal entity 
and membership of international and Chinese companies. 
n LIANG XIAOHUI
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: A GLASS HALF FULL 103 n
REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE
There is a long way before China adheres to the OECD Guidelines. However, the political will 
of the Chinese government to learn from and exchange with the OECD, including in the area 
of RBC, is as clear and strong as the determination of the Chinese business. It shall be stressed 
that the “business case” of RBC is of fundamental importance for the Chinese government to 
step closer to the OECD standards. Hence, at least in the medium term, it is suggested that the 
OECD RBC Unit puts its focus on Chinese business, other than the public sector.
 To conclude, as put by a Chinese saying, “human effort is the decisive factor”, the 
future of the collaboration between China and the OECD on RBC is no doubt in the hands of 
people with a clear vision, strong belief, and good patience, with Mr. Roel Nieuwenkamp being 
an outstanding example. 
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The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the commitment of political leaders in Paris in 2015 for achieving a 1.5°C compatible world are especially relevant for India. We can safely assume that the (non) achievement of these goals and agree-ment in India will have implications and consequences globally, not just for India. 
Businesses role and responsibilities in (non)achievement of these global goals and Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs) is critical. This is particularly critical for multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), both from India and from the advanced countries operating in and/or 
sourcing from India. Responsible business conduct (RBC) and business sustainability con-
nects closely, and in various ways, with the day-to-day activities and operations of businesses 
anywhere in the world, including India, and with the ambitious global goals, targets and agree-
ments. Hence, RBC and businesses sustainability are no longer just optional, or an additional, 
extra features.
With US $2 trillion economy in 2017, some argue that India is expected to be world’s 
third largest economy by 20281. However, the World Bank’s Poverty and Shared Prosperity 
2016 report suggested that although over half the world’s poor live in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Indians accounts for one in three poor people worldwide. The largest number of people (224 
million) in India live under the international US$1.90-a day poverty line2. Also, while India's 
emissions are much lower than Western countries (and China), and only one-third of the 
global average in per capita terms, but with over 4.5 percent of global greenhouse gases (GHG) 
concentrations, India is among major emitters in absolute terms3. The Indian economy relies 
on coal for over 60 percent of its electricity generation, and fossil fuel continues to be vital in 
India's long-term energy strategy4.
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (the Guidelines) - with over 
40 years history and experience, aiming to guide the MNEs on RBC - are perceived and 
promoted as “the world’s most comprehensive multilateral agreement on business ethics”5. 
The Guidelines are fairly well established as and amongst the authoritative global corporate 
responsibility instruments. India, however, is not an OECD member, nor a signatory to the 
OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises of 1976 (MNE 
Declaration). Also, in OECD’s official terminology, India is referred to as a non-adhering 
country for the Guidelines. Nevertheless, with growth expectations and challenges illustrated 
above, now India matters…and its presence in OECD is both required and important – for the 
mutual benefit of both India and the OECD (and its members countries). William Antholis, 
a former White House and State Department official, argued in his book, “To manage the 
biggest challenges facing the planet, China and India must be at the table. Steering the world 
economy, combating poverty, slowing global warming, preventing nuclear war – these are big 
and hard problems. You cannot get there from here without going through these two giants”6.
The Indian connection in the local and global business landscape is hard to miss. 
The global economic, business and social situations have made a full 360 degree turn since 
the Guidelines were adopted in 1976. As the Western countries, led by the United States, 
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become increasingly inward-looking, emerging giants - India (and China) - are stepping up 
and assuming significant roles in the world order. The context in 1970s, in which the MNE 
Declaration and the Guidelines were developed and adopted – to legitimize MNEs and 
promote and protect the investment and investors from Western countries, aiming to enter 
the developing countries, from host countries’ potential national policy discrimination - has 
substantially changed over time. The developing countries then were keen on protecting their 
domestic policy turf7. Today India (and China) are championing multi-polarisation and eco-
nomic globalisation and challenging the US stand on increasing trade related tariffs. Global 
trade situations have much changed, including the outward foreign direct investment (FDI) 
from India (and from China), as well as the attitudes of Indian policymakers and political 
leadership towards foreign investors, investments and MNEs. The attitudes towards RBC 
too need rethinking - both in India and in the OECD world. With this note, I focus atten-
tion on outlining some opportunities, challenges and strategies for enhancing the engage-
ment with India on RBC by the OECD Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct 
(WPRBC). The OECD, through its Enhanced Engagement Programmes, is anyway keen to 
strengthen co-operation with India, with a view to a possible membership8. Below I set out the 
opportunities first.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE WPRBC TO ENHANCE ENGAGEMENT  
AND CO-OPERATION WITH INDIA ON RBC
Since the new government assumed power in 2014 elections, India’s foreign policy witnessed 
a paradigm shift. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s aggressive9 international diplomacy - 
referred by some commentators as Modi Doctrine10 - focuses mostly on India’s economic 
growth through promotion of trade and investment relations and economic cooperation. 
Increased focus on bilateral interactions for improving international relations, including for 
instance with Israel and countries in the middle east, much differentiates the current foreign 
policy regime from the past. Flagship programme such as ‘Make in India’ and policy reforms 
for India achieving higher ranking in the World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business’11 are all aimed 
at attracting foreign investors and MNEs.
 The desire of Indian political leaders to play roles in global governance too has grown 
substantially. India is now an important member of G20 - influencing the reshaping of the 
world order12. While seat in the United Nations (UN) Security Council and membership of the 
elite Nuclear Suppliers Group have been elusive for different reasons, however, Indian govern-
ment has been successful in securing India’s membership of the non-proliferation regimes - 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Wassenaar Arrangement in 2016 and 2017 
respectively13. Active role in the formation of BRICS bloc - the grouping of five major emerging 
economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) - is yet another example of India’s 
strong desire to play active role in global governance and its institutions. 
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In March 2017, India joined the International Energy Agency (IEA) as an Association country. 
The IEA stated “As India moves to the centre of global energy affairs, the new institutional 
ties with the IEA mark a critical addition to the IEA’s global outreach”14. At the Paris Summit 
in 2015, India and France jointly announced the International Solar Alliance (ISA15), an 
inter-governmental organisation under the UN Charter, aimed to accelerate the deployment of 
solar energy in 121 sun-rich countries situated between the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn, 
representing 73% of the world’s population. Prime Minister (PM) Modi and French President 
Emmanuel Macron launched ISA in March 2018 in New Delhi. ISA is considered to be one of 
the most promising coalitions to combat climate change and the first international organiza-
tion hosted in India, with its headquarter situated in Gurugram, in outskirts of New Delhi. 
The Alliance set a target of producing 1 trillion watts of solar power by 2030 and to achieve its 
objectives, the Alliance aims to implement financial instruments to mobilize over $1 trillion 
in solar energy investment by 203016. India pledged to fulfil at least 40 percent of its energy 
needs from renewable sources by 203017. Over the last few years, Indian policymakers have 
transitioned “from a protest voice on the fringes of global climate policy to one that is actively 
shaping international efforts to combat climate change”18. The growing population of India, 
once seen as ‘demographic disaster’, is now viewed as ‘demographic dividend19’. That makes 
India a huge market for consumption and growth20. However, the growing Indian middle class 
is expected to contribute to increased consumption and energy demands. The Indian policy-
makers and businesses will need to balance the associated sustainability challenges. 
The OECD monitors and understands India’s desire for a proactive role in global 
governance and has been working with Indian policymakers and other stakeholders over 
the years to support several initiatives of India21. The OECD in general, and the WPRBC and 
the Guidelines in particular, can support Indian policymakers and stakeholders in meeting 
the ambitions of balanced, sustainable and inclusive economic growth, help India deliver 
on the promises made in global platforms, as well as help secure roles in global governance. 
The OECD’s strong government linkages may be attractive for Indian policymakers, political 
leaders and stakeholders interest on international diplomacy. I outline some challenges for the 
WPRBC in the following section.
CHALLENGES FOR WPRBC TO ENHANCE ENGAGEMENT AND CO-OPERATION 
WITH INDIA ON RBC
The Guidelines can be considered a pioneer, inspiration for, and the mother of all corpo-
rate social responsibility (CSR)/RBC and business sustainability related Multi-Stakeholder 
Initiatives (MSIs) and transnational voluntary regulation (TVR) movement globally. Several 
MSIs and TVR instruments are supported by the governments of OECD member countries. 
However, the distinctiveness of the Guidelines remains and is further strengthened post the 
2011 Review. The periodic reviews and updates continue to keep the Guidelines relevant with 
changing times, structural changes in international business and FDI, and with geo-political 
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global developments. Further, with close coordination and alignment with the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), and launch of several sector guidelines, 
we can claim that among the major achievements of the Guidelines, has been meeting the 
promise of the 2011 Review – be comprehensive in scope and application and demonstrate 
the potential for a soft law to be as effective as hard law. The current Chair of the WPRBC, Dr. 
Roel Nieuwenkamp calls it “soft law with hard consequences”22. Dr. Nieuwenkamp has worked 
hard, since he assumed the Chair in 2011, and strengthened the operational mechanism and 
practices of the National Contact Points (NCPs). Besides, the NCPs also offer the necessary 
support to the implementation of other international instruments such as the International 
Labour Organization’s Declaration and the UNGPs. With the backing of the adhering country 
governments, an able steering by OECD Secretariat and the WPRBC, NCPs are expected to 
grow in esteem, experience, strength, and effectiveness over the coming years and reviews.
 As an implementation mechanism associated with voluntary guidelines, the NCP was 
a very smart idea. While NCPs complements and supports, but still differentiate the Guidelines 
from all other MSIs and TVR initiatives. Another major differentiation of the Guidelines, from 
other MSIs and TVR  initiatives, is the support and backing of the good offices of adhering 
country governments. Many MSIs and TVR initiatives, while supported by government (and 
by other stakeholders), nevertheless largely depend on the MNEs and the forces of the market 
for their uptake, effectiveness and impacts, which can be unreliable at times, depending upon 
the conditions of the market and individual firms. Hence, the legitimacy and credibility of 
MSIs and TVR initiatives is often in question, and they are both praised and criticized for 
several reasons, though recently there have been shriller voices towards latter23. The hopes 
and excitement around the potential of MSIs/TVR initiatives, generated during the incubation 
phase, seem to be waning and concerns around their fragmentation, independence, duplicity, 
lack of harmonization, costs, impacts, and business model raised24. Emerging scholarly and 
policy evidence demonstrates significant variations in forms, methods and nature of relations 
among the constituting and supporting actors, in procedural rules, and in their impacts and 
effects. Such evidences suggest that the MSIs/TVR are yet to take a coherent institutional 
form25, unlike the Guidelines and the NCPs.
 Additionally, most of the MSIs/TVR are targeted at the supply chains, usually in 
developing countries, with implications and consequences for supplier entities for non-com-
pliance. The liberal trade regimes have supported India’s economic rise and surge in the global 
Indian middle class. The Indian policymakers, industry and stakeholders have traditionally 
perceived such TVR as non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Largely influenced by its domestic politics, 
India’s core concerns, raised on several occasions at multilateral forums such as the World 
Trade Organisation, relate to the protection of its manufacturing entities, farm sector, food 
security and trade in services, and these concerns often place India at odds with developed 
countries26. However, it is important to note that the source of over sixty per cent of GDP is 
estimated to be the unregistered business units of India27. 
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Harriss-White offer interesting statistics and analysis, “Forty per cent of manufactured exports 
are produced in India’s gullies and alleys; just under half the economy is black, involving factor 
and property incomes that should be reported but are not and 90 per cent of all jobs are unreg-
istered and without work rights.28 In absolute terms, India has the largest casual labour force 
in the world. While between 40 and 80 per cent of the labour forces in the public and private 
corporate sectors are estimated to be subcontracted to private agents - in turn on casual, verbal 
contracts - the corporate sector employs well under half as many people as the non-corporate 
sector. In 2007, partial-equilibrium modelling led to the conclusion that it was the latter that 
was driving the growth of both GDP and livelihoods. While data updated to 2015 has not yet 
been used for cause-effect statements, it is known that, in manufacturing, about three quarters 
of the labour force is unregistered, a proportion that has been ‘remarkably constant’ since 
1995…it is unlisted firms and micro and small enterprises that are the engines of both growth 
and profit”29 in India. The Indian policymakers have the need to balance efforts to boost eco-
nomic development and growth (for jobs creation) along with sustainable and inclusiveness 
(to reduce inequalities). Usually, the agenda of economic development and growth takes prec-
edence over RBC and business sustainability issues.
The Indian policymakers view any interference in domestic affairs by foreign funded 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other foreign institutions, as efforts towards 
harming the economic interest of India30 and stalling the Indian economy.31  Historically, post 
the colonial experience, Indian political leaders have been cautious with foreign interventions 
and interferences and took pride in being self-reliant and self-sufficient, and therefore fol-
lowed a mixed economy model32, created the Non-Aligned Movement, and supported New 
International Economic Order33. Apparently, the experience of the failed UN Code of Conduct 
on Transnational Corporations, and the perceived role of the OECD in the failure of the UN 
led effort, with the MNE Declaration and the Guidelines, made Indian policymakers and 
leaders wary of the Guidelines.34 The investment-nexus of the Guidelines is about protecting 
the investors and the investment, and hence the stance of Indian policymakers on protecting 
their own industry, investors and investments may be seen at odds with OECD efforts on 
MNEs and supply chains related RBC.
Also, sustained and structural targeting of Indian manufacturers/suppliers on human 
rights and workers issues over the last few decades by certain international campaigning groups 
and NGOs, cause alarm among Indian policymakers, when thinking about the Guidelines. 
After a prolonged litigation on one such issue (between 2005-2008), involving a supplier of the 
Dutch brand and campaigning groups, Indian government banned the entry of certain Dutch 
professionals through a tightened visa regime.35 This case also contributed to the deterioration 
of diplomatic ties between India and the Netherlands36. While efforts made from both ends 
since, the bilateral ties are not fully normalised until now. The Indian CSR law (Section 135 of 
Companies Act 2013), differently focused on developmental issues, is driven by the needs of 
local challenges and politics, and enjoys widespread local political and stakeholder support. It 
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is hard to imagine if the Indian policymakers, while drafting the CSR mandate as part of the 
Companies Act Bill, were not conscious of the global underpinnings of CSR/RBC and business 
sustainability. The underlying message of the CSR Mandate - for firms and stakeholders in 
India, and beyond – could be read as: Indian policymakers are more concerned about what 
happens to the profits made by the firms, not how profits are made. This message is diametri-
cally opposite of the primary concern of the WPRBC, the Guidelines, the UN bodies, and most 
of the policymakers, thinkers and scholars globally vis-à-vis RBC and business sustainability. 
 Although, with ambitions for roles in global governance, commitments made glob-
ally on sustainability, as well as the growing Indian private sector, Indian policymakers will 
need to engage in serious thinking about RBC and business sustainability. The balanced views 
of the WPRBC on the Guidelines – on risk, due diligence, mediation, and disengagement from 
supply chains as a last-resort option37, and with multi-stakeholder based institutional imple-
mentation framework of NCPs - are well positioned to support the Indian policymakers and 
stakeholders on such issues.
 Appropriate engagement with the Indian policymakers and stakeholders by the 
WPRBC can bring better clarity about the Guidelines, and will surely help. Dr. Nieuwenkamp’s 
favourite cautionary tale from James Cameron’s movie Avatar38 indicates his passion for the 
Guidelines and is unique for creatively capturing the attention and imagination of businesses 
towards RBC. Such creativity is perhaps required for engagement with Indian policymakers 
and other stakeholders also to help them forge frameworks for RBC and business sustainability 
in a rapidly growing economy, amidst the global competition for resources and investments. 
Drawing from the opportunities and challenges discussed so far, I now turn to outlining some 
possible strategies for the WPRBC in the following section. 
STRATEGIES FOR WPRBC TO ENHANCE ENGAGEMENT AND CO-OPERATION 
WITH INDIA ON RBC
The ‘Active with India’ report developed by OECD in 2016 cover and highlights OECD engage-
ment with India on several issues.39 However, a review of this report suggest that barring few 
exceptions, most of the OECD engagement with the Indian government/officials seem to be 
in/at central level in New Delhi. PM Modi has been promoting and emphasising the idea of 
“Competitive Cooperative Federalism”.40  Given the size of India and need for growth across 
the country, there is encouragement, interest and growing policymaking capacity at the 
sub-national level – federal states/provinces and cities - for engagement in international rela-
tions and diplomatic issues, particularly with an aim to attract investments. Pant and Tewari 41 
argue that the state governments, rather than central government in India, are better equipped 
to plan and meet the challenges, and “to undertake diplomatic measures in areas of trade, 
commerce, foreign direct investment, education, cultural exchanges and also outsourcing of 
business”. Pant and Tewari42 developed the case for para-diplomacy in India by arguing that 
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the sub-national actors as formal legal personality “are necessarily more likely to engage in 
international activities designed to promote and protect local and international interests and 
prerogatives”. Pant and Tewari43 also suggest that there could be difference in positions of the 
central and state governments on various issues, due to ideological or political reasons, and 
that could stall or delay important decisions. 
William Antholis developed an "inside out" perspective on India (and China) and 
advised Western policymakers to engage not just with the political and stakeholder leaders’ 
in New Delhi (and Beijing) but also with leaders and stakeholders managing and adminis-
tering and influencing the country-sized provinces.44 Many of the local provincial leaders are 
regular participants at global forums. Antholis argue, when negotiating, it is important to 
recognize and appreciate that if national leaders are unwilling to move or sign agreements that 
may seem relatively straightforward to outsiders, perhaps “it may be not so much that China's 
or India's central leaders do not want to act. Rather, their greater concern may be that they do 
not have the power to act". Echoing same sentiments, Alyssa Ayres also argued, “India's vibrant 
democracy encompasses a vast array of parties who champion dizzyingly disparate policies.45 
And India isn't easily swayed by foreign influence; the country carefully guards its autonomy, 
in part because of its colonial past. For all of these reasons, India tends to move cautiously and 
deliberately in the international sphere”. However, with renewed foreign policy orientation, 
central government officials and leadership may in fact be happy with the WPRBC engaging 
with sub-national leaders and supporting with RBC and business sustainability as well as asso-
ciated investments in India.
Similarly, the WPRBC may consider encouraging the OECD’s institutional stake-
holders the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC), the Trade Union Advisory 
Committee (TUAC) and the global network of civil society organisations - OECD Watch) to 
increase their membership in India. Much like OECD, the BAIC too seem to have restricted 
itself to New Delhi based industry associations (Confederation of Indian Industry and 
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry). There are several strong regional 
and sectoral industry associations across India. They may be happy to engage and associate 
with BIAC and the OECD, and learn and promote RBC issues among their member compa-
nies. Also, OECD Watch membership of NGOs in India too seem to be limited currently to 
the friends of SOMO (Dutch NGO hosting the secretariat of OECD Watch). Thousands of 
NGOs in India may not be even aware of the OECD, the Guidelines and OECD Watch. A wider 
outreach by OECD Watch should be encouraged to increase and diversify its membership in 
India and adding new voices from India on RBC, the Guidelines and the NCP processes. 
Additional industry associations and chambers of commerce and industry (as 
members of BIAC), NGOs (as members of OECD Watch) and trade unions (as members of 
TUAC) from India may also be instrumental in generating wider awareness among business 
and stakeholders and influencing government policies vis-à-vis RBC and business sustaina-
bility issues in general and on the Guidelines in particular.
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 Eradication of poverty, economic growth, employment creation, full and productive 
employment, and equal pay for work of equal value are an important and integral part of the 
decent work for all agenda in the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Government 
of India, provincial leaders, and several other stakeholders have committed themselves to 
contributing to the achievement of these goals in India, and are in the process of setting up 
policies, infrastructure and awareness for the same. While strengthening the NCPs across the 
adhering countries, the WPRBC may consider identifying an appropriate NGO in India for 
leading on setting up of an independent, multi-stakeholder governed NCP. There is a big void 
in alternative forums for access to justice, remedy, and grievance mechanisms for millions 
of workers. The Indian judicial system is overburdened, and in some cases, difficult to access 
and overwhelming for many voiceless workers46. An independent NCP may serve the purpose 
and create wider awareness and positive environment for the Guidelines, besides supporting 
India’s march towards the SDGs.
 A broader focus on both the Indian businesses (large and small) and advance country 
MNEs operating and/or sourcing from India, and not just the supply chain entities, may also 
help spread the right message and allay the fears that the OECD is a ‘rich-men’s’ club, and 
interested only in safeguarding investments and investors of its members, and mitigating risks 
in their supply chains. The Indian domestic market itself is huge and trade is less than 40 
percent of the GDP, and that too substantial part of it is in services47. Focus only on the supply 
chains entails the danger of the Guidelines being perceived as NTBs - by the government, 
industry and other stakeholders in India.
 A wider outreach, contact campaigns and consultations for awareness on the 
Guidelines, and sector guidelines would also help. In 2015, the OECD in partnership with 
the Centre for Responsible Business (CRB) held a consultation48 in India on the OECD Due 
Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and 
High Risk Areas. This consultation led to generation of internal demand for the Guidelines in 
the gold industry in India49. 
CONCLUSION
There can be no arguments and debates on the issue that the whole world and the humanity will 
suffer the consequences of the lack of RBC and business sustainability. The regulatory capacity 
of the state is diminishing globally. Conventional institutions are overstretched almost every-
where to be able to regulate and monitor every activity of businesses. Self-driven and volun-
tary RBC and sustainability strategies and action of all enterprises are important, not just of 
MNEs. OECD should rethink and reconsider the ‘MNE’ and ‘investment-nexus’ in the next 
review phase of the Guidelines. Also, in the face of global challenges, the forward-looking 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Accord offer hope to the world. As a global 
and authoritative corporate responsibility instrument, with a unique implementation mech-
anism of NCPs, the Guidelines should be aligned with these commitments of global leaders 
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in the next review phase. Such an alignment will surely offer assurance to the global leaders, 
firms and stakeholders about the continued relevance of the Guidelines, and facilitate them to 
integrate into national policies and actions. 
 With the challenges and opportunities discussed earlier, and growing prominence 
and influence of India, it is evident that India - a country of the size of a subcontinent - need 
different and focused strategies for promotion and uptake of RBC and business sustainability. 
While diplomatic level efforts with central and provincial actors need to be intensified in India 
by OECD, WPRBC and other arms of OECD, the WPRBC should also identify relevant and 
strong non-state actors as partners in India to take the agenda of RBC and business sustain-
ability forward. CRB’s annual conference in November – India and Sustainability Standards: 
International Dialogues and Conference50 – offers a great neutral platform to the WPRBC and 
the OECD to plan wider outreach, contact campaigns and consultation with several stake-
holders at one place every year. Few other such platforms and institutions exist in India, which 
can also be leveraged by the WPRBC and the OECD, particularly for sectoral deepening of the 
Guidelines and the sister due diligence instruments. 
 A clear message about the changed and differentiating characters and defining fea-
tures of the Guidelines, its strengths, and relevance for India should be communicated to 
Indian policymakers, firms and stakeholders during focused national and regional level con-
venings. Such convening initiatives will help spread the message that the Guidelines, unlike 
several other MSIs and TRVs, is not just about mitigating risks in supply chains, but its deeply 
concerned with India, and the development, growth, and sustainability there; supply chain 
aspect is indeed there in the Guidelines, but that applies to all business entities, including the 
suppliers of supplier entities - RBC in the Guidelines is about behaviour and actions of all firms 
in India, as globally.
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LOOKING BACK: HOW THE OECD GUIDELINES HAVE ADVANCED CORPORATE 
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines, or Guidelines) are 
the oldest and only multilaterally agreed code of responsible business conduct (RBC) that 
governments have committed to promoting. These recommendations by governments to 
multinational enterprises encourage corporate accountability and responsibility through 
transparency, as do the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Standards (GRI Standards). The 
similarities and areas of strategic collaboration between the two instruments are multiple.
 The Guidelines, which govern economic, social and environmental issues, are designed 
to be relevant at the global level and to reflect multi-stakeholder inputs, and are intended for 
voluntary use. GRI offers a reporting framework based on normative principles that are fully 
compatible with those expressed in the OECD Guidelines. At their inception, the Guidelines 
included a reporting recommendation, a very progressive measure for the time. And, as early 
as 2005, the OECD Guidelines referenced the use of the GRI Guidelines – the instrument 
that would later become the GRI Standards. The OECD Guidelines apply to all sectors of the 
economy: small and medium sized enterprises are also encouraged to observe the recommen-
dations. The GRI Standards are also designed for use by all organizations regardless of their 
type, size, sector or location, including in the non-for profit and public sectors.
 Throughout five revisions, the OECD Guidelines have continuously adjusted to global 
changes while advancing the RBC agenda. They have expanded to reflect the growing scope of 
corporate responsibility, considering both positive and negative business impacts on society. 
The OECD Guidelines have evolved to address substantive areas with respect to business ethics 
and have been aligned with major global instruments.
 There are several examples of the functional alignment and strategic fit between the 
OECD Guidelines and the GRI Standards. For instance, GRI was invited to every open session 
organized by the OECD (for example, the annual forum) and was heavily consulted for the 
2011 revision. In addition, the OECD Secretariat was invited and actively participated in the 
GRI Government Advisory Group from its beginning in 2008. The OECD members were 
Carolyn Irvin, Director Investment, and Roel Nieuwenkamp, Chair of the OECD Working 
Party on RBC. This reflects, on the one hand, the fit between reporting guidelines and norma-
tive guidance and, on the other, the synergy between the global corporate network of GRI and 
the governmental network of the OECD.
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The National Contact Points
 The OECD Guidelines are the only corporate responsibility instrument with a proper built-in 
grievance mechanism, known as National Contact Points (NCPs), and all adherents to the 
OECD Guidelines are required to set up their own. These act as a forum for discussion for all 
matters relating to the OECD Guidelines and contribute to the resolution of issues that arise 
relating to their implementation by governments. The purpose of NCPs is to ensure the effec-
tiveness of the OECD Guidelines by undertaking promotional activities, handling complaints 
and enquiries and contributing to the resolution of specific issues that arise. 
 The role of NCPs was clearly strengthened during the last update of the OECD 
Guidelines in 2011. From that point on, they function as a stronger grievance mechanism for 
both business and human rights issues. In its input to the OECD Investment Committee, GRI 
committed to provide information, generic support and advice to the NCPs regarding the GRI 
Standards and the role that this framework could play in promoting and facilitating the effec-
tive use of the OECD Guidelines.
LOOKING AROUND: THE DRAMATIC CHANGE IN THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
The Rio+20 Conference
The main objectives of the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro, 
also known as Rio+20, was to secure renewed political commitment for sustainable devel-
opment, assess the progress to date and the remaining gaps in the implementation of the 
outcomes of the previous summits, and address emerging challenges. A significant outcome 
was the agreement to launch a government-led process to create a set of universal Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) that would become the international framework for stakeholders 
to better target and monitor progress on sustainable development.
 During the formal roundtable on the Green Economy, GRI presented a proposal for 
the Rio+20 Conference to adopt a policy framework on sustainability reporting. This frame-
work would be based on the “report or explain” approach to sustainability reporting, and 
envisioned a significant role for policy and an outcome recommending soft and flexible regu-
lation. Such an approach would be flexible enough that businesses would be best able to decide 
whether to report or explain why if they do not. It would also give governments flexibility in 
policy implementation. The result would be more information about the sustainability perfor-
mance of organizations becoming available worldwide, enabling organizations to manage and 
improve their own sustainability performance.
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 As a result, Paragraph 47 of the Rio text opened the door for policy and regula-
tion on reporting. The Paragraph recognises that corporate sustainability reporting is truly 
global, and that governments should both support and stimulate reporting. During the Rio 
Conference, a group of leading governments joined together in support of Paragraph 47 of the 
Rio+20 outcome document “The Future We Want.” Brazil, Denmark, France and South Africa 
formed the “Group of Friends of Paragraph 47” to advance corporate sustainability reporting 
and invited GRI and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) to support the 
group as its Secretariat.
The SDGs as the new sustainable development framework 
 The UN 2030 Agenda resulted from the convergence of two separate processes: the Millennium 
Development Goals track and the sustainable development track. The former dealt primarily 
with social development, and had poverty eradication as its primary objective, while the latter 
was introduced into the discussions during the first Rio Summit in 1992. Input from both 
tracks was brought together in the context of the post-2015 process to form a transformative 
development agenda – the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which called for a new 
approach based on a number of principles guiding its implementation – the SDGs.
 The SDGs embrace a universal approach to sustainable development. They establish 
a more active role for the private sector in global development, both in delivery, as well as 
financing and building partnerships (Goal 17). They call on business to innovate, to address 
development challenges, and recognize the need for governments to encourage sustainability 
reporting. To align with the SDGs, businesses need to incorporate the goals not only into their 
strategic planning and business development plans, but also in every activity across the supply 
chains.
 In practice, RBC is not widely associated with the SDGs, as the former is generally 
seen as a compliance issue, rather than a comprehensive way for the private sector to contribute 
to the SDGs. Discussion has mostly centered on new business and financing models, social 
impact investing and entrepreneurship. This way of looking at the subject fails to take into 
account that RBC goes beyond compliance. For example, the stated purposed of the OECD 
Guidelines is to “encourage the positive contributions that businesses can make to economic, 
environmental and social progress and to minimize the difficulties to which business opera-
tions may give rise.”
 The link between RBC and the SDGs should ultimately be made at all levels. 
Implementation of RBC principles and standards, like the OECD Guidelines and the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, can be a transformative, albeit still 
underused means for businesses to interact with the SDGs and maximize their contribution. 
Some businesses are using RBC as a baseline for their SDG contribution, but there is a need to 
scale up these practices. 
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The role of the private sector in advancing sustainable development
 RBC is vital to promote sustainable trade and investment across supply chains. Under the 
OECD Guidelines, both businesses and the responsible investment community are encour-
aged to engage in risk mitigation to promote inclusive growth and development. The SDGs 
have a similar purpose, as they aim to provide a bold global development agenda and frame-
work for economic growth that protects humanity and the planet. Both are a call for action for 
all actors in society to take shared responsibility for a better future – with the private sector 
leading the way.
 GRI and its Sustainability Standards can be the bridge between businesses and gov-
ernments, enabling them to make positive contributions to the SDGs. Business and govern-
ment leaders may agree with international principles, but little can be accomplished without 
guidance to best implement them. GRI helps organizations to align big picture, principle-based 
approaches with the reality of data-driven reporting. As such, GRI champions a strong role for 
the private sector in the development of the SDGs and is mobilizing businesses to understand and 
contribute towards making them a reality. GRI also engages with investors to use finance as a tool 
to promote better business behaviour. Our work ultimately empowers the sustainable decision- 
making needed to achieve the SDGs.
 As private sector actors increasingly engage with the SDGs, they reduce negative 
impact to the environment and society – while increasing positive impact by developing inno-
vative solutions:
 n  Businesses need to approach the SDGs with a “do no harm” attitude, 
to minimize and/or avoid negative impacts. They can use due diligence 
to avoid pursuing actions that can cause harm to the public or the 
environment and should directly address adverse impacts. Private sector 
actors can consider the business risks related to each goal and adjust their 
conduct accordingly to avoid doing harm and undermining the SDGs.
 n  The SDGs indicate market gaps, development needs and investment 
priorities. The issues addressed in the SDGs provide a roadmap for 
businesses to seek opportunities, develop solutions, and manage risks. 
They also provide a vision for sustainable, long-term growth. According to 
the Better Business, Better World report, developed by GRI and the United 
Nations Global Compact, achieving the SDGs opens up US$12 trillion of 
market opportunities for the private sector, and could create 380 million 
new jobs by 2030. The SDGs offer a compelling growth strategy and open 
up new market opportunities that private sector actors can seize.
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LOOKING FORWARD: TOWARDS A BETTER ALIGNMENT  
OF THE OECD GUIDELINES
Due diligence in the light of the business proactive sustainability agenda
 This is a pivotal moment for sustainability. Transparency has become embedded in how busi-
ness is conducted: carrying out due diligence to address negative impacts is now a part of 
doing business. The OECD has always played an essential role in providing guidance on due 
diligence – explaining what businesses are expected to do while considering the particularities 
of their supply chains.
 The OECD Guidelines call on businesses to conduct due diligence on their opera-
tions and throughout their supply chains to identify, prevent and mitigate actual or potential 
adverse impacts and account for how negative impacts are addressed. Some leading companies 
are building on their supply chain due diligence to articulate their SDG contributions by, for 
example, identifying materials risks in the supply chain and connecting them to the SDGs on 
an operational level.
 One salient example of this is how operations related to mineral supply chains or the 
extractive sector have contributed to redefining risks and impacts across industry sectors and 
global supply chains.
 The link between responsible sourcing and human rights issues largely entered the 
global dialogue via the violence and human rights infringements associated with sourcing 
conflict minerals – tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold (grouped as 3TG) – in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). Following the OECD’s Due Diligence framework, regulatory efforts 
such as the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the EU 
Conflict Minerals Regulation (to be enforced in 2021), and a multitude of other initiatives and 
assurance schemes, have demonstrated the importance of the topic to a variety of stakeholders, 
as well as the need for better quality reporting on the topic.
 In view of increasing attention to the adverse social impacts of mineral and metals 
sourcing, GRI, in partnership with the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI), has embarked 
on a project to develop advanced resources for reporting on mineral and metals sourcing 
impacts and due diligence that builds on and accompanies not only the GRI Standards, but 
also the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains from Conflict-
Affected and High Risk Areas.
 However, the topic of responsible sourcing warrants a broader definition beyond 
3TG from the DRC. This is demonstrated by the wide focus of the OECD’s Due Diligence 
Guidance and the multitude of sourcing related conflicts around the world. Adverse impacts 
result from mining 3TG in other regions or other minerals and metals in the same region; 
importantly, the sustainability impacts associated with mining cobalt, mica, gold, and gems 
in Africa, Asia, and South America are gaining more attention from stakeholders – including 
regulators, civil society organizations and investors. Through the disclosures on due diligence 
related aspects, GRI encourages the shift to a more holistic approach that addresses the global 
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risks of business impacts on society and the planet. Broadening the scope of human rights in 
the OECD Guidelines reflects that a business’ operations and supply chain are intertwined 
with social positive and negative impacts.
The OECD as a catalyzer for innovation: disclosure for enhanced responsible  
business conduct
Due diligence sets the basic conditions and baseline for businesses to “do no harm.” More 
importantly, while carrying out due diligence assessment, businesses are also able to identify 
opportunities to “do better.” It is therefore essential to guide companies carrying out their due 
diligence process towards identifying opportunities to contribute to sustainable development. 
The idea behind such progress is to envision transparency as a tool to further enhance RBC.
 The OECD can act as an incubator of responsible business innovation. The Guidelines 
and their revisions are a useful tool to innovate and create a facilitating policy environment. 
They are a vehicle to enhance corporate sustainability and reporting policies in the OECD 
countries.
 Through the sustainability reporting process, companies select the challenges and 
risks that are most relevant to them and incorporate them into their strategy with the goal to 
acknowledge, avoid and mitigate real and potential negative impacts. This results in greater 
transparency of information, which enables better decision-making by organisations. It also 
helps to communicate how companies assess and manage their non-financial risks and ulti-
mately helps to build trust in the marketplace.
 The rigor of sustainability reporting, through the use of clear methodologies, is 
crucial to foster responsible conduct among businesses. All private sector actors should have 
immediate access to relevant information that is concise, consistent, current and comparable 
– i.e., decision-useful. The GRI Standards are already used by a wide range of organisations all 
around the world to communicate information that matters to them and their key stakeholders.
 Sustainability reporting should be considered a useful tool to assess impacts, current 
and potential, as well as a driver for improving performances on RBC. GRI encourages to 
further refer to the use of disclosure and sustainability reporting in the OECD Guidelines.
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INTRODUCTION
Since their adoption in September 2015 by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have led to two main strands in the literature and prac-
tice-oriented debates. One asks how companies can contribute to implementing the SDGs as 
a way to contribute value to society through doing good1,2. Concerned with ‘SDG-washing’, a 
second and more critical strand voiced by company leaders, international economic organisa-
tions such as the OECD practice-oriented experts3 and scholars4,5 warns that contributing to the 
SDGs cannot justify deviating from the ‘do-no-harm’ approach that has spurred much theory 
and practice on responsible business conduct (RBC). Concern has been raised that economic 
actors’ shift of focus from not doing harm onto SDG interventions aiming to do good may occur 
without adequate assessment of potential risks of adverse impacts. Concern has also been voiced 
that companies may engage in ‘cherry-picking’ rather than contribute to needs that are contex-
tually relevant and salient. Recently, the CEO of the Global Compact has joined these voices, 
highlighting the need for companies to consider the full spectrum of their impacts and continue 
paying attention to the Global Compact Principles and the UN Guiding Principles (UNGPs) 
on Business and Human Rights.6 Among the various calls for a comprehensive approach to the 
SDGs this is perhaps the most striking. It re-introduces an emphasis on not doing harm after 
the UN Global Compact Office since 2015 has focused much of its commu-
nication through its website (which is the initiative’s main communication 
channel) to the SDGs and the emphasis of SDGs on business opportunities 
for innovation and contributions to doing good. 
These views indicate a need for methods and guidance for combining the 
moral imperative to do no harm with the ‘do good’ approach that informs 
the SDGs and in particular SDG 17. Whereas SDGs 1-16 concern a range 
of public policy objectives and are addressed to states, SDG 17 is addressed 
to business enterprises.7 It calls upon them to contribute to the implemen-
tation of SDGs 1-16 in support of governments and create value for society 
through their knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources. Target 67 under SDG 
17 makes explicit reference to the UNGPs as a foundation for a dynamic and well-functioning 
business sector that does not cause harm. Hence, the connection between the SDGs and 
RBC is already present in principle. But the concerns noted above indicate that it needs to be 
operationalised. 
 Given the practice of the OECD to issue guidance for economic actors in regard to 
RBC in accordance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines) and 
the policy support its work in the field enjoys, the OECD is well placed to develop guidance for 
implementing the SDGs in a manner that does not cause harm. As this short piece describes, 
this may also offer opportunities to help companies identify SDG interventions that are con-
textually relevant. As outlined below, this may be done through a comprehensive approach to 
risk-based due diligence (DD), a practice that is prescribed by the Guidelines. The main lines 
of such an approach are set out in here and can be elaborated through a multi-stakeholder 
process towards a guidance instrument.
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RISK-BASED DUE DILIGENCE AND BUSINESS CONTRIBUTIONS  
TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC GOODS
The SDGs and debates on their implementation complement two theory-currents related to 
RBC: business-and-human-rights (BHR) and political corporate social responsibility (PCSR). 
While BHR scholarship emphasises that companies should avoid causing harm, the PCSR lit-
erature takes its cue from the capacity of business to contribute to society by complementing 
governments in the delivery of public goods. 
 Originating with the 2008 UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework (UN 2008, 
‘Framework’), risk-based DD was elaborated by the UNGPs and adopted by the OECD through 
its 2011 revision of the Guidelines, extending DD beyond human rights to several other RBC 
issues. Motivated by a pragmatic aim of reaching a normative product likely to be adopted, 
the Framework and the UNGPs adopt a ‘do-no-harm’ focus and offer risk-based DD for firms 
to identify, prevent, mitigate, account for and remedy their adverse human rights impacts.8 
The construction of risk-based DD is a significant contribution to recent year’s RBC literature 
and practical guidance.
 Pre-empting the SDGs, some scholars have been arguing for increased emphasis on 
how business enterprises may contribute to the fulfilment of human rights9,10 and delivering 
public goods in a more general sense11,12. PCSR scholars have advanced the latter argument, 
based on the theory’s argument that companies should help fill governance gaps in various 
ways. Based on an idea of companies thereby assuming roles that are technically governmental 
(or ‘political’), PSCR theory has, however, been argued to be lacking in practical operation-
ability for companies to identify social needs and act where governments fail13,14. From this 
perspective, the SDGs can offer direction, especially if companies apply themselves to using 
their strength to help advance needs related to SDG 1-16 that arise due to lack of governmental 
activity or presence. However, risks remain that companies may cause or contribute to harm as 
they aim to do good. Studies demonstrate that businesses can contribute to human-rights-re-
lated social needs and policy objectives, such as education and health services, but the human 
rights relevance is rarely explicated.
 Many SDGs relate to human rights of a socio-economic nature (such as food, educa-
tion, health services, non-discrimination, employment, working conditions (SDGs 2-6, 8) and 
the provision of related public goods. Some SDGs may spur increased activities that are known 
for causing human rights risk (for example land and community rights in the agricultural 
industry for non-carbon-based energy (SDG 7)). 
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IDENTIFYING OPPORTUNITIES FOR DOING GOOD WHILE MANAGING RISKS 
OF CAUSING HARM 
Human-rights impact-assessment is a core element of risk-based DD, according to the 
Guidelines. As explained in the following, companies can benefit from this to identify human-
rights-related needs, which they can turn into action to help fulfill human rights. The risk-
based DD process includes complementary actions of assessing actual and potential human 
rights impacts in context, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and 
communicating how impacts are addressed. The process should involve meaningful consulta-
tion with potentially affected groups and other relevant stakeholders, taking into account the 
nature and context of the operation. Interestingly, social-impact-assessment theory finds that 
broad stakeholder consultation helps identify adverse impact as well as potential benefits of an 
operation, such as local needs that can be addressed.15 
 Consistent with the UNGPs, the Guidelines prescribe that when a company identifies 
a risk of contributing to an adverse impact (for example in its supply chain), it should use its 
leverage (influence) to require or stimulate changed practices with business partners or gov-
ernments to which the company is directly linked through its operations, product or services.
 The fulfilment of human rights and provision of public goods can be affected by insti-
tutional defects. These may be addressed by training and capacity building based on systems 
that companies have in place, or are able to develop in innovative collaboration with local 
companies, authorities or experts. This applies for example to occupational health and safety 
(OHS) and related work-place training, or local administrative capacity to deliver and dis-
tribute socio-economic and other human rights in non-discriminatory fashions. Building 
OHS capacity can contribute to fulfilling rights to health, at the same time increasing up-times 
and production and lowering health-related expenses for the individual, the community and 
governments. Building administrative capacity with local authorities can contribute to indi-
viduals gaining access to public goods without discrimination, in line with the fundamental 
idea that human rights be enjoyed without distinction of any kind, such as race, gender, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
 To identify such opportunities, companies can extend DD with a dual focus: from a 
process to identify and manage potential or actual harm, into also identifying societal needs to 
be translated into business potential for SDG contributions. Obtaining a broad understanding 
of societal needs allows the company to maximise the resources it already invests in the DD 
process. The assessment may identify contextual problems that cause or may enhance human 
rights risks. Considering context and the dynamic character of societal risks can enable the 
company to identify governance gaps that are within its capacity to address, possibly in collab-
oration with experts (consistent with the Guidelines). Once potential SDG-contributions have 
been identified, an impact assessment of planned activities should be made to ensure that no 
human rights risks are caused, and to adapt the activities if required. 
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 Consider the following examples: reacting to deficient OHS practices in the supply 
chain need not be limited to leverage addressing business relations. It could be turned into 
training programmes for extended audiences, such as sectoral clusters in the community. 
Assessment of risks of causing adverse health impacts through emission of product-redun-
dancies into fresh-water sources may find local processes for rinsing water deficient, or that 
wells are simply lacking. These problems can raise the company’s own human rights¬ risks 
because access to water is already precarious. The company can help build knowledge with 
communities, local companies and authorities of appropriate filter processes, complemented 
by capacity building for measurements and maintenance and the planning and establishments 
of wells.
 The dually focused DD process constitutes a continuum with three connected focal 
points, leading to a new similar continuum: at one end are societal risks that the company 
may cause or contribute to. These must be addressed directly. In the middle, adverse impacts 
that the company is linked to through operations, services or products of its business rela-
tions. These require the company to exercise leverage with private or public actors, whether 
acting in economic or governance capacities. Finally, human-rights-needs non-related to the 
company but potentially within its capacity and contextual strength, offering potential SDG 
contributions. The ‘do-good’ element of the continuum connects back to the ‘do-no-harm’ 
element through an assessment of human-rights-risks of proposed contributions, leading to a 
new process assessing risks of causing or contributing; business-relations-related risks that call 
for leverage; and SDG-opportunities.
CONCLUSION
This short piece has shared some thoughts on how the Guidelines may help companies nav-
igate the risk of SDG-washing by ensuring that their SDG-efforts are both meaningful to 
society and do not cause harm. In regard to business contributions to the SDGs, it has been 
argued that companies should take point of departure in institutional and governance gaps 
that constitute risks of adverse societal impacts, and proceed on that basis to help address 
the gaps. Comprehensive engagement with the Guidelines’ risk-based DD approach can help 
companies not only identify and manage risk of adverse impacts, but also identify potential 
ways in which they may contribute to society and ensure that such interventions, in turn, are 
designed in a manner so as not to cause harm. 
 Developing guidance for this may provide opportunities for the OECD, in collab-
oration with UN human rights experts, to advance the contributions of the Guidelines in a 
manner that complements the SDGs while ensuring respect for other key instruments on RBC, 
not least the UNGPs.
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 The Guidelines (Chapter V) already cover companies’ contributions to local employ-
ment and capacity building. Extending guidance to include a dual DD perspective offers 
opportunities to further combine the Guidelines’ ‘do-no-harm’ and ‘do-good’ objectives. As 
identifying contextual risks is already part of DD, expanding the focus to a contextual needs-as-
sessment can help generate more value for the company as well as society. Contributing to han-
dling governance gaps and societal needs may even help the company manage risks of adverse 
impacts. The brevity of this chapter does not do justice to the complexity and inter-connected-
ness of such actions, but future OECD guidance may do so.
n KARIN BUHMANN
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: A GLASS HALF FULL 133 n
NOTES 
1.  Chakravorti, B. (2016), The Inclusive Innovators: 10 questions, 20 business leaders, 17 
sustainable development goals, Tufts University, Boston.
2.  O’Connor, D., Mackie, J., van Esveld, D., Kim, H.. Scholz, I. and Weitz, N. (2016) 
“Universality, integration, and policy coherence for sustainable development: Early 
SDG implementation in selected OECD countries”, working paper, World Resources 
Institute, August 2016.
3.  Shift, Danish Institute for Human Rights, Institute for Human Rights and Business, 
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, Oxfam and ICAR (2017) An open letter 
to United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres and United Nations Private 
Sector Forum 2017 Participants, 13 September 2017.
4.  Ruggie, John G. (2016), “Making Globalization work for all: Achieving the SDGs 
through business respect for Human Rights”, www.shiftproject.org/resources/view-
points/globalization-sustainable-development-goals-business-respect-human-rights/  
(accessed 10 March 2018).
5.  Gupta, J. and Vegeling, C. (2016) “Sustainable development goals and inclusive devel-
opment”, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 16(3) 
433-448.
6.  Kingo, L. (2018) Executive Update: How to Put Human Rights at the Heart of Your 
Business: Four Key Steps. UN Global Compact newsletter March 2018.
7.  Para. 1 of the SDG resolution (A/RES/70/1) states: ‘We, the Heads of State and 
Government and High Representatives, meeting at United Nations Headquarters in 
New York from 25 to 27 September 2015 as the Organization celebrates its seventieth 
anniversary, have decided today on new global Sustainable Development Goals.’ 
Throughout the SDG resolution, ‘we’ therefore refers to these Heads of State, etc. This 
applies to all commitments in paras. 2-58, and therefore to SDG 1-17. SDG 17 (on states’ 
commitment to develop Global Partnerships, and activities through which these can 
contribute) refers to ‘partnerships’, including multi-stakeholder partnerships involving 
the private sector, civil society etc. The means of implementation set out in paras. 60-62 
refer to the role of the private sector etc. as part of the Global Partnership for imple-
menting the other SDGs (that is, SDGs 1-16).
8.  Ruggie, J.G. (2013), Just business, Norton, Boston.
9.  Wettstein, Florian (2012) CSR and the debate on Business and Human Rights: Bridging 
the Great Divide, Business Ethics Quarterly 22(4) 739-77.
10.  Kolstad, I. (2012), “Human rights and positive corporate duties: the importance of 
corporate–state interaction”, Business Ethics: A European Review, 21(3) 276-285.
11.  Frynas, J.G. and Stephens, S. (2015), “Political Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Reviewing Theories and Setting New Agendas”. International Journal of Management 
Reviews, 17(4) 483–509.
KARIN BUHMANN n
n 134 OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: A GLASS HALF FULL
12.  Scherer, A.G., Rasche, A., Palazzo, G. and Spicer, A. (2016), “Managing for Political 
Corporate Social Responsibility: New Challenges and Directions for PCSR 2.0”, Journal 
of Management Studies, 53(3) 273-298.
13.  Baur, D. and Arenas, D. (2014), “The value of Unregulated Business-NGO Interaction: A 
deliberative perspective”, Business & Society, 53(2) 157–186.
14.  Edwards, P. and Willmott, H. (2008), “Corporate citizenship: Rise or demise of a 
myth?”, Academy of Management Review, 33(3)771–773.
15.  Greenwood, M. (2007), “Stakeholder engagement: beyond the myth of Corporate Social 
Responsibility”, Journal of Business Ethics, 74(4) 315-327.
n KARIN BUHMANN
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: A GLASS HALF FULL 135 n
Professor of International Business, 
RSM Erasmus University Rotterdam
Bottoms up? 
OECD Guidelines  
and the race to the bottom 
or to the top
n 136 OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: A GLASS HALF FULL
INTRODUCTION: A RACE TO THE BOTTOM OR A RACE TO THE TOP?
The international regulation on the (un)sustainable behavior of Multinational Enterprises 
(MNEs) has advanced along two ambitions:
 [1]  Prevent a race to the bottom: setting minimum standards on sustaina-
bility and due diligence procedures to check on their implementation by 
(multinational) enterprises. In ethical terms these standards are princi-
ple-based and aimed primarily at “avoid doing harm”. 
 [2]  Stimulate a race to the top: setting joint ambitions on sustainability to 
stimulate companies (jointly with other stakeholders) to “do good”. These 
approaches are more ‘process” and ‘goal based’ and less ‘norm based”.1
 Assessing the effectiveness of each of these approaches, first of all, requires a basic 
understanding of the international context in which initiatives for sustainable corporate activ-
ities (can) develop. What looked like an undisputed trend towards higher degrees of ‘globaliza-
tion’ and global convergence in regulation - strongly influenced by the activities of MNEs - has 
over the past decades become more ambiguous and volatile. The American Military College 
introduced a term for this context: a VUCA world – one in which Volatility, Uncertainty, 
Complexity and Ambiguity prevail. This new reality also increasingly defines the conditions 
under which any approach towards regulating the behavior of MNEs can be considered to be 
effective. The result of this particular chain of events has been that the number of ‘risks’ MNEs 
have to address in their strategies has seriously increased. In a sample of 70 leading MNEs for 
instance we counted a twofold increase in risk categories disclosure over the 2002-2012 period. 
From 7 to 15 identified risks; of which ‘sustainability’ issues have become identified as a risk as 
well as a risk-mitigation factor.2 
 MNEs that are serious about implementing sustainability take – in an increasingly 
challenging international arena – have two basic approached at their disposal:
 (1)  A relatively reactive approach in which companies abide by international 
voluntary regulation such as the OECD Guidelines on MNEs (OECD 
Guidelines, or Guidelines) or the Ruggie Principles (UNGPHR).  
Most of these rules are aimed at the basic principle of ‘do no harm’ and  
at limiting reputational and other risk factors that are related to their 
international activities.  
 (2)  Take a more strategic and (pro) active approach beyond legal and moral 
obligations in their home as well as (some) host bases and set up new  
rules of the game – often together with other stakeholders - that con-
tribute to the (global) ‘common good’. 
n ROB VAN TULDER
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: A GLASS HALF FULL 137 n
Table 1.  Spaces for Strategy formulation and implementation by MNEs
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT AIMED AT….
Preventing race to the 
bottom [negative duty]
Stimulating race to the top 
[positive duty]
MNE STRATEGY 
AIMED AT…
Avoid  
doing harm  
[rights &  
principles]
Reactive:  
risk of tactical 
considerations and  
liability orientation
Initiatives:  
OECD Guidelines  
(early iterations); Base 
Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS)
Active-reactive:  
risk of adverse selection 
and risk aversion strategies; 
ticking boxes exercises
Initiatives  
ISO 26000; GRI3+4; 
UNGPHR; OECD 
Guidelines (post 2011)
Doing good 
[responsibilities  
& intentions]
Reactive-active:  
risk of SDG or blue-
washing (in case no  
due diligence exists)
Initiatives:  
GRI1+2; Paris Climate 
Agreement; Global 
Compact; publish  
what you pay
Pro-active:  
create joint goals, ambitions 
and hyper norms 
Initiatives:  
Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs); sectoral 
coalitions (WBCSD; WEF)
INTERACTION EFFECTS
The interaction between corporate strategies and regulatory initiatives creates a variety of oper-
ating spaces (Table 1). Operating in each space involves different tactical and strategic moti-
vations for MNEs. The proactive space, in particular, provides what Donaldson and Dunfee3 
call the ‘moral free space’ for internationally operating companies. Their social contract theory 
talks about hyper norms, in which companies might (actively or proactively) go beyond what 
has been agreed upon by governments in laws and international treaties to reap a competitive 
advantage based on ‘positive duties’. International norms always represent a compromise or 
have a voluntary status that is difficult to implement. In the reactive space, companies have to 
deal with negative duties and ‘rights’ as elaborated in many of the international treaties. The 
rights-approach is very much related to reactive motives of persons, companies, and countries, 
whereas the responsibilities-approach makes room for active and even proactive motives.
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 The rights-and-negative duties approach has been universally accepted through the 
adoption of various versions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (first version in 
1948). But such an approach has also been argued to have limited effect on the life of people 
and the actual operation of companies.4 It proves difficult to enforce rights in an internation-
ally competitive environment and prevent a ‘race to the bottom’. Many observers still con-
sider the implementation of these measures at best as ‘patchy’.5 An example of the problematic 
effectiveness of initiatives aimed at preventing a race to the bottom in core areas of economic 
regulation are the efforts on tax rates. The OECD’s BEPS initiative concentrates on tax avoid-
ance strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low 
or no-tax locations. But this practice only addresses part of the root causes of the global race to 
the (tax) bottom. According to World Bank data, corporate taxes globally still decreased from 
54% in 2005 to 41% in 2016.
THE OECD GUIDELINES RAISED THE NEGATIVE BOTTOM LINE
The OECD Guidelines provide a more interesting step forward in preventing a race to the 
bottom. It took a long time though – and various iterations since their inception in 1976. 
Nieuwenkamp characterizes them as ‘soft law with hard consequences’.6 Recently, the imple-
mentation and strengthening process of National Contact Points (NCPs) has gained some 
momentum, which prompts Nieuwenkamp to consider the glass as “half full’.7  The scientific 
discourse on the effectiveness of the Guidelines, presents a comparable (mixed) picture. Using 
Scopus as a source, we can see that first generations of the OECD Guidelines, got hardly noticed 
in the scientific discourse (Figure 1). But since the mid-1990s the number of scientific papers 
that referred to the Guidelines grew exponentially. In earlier phase the OECD Guidelines 
were used as a check on the introduction of codes of conduct with MNEs.8 Later on they have 
been widely used as reference point of collaborative governance9 as part of ethics research10, 
as example of the struggle for corporate accountability11 or also (still) as an approach ‘for lack 
of anything better’.12  Slowly some research is maturing on the working of the NCPs, but pri-
marily from a legal point of view.13 
 A recurring question remains, therefore, how to make ‘open norms’ - related to 
‘avoiding harm’ - effectively change the behavior of the MNEs. Kun14 concludes that the effec-
tive operationalization of open norms is not necessarily predetermined by the given legal form 
(hard or soft) but by a number of factors such as clarity and legal infrastructure surrounding 
the norm. Perhaps more interestingly, Kun concludes that an open norm will have greater 
chance of operationalization and implementation if it has ‘some kind of a business case in 
addition to its function of moral suasion’.15  
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Figure 1. Scientific publications including the OECD Guidelines
THE OECD GUIDELINES ALSO TRIGGERED ANOTHER BOTTOM LINE
A negative duty approach never suffices to define the sustainability ‘business case’ nor can 
it stimulate a race to the top.  The ‘openness’ of the norm needs to be complemented by a 
clear and positive goal. This is the realm of alternatives based on a responsibilities-and-positive 
duties approach. At a global scale, positive duty/responsibility approaches have only recently 
been initiated. The experience of the OECD Guidelines triggered these efforts in two respects: 
(i) the Guidelines showed the limitations of a ‘negative duty’ approach, in particular the lim-
itations of the use of NCPs and complaint mechanisms in creating positive change; and (ii) 
the Guidelines also created a more principled bottom line for the international discourse. 
Noticeable was the introduction in 1999 by a group of opinion leaders under the auspices of 
UNESCO of a draft ‘declaration of human duties and responsibilities’.  
 ‘Multi-stakeholder initiatives’ were initiated in which representatives of civil society, 
firms and governments participated – and in which mostly the Guidelines were taken as 
starting point. Some of these initiatives remain largely voluntary such as the ISO 26000 guide-
lines. The transition from Global Reporting Initiatives from a general framework (GRI1+2) 
to a more specific framework with a higher degree of materiality (GRI3+4) also illustrates 
that some organizations were able to raise the bar beyond the OECD Guidelines and help 
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stakeholders (including NGOs and sometimes governments) to developed more process ori-
ented frameworks. The conclusion of the SDGs in September 2015 highlight the most recent 
and most all-encompassing type of approach: it defines a positive agenda for change (with 17 
targets) and invites companies, NGOs, governments and knowledge institutes to work together 
on this common agenda. This effort is aimed at creating convergence in ambitions (for the year 
2030). Whether this can be achieved depends on the mobilizing effect this ambition has on 
stakeholders around the world. The SDGs have also prompted – or reinforced - a number of 
other initiatives aimed at creating a race to the top. It reinforced for instance the effort of the 
World Business Council on Sustainable Development). It also prompted initiatives like the 
Business and Sustainable Development Commission – part of the World Economic Forum. 
In January 2016, leaders from business, finance, civil society, labor and international organ-
izations discussed the business case for realizing the SDGs. They concluded that “achieving 
the SDGs opens up US12 trillion dollar of market opportunities in the four economic systems 
examined by the Commission, (…) which are food and agriculture, cities, energy and mate-
rials, and health and well-being. They represent around 60 percent of the real economy and are 
critical to delivering the SDGs”.16  
CONCLUSION: BOTTOMS UP?
Did the introduction of the OECD Guidelines stop the “race to the bottom” through better 
behavior of MNEs? One can certainly argue that the OECD Guidelines have had an effect on 
most of the ‘Western’ MNEs. But in the 40 years of existence, the Guidelines have also been 
struggling more with a new breed of MNEs from emerging markets like China, Russia and 
India. They and their countries have not really been supportive of the Guidelines (no NCPs 
for instance).17 Furthermore, it is increasingly realized that a ‘negative duty’ approach to cor-
porate responsibility issues does not suffice in particular because it does not provide a positive 
impetus to ‘do good’.  
 On a more positive note however, we can also argue that the OECD Guidelines 
created a solid ‘bottom’ for the race to the top. Abiding to the basic idea of the Guidelines in 
the international discourse has become the ‘new normal’. So the Guidelines created a ‘defense 
mechanism’ for those companies that wanted to proceed farther and faster than other com-
panies. Even when the Guidelines were not implemented fully, companies felt more free to 
proceed and try to move ‘beyond compliance’ and ‘avoid doing harm’.18 The danger of ‘SDG 
washing’ looms however – using the SDGs by some companies to market their position con-
tribution to some SDGs while ignoring their negative impact on others. Nieuwenkamp19 sees 
this danger and argues correctly: “ultimately, companies should do their due diligence on all 
SDGs to avoid undermining these goals. This is the essential baseline. Just think about what 
not having child labor in the supply chains would mean for the SDGs. A focus on managing 
the negative impacts on the SDGs is most urgent. This approach, taken together with the focus 
and positive impacts on certain SDGs, is a recipe for businesses to maximize their contribution 
to the SDGs.” 
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 These are exiting as well as confusing (VUCA) times. MNEs have to decide what type 
of principles they adopt for their operations and whether they consider rights and responsibil-
ities a trade-off, a dilemma or something else. If they see this as an opportunity, they are more 
pro-actively motivated. There are plenty of MNEs that are convinced of the opportunities 
related to making the SDGs work.20 If MNEs, however, engage in international developments 
primarily with a risk-management strategy, they will probably only be concerned with liabili-
ties and rights as covered by laws, international treaties and voluntary guidelines. The OECD 
Guidelines remain the guarantee – weakly enforced as they may be – that the SDGs’ effort 
will not fall prey to ‘adverse selection’ and SDG washing effects - the participation in name 
of companies that are not serious about really implementing the SDGs. The Guidelines are 
actually the only guarantee that the ‘bottom’ will not be reframed as the ‘ceiling’ of sustainable 
development – otherwise the SDGs will not be achieved as well. A worthy cause.
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BACKGROUND
The goal of this short recall is to narrate an important development which occurred in 2013 
around the time of the First Global Forum on Responsible Business Conduct (RBC) held at the 
OECD in Paris. It was my first international conference that focused on the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines) and that’s where I met Roel Nieuwenkamp the first time.
 In preparation of the conference, I read the programme and related documentation 
and took note of the following. The participants that were listed in the programme repre-
sented the main stakeholders from governments, business (Business and Industry Advisory 
Committee to the OECD (BIAC)), Trade Unions (Trade Union Advisory Committee to the 
OECD (TUAC)), and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (OECD Watch, a global 
network of civil society organisations). 
 I was impressed by the presence of the four key stakeholders but was also curious to 
know whether other stakeholders were part of the OECD’s process on RBC.  I subsequently 
consulted the website of the OECD on RBC and found out that under the heading “other impor-
tant partners” also listed the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights; UN Global 
Compact; the International Labour Organisation; the International Coordinating Committee 
on National Human Rights Institutions; the Global Reporting Initiative; the International 
Organisation for Standardization; and the UN Economic and Social Commission of Asia and 
the Pacific (ESCAP).1  
 The representation looked very inclusive and participatory except, I, however, did not 
discern an adequate number of academic speakers who were not at the same time also members 
of any of the stakeholders listed above. After all, the same webpage mentioned above states: 
The true intent and purpose of the Guidelines can only be realised through collaborative and 
multi-stakeholder action. Adhering governments engage with stakeholders in different ways in 
the implementation of the Guidelines. On a national level, many of these interactions are chan-
nelled through NCPs. On an international level, business, trade unions, civil and other partners 
regularly interact with the OECD. (emphasis added by author)
 In view of the importance of the Guidelines and its many impressive years of exist-
ence, I realised that “independent and neutral” academic stakeholders - I thought they might 
be subsumed under “other partners” – were actually missing. Academic partners could add 
useful analytical perspectives, broaden the discussions and provide suggestions for further 
development of the Guidelines that would not be co-opted by the positional interests of the 
various other official stakeholders.  More importantly, academic partners could be the impor-
tant transmitters in getting the words out to the future generations of business people and 
members at large of societies who might be affected by the Guidelines.
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 Some of the academic speakers listed then and in subsequent Global Forum pro-
grammes are either members of National Contact Points (NCPS), consultants to governments 
in charge of NCPs, or work for BIAC, TUAC or OECD Watch. Hence, I concluded that adding 
academic participants which are not affiliated with any of the main stakeholder groups could 
be useful for the OECD RBC dialogue process.
EMERGING ACADEMIC NETWORK
Seeking to get feedback on my idea, I approached Roel Nieuwenkamp during the 2013 Global 
Forum and subsequently discussed my idea during bilateral meetings that same year while I 
was in Paris teaching at Sciences Po in their Master of Public Affairs Programme. 
 I quickly sensed commonality of views between myself and Roel and an interest to 
turn the idea into practice. While acting as chair of the OECD Working Party on RBC, Roel 
also continued to teach as part-time Professor of Public Administration at the University of 
Amsterdam. Having held important jobs in government, in business and in academe, Roel 
agreed that giving space for academic reflections and discussion could be beneficial for the 
implementation and further development of the Guidelines.
 Roel was interested in several potential avenues of academic activities related to the 
OECD Guidelines such as mapping corporate social responsibility (CSR) on a global level and 
comparing CSR with the Guidelines. We also talked about comparisons between the other 
related instruments like the UN Guiding Principles on Human Rights (UNGPs), the ILO 
Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 
and the UN Global Compact and its 10 Principles. 
 Our discussions continued during the 2014 Global Forum and resulted in us pro-
viding related information about our idea to create an academic circle on an informal basis. 
We went through re-naming the group from Academic Circle, to Academic Friends and on to 
Academic Network. As a first step, we established a list of academics who expressed interest in 
joining our network. We started with 37 and are now at 57 members of the network. Members 
also include John Ruggie, Karl Sauvant, Lisa Sachs and other academics located in different 
parts of the world. 
NETWORK TAKING SHAPE
In 2015, we moved towards organising phone conferences with the membership of one-hour 
duration. Barbara Bijelic, Legal Expert in the RBC of the Investment Division, Directorate for 
Financial and Enterprise Affairs at the OECD worked with Roel and helped us set up the phone 
conferences for keeping the membership à jour and provided us with very useful suggestions 
as to how we could proceed with our network.
RAYMOND SANER n
n 146 OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: A GLASS HALF FULL
 The phone conferences were organised according to the following structure. Roel 
would give an update on the latest developments concerning the Guidelines including nar-
ration of latest case examples and news from various NCPs.  Participants were subsequently 
informed of plans that we wanted to suggest to them, for instance, organising informal meet-
ings during the Global Forum in Paris or during the annual meeting of the UN Business and 
Human Rights meeting in Geneva. And at the end of the phone conference, I would open the 
floor for questions and comments coming from the membership of the academic network. 
 In 2016, we put out a call for abstracts for papers in the lead up to the 40-year anni-
versary of the Guidelines suggesting that accepted papers may be discussed or presented at the 
2016 OECD Global Forum on RBC. Potential ideas for papers are copied below. Participants 
were also encouraged to propose additional research topics. 
 n  What can we learn from the 40-year history of the development of 
the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises since their introduction 
in 1976? What did they deliver and what should the next 40 years 
bring? What is the impact of the co-existence of the Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, the Global Compact and the UNGPs? Do 
business, government or civil society groups “go shopping” when 
deciding on which framework to use?  If so, what are the expected 
advantages/disadvantages of using either or the other for the  
different actors?
 n  What are the trends and impacts of RBC and the Guidelines in trade  
and investment agreements?  
 n  What impacts have NCPs’ final statements brought for companies (for 
example commercial consequences to business (positive or negative), 
impacts to access to benefits and services (for example through export 
credits, investment promotion), reputational consequences?
 n  What submission criteria and standard of proof should NCPs require 
given that the objective of the mechanism is to promote dialogue and 
implementation of the Guidelines? How is this reflected in practice and 
how does it compare to other systems?
 n  How can NCPs be strengthened with regard to their role of providing 
access to remedy for human rights and environmental damages? 
 n  How are the core criteria of NCPs (visibility, accessibility, transparency 
and accountability) reflected in their handling of specific instances? 
 n  What has driven or dissuaded companies from engaging in the specific 
instance procedure of the NCPs? 
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 n  How do governments themselves perform against the expectations 
of the Guidelines  (for example in terms of environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) reporting, procurement, due diligence for RBC)?
 n  What role should the Guidelines and the NCP mechanism play in the 
following contexts and how have they been applied in practice with  
regard to:  
• modern slavery/ human trafficking in supply chains
•  conflict minerals other than tin, tantalum, tungsten  
and gold (for example precious stones, coal, jade, et cetera.) 
•  labour conditions and human rights abuses related to mega 
sports events
• human rights and labour standards in the fisheries industry
• internet freedom/ privacy related issues
• climate change related RBC risks
•  encouraging enabling sectors such as the financial sector 
to ‘enable’ RBC in other sectors
 n  Where do the current gaps lie with regard to the Guidelines? 
 Some of the abstracts were well written and the authors were encouraged to write 
papers that could be presented during the 40-year anniversary conference scheduled to be held 
in December 2016 in Paris and some of the presenters accepted the call for written papers to 
be included in a book jointly edited by Nicola Bonucci (OECD), Catherine Kessedjian (ILA- 
International Law Association) and Laurence Ravillon (SFDI- Société française pour le droit 
international). This book will be presented during the coming Global Forum in June 2018.
CURRENT PROJECT OUTLOOK
It was difficult for Roel to participate in the creation of the academic circle since he held at the 
same time the chair of the Working Group on RBC and needed to keep a distance between 
the new informal academic group and his position at the OECD. Nevertheless, we were able 
to organise conference calls and met during the Global Forum in Paris and I was also able to 
organise a side-event during the annual conference in Geneva on Business and Human Rights 
in November 2015.  
 It was nevertheless clear that we needed to find a university which would be interested, 
willing and able to host the secretariat for the Academic Network. We could not continue 
counting on the OECD Secretariat to support us which would have meant putting undue work 
pressure on the OECD Secretariat.  In any case, a distance needed to be established between 
the Academic Network and the OECD itself for integrity sake.
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 Roel and I searched for candidate universities in the USA and in Europe and got initial 
indications of interest.  But at the final end, committed offers to take on the responsibility 
to provide resources and competent leadership came from two Dutch Universities namely 
Nyenrode Business Universiteit and Erasmus University Rotterdam.  Colleagues representing 
both Dutch universities finally concluded that Erasmus University Rotterdam under the guid-
ance of Martijn Scheltema, Professor of Law, will establish the secretariat of the Academic 
Network around the Global Forum in June 2018 which will also coincide with the stepping 
down of Roel as Chair of the Working Party on RBC. 
IN CLOSING 
I am happy that a solution could be found that will ensure the continuity of the Academic 
Network and also provide the opportunity to make our network more formal and more per-
forming on a regular basis. The new start will also help us all to provide a continuity to what 
Roel and myself were able to initiate and to go beyond what has been achieved so far.
 I cherished the opportunity to collaborate with Roel. He was an inspiration and a very 
reliable colleague always ready to respond wherever in the world his professional assignments 
took him. Throughout the period 2014-2017, I could also count on Roel to provide inputs to 
conferences that I either organised or co-organised which had a link to the OECD Guidelines 
such as the conference on Business Diplomacy at Windesheim, Netherlands in 2014,2 the bian-
nual conference on negotiations in Paris in (2016)3 and in the Colloquium on Living Wage at 
the University of Geneva, 2017.4  
 We both agree that more work needs to be done in regard to the development of sec-
tor-specific standards, ensuring complementarity with the other guiding principle documents, 
strengthening the functioning of the NCPs, improving dissemination of the Guidelines in the 
wider public and deepening the link to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.
I wish Roel continued success in his diplomatic career and thank him for all the great contribu-
tions that he was able to make while being Chair of the Working Party on RBC and thank him 
for letting us know that he will remain available in the future for eventual advise and support 
to our Academic Network. 
n RAYMOND SANER
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1.  http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/partners-stakeholders.htm 
2.  R. Saner, L, Yiu (2014) “Business Diplomacy Competence: A Requirement for 
Implementing the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, The Hague Journal 
of Diplomacy, 9 (2014) 311-333.
3.  Most NCP activities are based on negotiations and hence competence in conducting 
bilateral and plurilaterial negotiations are required to find mutually beneficial solution. 
Roel gave insightful examples of how negotiations were crucial for NCP mediation 
processes.
4.  Living Wage is a policy that goes beyond Minimum Wage and is crucial for future 
relations between employers’ associations and labour unions, all the presentations 
are available at: www.csend.org/conferences-and-forum/labour/467-a-colloqui-
um-on-is-a-living-wage-bad-for-the-economy?highlight=WyJsaXZpbmciLCJ3YWdlIi-
wibGl2aW5nIHdhZ2UiXQ
RAYMOND SANER n
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As Roel Nieuwenkamp steps down from his role as the first 
Chair of the OECD Working Party on Responsible Business 
Conduct, this Liber Amicorum pays tribute to his many years 
of work on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 
It compiles testimonies from academics close to him who are 
also engaged in efforts to promote responsible business conduct.
